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The phenomenon of Eurocommunism, especially as practiced
by the Communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain, is a
direct threat to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and a
serious challenge to the power, prestige, and legitimacy of
the CPSU itself. This research represents an analysis of
the validity of the Eurocommunist shift away from Moscow's
influence, the impact of the "Eurocommunist model" upon the
ruling Communist parties, and the responses the West may
expect from the Soviet bloc in the future. Using not only
Western sources, but also the pronouncements of the Communist
parties in the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and others, this
study reveals a wide variety of reaction from behind the
"Iron Curtain." However, given the current political reali-
ties, the West may most likely expect the eventual expulsion
of the Eurocommunist parties from the international Communist
movement and a simultaneous Soviet-led repression of dissent
and "revisionism" within its sphere of influence, perhaps
rendering a fatal blow to East/West detente.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There have been only two European conferences of
Communist parties. The first was held in Karlovy Vary,
Czechoslovakia, in April 1967; the second was held in East
Berlin in June 1976. By the time the Karlovy Vary conference
convened, the unity of European communism was already frac-
tured, owing to the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet con-
flict and the "revisionist" attitudes of several Communist
parties in Western Europe. The conference itself was boy-
cotted by the Albanian, Dutch, Icelandic, Norwegian, Yugoslav,
and Romanian parties and the Swedish party chose to attend
simply as observers. When the conference ended, however,
all of those in attendance unanimously accepted a final
document, largely drafted at the one preparatory meeting,
which called for continued efforts to exploit detente and
expressed the traditional unqualified acceptance of the CPSU
as the unchallenged and unchallengable leader of the
international Communist movement.
Nine years later in East Berlin, the second European
conference of Communist parties was called to order.
Originally suggested by the West German, Hungarian, and
Bulgarian Communist parties in late 1973, the conference was
made possible only after years of preparatory meetings.
When the conference actually took place in June 1976,
twenty-nine East and West European Communist parties attended;
only the isolationist Icelanders and the intransigent Alban-
ians absented themselves. The conference lasted two days
and the final document, which took over a year and a half
to work out, was not even signed. Whatever had remained of
the "monolithic unity" of international Communism was formally
buried at the East Berlin Conference. "Proletarian inter-
nationalism" was not even mentioned in the final document
nor was any special status accorded the CPSU or the USSR.
Ritual references to Marxism-Leninism were deleted as was
the traditional notion that Communism was the natural and
only leader of all "progressive forces." The Berlin docu-
ment stressed instead that each Communist party would adhere
to the principles of equality and sovereign independence,
non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the
free choice of different roads in the struggle for social
change and for socialism. Soviet prestige was badly damaged
and the CPSU's leadership of the international Communist
movement was not only challenged but was dismissed as an
inoperative and obsolete concept.
It is highly unlikely that any world or pan-European
conference of Communist parties will take place in the
foreseeable future. In his assessment of the Berlin Con-
ference, reported in 1 ' Humanite ' on 2 July 1976, the French
Communist Party leader, Georges Marchais, noted: "In our
delegation's speech we submitted the idea that in the future
conferences like this will undoubtedly no longer meet the
needs of the time," A similar statement by the Executive
Committee of the British Communist Party, reported in
Morning Star on 12 July 1976, commented: "Last month's
conference in Berlin and the preparations for it, indicated
that some methods utilized hitherto in the international
Communist movement were no longer appropriate."
The political force which has received the greatest
share of credit (or blame, depending upon one's ideological
perspective) for these developments is something known as
"Eurocommunism." Over the last several years, this term
has come to mean many things to many people and as a politi-
cal concept it has suffered from misuse, abuse, and misrepre-
sentation. Given the impact and importance of the Eurocommunist
phenomenon, it is imperative that this issue be brought into
clearer focus. Only through an objective and accurate under-
standing of this concept and its impact upon the international
scene can Western decision-makers design and implement
rational, responsive, and realistic policies that serve
their national interests and international responsibilities.
The "Eurocommunist" issue is large and complex. Given
the constraints of time and space, this study addresses
only the following three issues:
A. Who and what are the Eurocommunists and does their
apparent political shift represent merely a tactical, short-
term move or a more permanent, strategic doctrinal evolution?
B, What have been the demonstrable ramifications and
impacts of the "Eurocommunists" upon the Communist party
regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and how
have these regimes chosen to respond to the Eurocommunist
phenomenon?
C. Give the ever-widening distance between the
"Eurocommunists" and the regimes in the East, what are the
most likely responses or sets of responses that Western
policy-makers can anticipate from the Soviet bloc nations
in the future?
This research represents not only an attempt to inte-
grate what has been written about Eurocommunism in Western
journalistic and academic circles but also that which has
found expression in the media, policy pronouncements, and
political decisions within Eastern Europe and the USSR.
The author is highly indebted to the staff at the Hoover
Library at Stanford University and also to Dr. Jiri Valenta
and Dr. David P. Burke, two outstanding scholars and professors
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
Without their invaluable and selfless assistance, this
research effort would have been a virtually impossible task.
It is sincerely hoped that this study will stimulate
further interest in this vital issue so that Western policy-
makers will be able to base their decisions upon accurate,
current, unbiased, comprehensive, and meaningful information.
II. EUROCOMMUNISM - WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Of the myriad of issues which have been piling up on
the policy desks inside the walls of the Kremlin, Euro-
communism is certainly one of the most critical for the
Soviet leadership. Other important problems requiring the
constant attention of the Soviet elite certainly exist, but
few are as potentially destabilizing or explosive as the
phenomenon of Eurocommunism. For example, Sino-Soviet
relations have not improved, as had been hoped, since the
death of Mao. But Sino-Soviet relation, ' ave seldom been
good and the Chinese threat to Soviet pov-er is currently
minimal. The USSR is also faced with corruption, ineffi-
ciency, and waste in her social and economic systems, but
such problems have beset the Soviet state since its founding
in 1917, and the Soviet leadership has grown accustomed to
dealing with them, although they are most reluctant to admit
this fact in public fora. SALT negotiations and the ramifica-
tions of detente continue to absorb th' attention of the Soviet
elite, but these issues, too, have been around for years and
will continue to be areas of vital concern for as lrng as
the USSR and the USA face each other as superpower adversaries
on the international scene. Even the much-publicized prob-
lem of internal dissent within the USSR is merely a reoccuring
problem that threat, initimidation, expulsion, and incarcer-
ation have largely managed to control. Eurocommunism,
10
however, is a relatively new political force and a poten-
tially damaging challenge to the Soviet leadership and the
CPSU. It is also apparent, judging from the range of the
reactions that have come from the Kremlin within recent
months, that the Soviet leadership is not only concerned
about Eurocommunism, but has also been unwilling or unable
to develop a clear and consistent policy with which to deal
effectively with this new political phenomenon.
What is this thing called "Eurocommunism" that is causing
such a sensation in the journalistic, academic, and govern-
mental circles of the world? What is meant by the term and
to whom does it , or should it, apply? The word itself
implies that one should look to Europe for the answers to
these and other related questions, yet much contemporary
literature on the subject suggests that to limit one's atten-
tion to simply the European continent is to miss a great deal
of what the term embraces in its entirety. The point is
merely this; to date, no one has been able to crystallize
a definition of Eurocommunism that both defines the word in
specific, meaningful terms and that also satisfies the
journalistic, academic and political whims of those who
wish to write and speak about it. Because of this world-
wide semantic failure, the term "Eurocommunism" has come to
mean many different things to many different people; it
has been abused, misused, misinterpreted, and unfortunately,
almost destroyed as a viable political concept. Before one
11
can begin to assess the "Eurocommunist" impact upon such
things as Western democracy, NATO, Eastern Europe, or the
Soviet leadership of an international Communist movement,
one must know what "Eurocommunism" is, and what it is not.'
To do this, to retrieve "Eurocommunism" from the never-never
land of nebulous concepts to which it has been gradually,
yet effectively, condemned, it is imperative that one turn
one's attention to the area of and actors in that part of
the world which spawned the original concept — the land mass
of Western Europe and the Communist parties that are to be
found there.
It should come as a surprise to no one that there are
active Communist parties in every Western European nation.
All of these parties have been operating in their respec-
tive nations since the early 1930' s and, since the Spanish
government lifted the 38-year-old ban on the Spanish Communist
Party (PCE) on 10 April 1977, all of these parties are legal.
The following chart, assembled from data presented in
Staar ' s 1976 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs
should give the reader a general idea of the relative size,
strength, and electoral impact of each of these Communist
1parties.
Richard Staar, 1976 Yearbook on International Communist






AUSTRIA 25,000 - "3a 1.2% - 1975
BELGIUM 10,000 - .1% 3.2% - 1974
DENMARK 8,000 - .15% 4.2% - 1975
FINLAND 48,000 - 1.0% 19.0% - .975
FRANCE 500,000 - .9% 21.0% - 1973
GREAT BRITAIN 29,000 - .5% 0.5% - 1974
GREECE 27,500 - 0%. 3.6% - 1974
ICELAND 2,500 - 1.0% 18.0% - 1974
IRELAND 300 - .08% 0.0% - 1973
LUXEMBOURG 500 - .1% 10.4% - 1974
NETHERLANDS 10,000 - .07% 4.5% - 1972
NORWAY 2,500 - .06% 1.0% - 1973
PORTUGAL 50,000 - . 6 % 12.0% - 1975
SWEDEN 17,000 - 09- 5.3% - 1973
SWITZERLAND 6,000 - .01% 2.5% - 1975
WEST BERLIN 8,000 - 1.9% - 1975
WEST GERMANY 40,000 - .06% 0.3% - 1972
ITALY 1,700,000 - 3.0% 27.0% - 1972
SPAIN 100,000 _ • 3 x>
2This figure represents estimated membership only, based
upon data presented in a report in Christian Science Monitor ,
11 April 1977, p. 26.
13
The graphic below, published in early 1976 in The
Economist
,
also illustrates the relative electoral positions
of the various Western European Communist parties and, in
addition, provides an indication of how many parliamentary
seats are currently held by these Communist parties. 3
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Several interesting points can be made through an analysis
of these data. First, although the majority of these parties
have grown somewhat since 1975, it is apparent that these
Communist parties carry an electoral clout far in excess of
their respective membership figures. Throughout Western
The Economist, 3 January 1976, pp. 32-33
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Europe in recent elections, the 2~- million communist party
members have managed to attract over 25 million votes, a
10 to 1 ratio. Additionally, it is fascinating to discover
that the current world-wide debate concerning Western Euro-
pean communism has been generated by the activities of a
political force representing only 0.7% of the entire Western
European population in membership and only around 7% of
the entire Western European electorate in popular votes.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, over 92% of the
communist party members in Western Europe are to be found in
only three countries: Italy — 68%, France — 20%, and Spain -
4%. Communist party membership in the remainder of the
Western European countries totals less than 800,000 — a
mere 0.1% of this particular population group.
Much political power is currently held by the Italian
(PCI) and French (PCF) Communist parties and, since its
recent legalization, many observers predict a strong elec-
toral showing by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) as well.
The PCI is considered to be only a matter of years away
from assuming a parliamentary majority on the national level
and the PCF, in concert with the French Socialists, appears
to be headed for a parliamentary majority in the national
elections of 1978.
Assuming the "Euro" in Eurocommunism is not a misnomer,
an assumption this author would hold to be valid, what set
of political principles or ideological concepts does this
term denote? Indeed, does "Eurocommunism" exist as an
15
independent political movement and, if so, how should it
be defined?
Many experts, especially in the Western nations, claim
Eurocommunism to be a new ideology and a new political
movement of world-wide relevance and impact; as a new
communism which maintains some of its original aims while
accepting the basic tents of pluralistic democracy and the
parliamentary system as essential in strategic and not just
4in tactical terms. Other observers hold Eurocommunism to
be simply a term for describing some of the policies put
forward, on some occasions, by some communist parties in
Western Europe, Japan, and other areas of the world. Still
others would assert that Eurocommunism is but a political
charade that speaks of democracy and pluralism only in the
future tense, insofar as it concerns a hypothetical advance
to power on the part of its proponents. Behind this liberal
mask, the old undemocratic, unwaveringly pro-Soviet face
still remains.
East of the "Iron Curtain" Eurocommunism has been
assessed and defined in a totally different manner. First
4Arrigo Levi, "Eurocommunism: A Foot in the Door or




Michael Leeden, "Eurocommunism Exposed," The New
Republic (26 March 1977), p. 14.
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Secretary Todor Zhivkov of the Bulgarian Communist Party
has called Eurocommunism simply a "new kind of anti-commun-
7ism" and the Bulgarian party organ, Rabotnichesko delo, has
demanded that Eurocommunism be "unmasked as anti-Marxist"
8
since its purpose is to "deny real socialism in the USSR."
The Hungarian press has portrayed Eurocommunism as "a product
of bourgeois propaganda which is no socialist alternative"
9
and as such is simply "fiction." Finally, in December
1976, Vadim Zagladin, a prominent Soviet Central Committee
member, described Eurocommunism as a term "invented by the
Americans, particularly Zbigniew Brezezinski , " and stated
that it was aimed at "breaking the unitary front of the
10international communist movement with an anti-Soviet aim."
Within the Eurocommunist movement itself there are
varying definitions of the term. For example, Jean Kanapa
of the PCF's Politburo considers the term imprecise and at
times too suggestive. Yet, Kanapa uses the term because it
7
Belgrade NIN , No. 1355, 26 December 1976, as reported by
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) , Daily




Tarsadalmi Szemle , February 1977, as reported by FBIS,
Daily Report, Eastern Europe (25 February 1977), p. F-4.
NOTE : Due to time constraints, and in the interests of
brevity and clarity, subsequent footnotes citing the daily
reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service will
contain simply the following annotation — (FBIS) . This
should allow the reader to discern that a FBIS translation
was used and not the original document or publication.
L'Espresso , 26 December 1976, (FBIS).
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is a convenient shorthand for "several communist parties in
industrialized nations which, though in different situations,
have had the feeling of being confronted with fundamentally
common problems, so that they have come up with similar
answers, thereby outlining a socialist perspective which
is strongly marked by a common concern for democracy."
As should be obvious from the foregoing, there is little
consensus regarding the meaning of this term. While many
of the above definitions, and others, could probably be
supported adequately by data, the truth lies somewhere in-
between. A thorough examination of the available evidence
has led this author to believe that the following definition
of Eurocommunism is a fair, accurate, and objective one that
could be readily accepted by virtually all seriously interested
students of the Eurocommunist phenomenon.
First, the term "Eurocommunism" itself was coined, not
by any particular communist party, but rather by the Western
media in an attempt to conceptualize the emergence of a more
moderate, democratic, and less revolutionary tendency in
world communism. Specifically, the term refers to the out-
look of the Italian Communist Party as it developed under
the tutelage of its leaders, Gramsci, Togliatti, and Belinguer;
but it also encompasses the outlook of other Western European
Jan F. Triska, "Diversity in Unity: Eurocommunism and
the Soviet Union," Paper presented at the Conference on
Soviet-American Relations in the 1970' s at the Kennan




parties — primarily those of France and Spain — which have
recently adopted several features of the PCI's ideological
12
and political approach. The PCI is, without a doubt, the
consensus leader of this "movement," and the PCE is certainly
the most anti-Soviet of the three. Other communist parties
have, at various times and on particular issues, made signi-
ficant contributions to the "spirit" of Eurocommunism yet
the main thrust of this new political approach remains clearly
in the hands of the PCI, PCF, and the PCE. Some of the other
contributors have been the communist parties of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Iceland, Holland, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, and even Japan and Australia; a situation
which might suggest that Eurocommunism is actually a world-
wide trend in the international communist movement which
finds its greatest expression in the developed non-communist
nations. As will be covered in more detail later, there is
also evidence to suggest that the communist parties of
Romania, and Yugoslavia, plus certain segments of the ruling
elites in other Eastern European countries, also are sympa-
thetic to and at times supportive of the Eurocommunist '
s
political initiatives. Despite its growing international
significance and global appeal — factors which have blurred
the term's definition — Eurocommunism remains primarily a
12Charles Gati, "The Europeanization of Communism,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 3 (April 1977), p. 541.
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Western European phenomenon focusing specifically upon the
party platforms and political activities of the communist
parties of Italy, France, and Spain, although not applicable
to the still pro-Soviet parties such as the Portuguese and
Luxenbourg CP's. These three parties are the largest, the
most vocal, and the most politically successful communist
parties on the Western European land mass and it is in this
area where the first dramatic impacts of Eurocommunism will
be felt.
There appear to be at least three basic, interrelated
propositions which underpin the Eurocommunist ideological
platform and which set Eurocommunism apart as an independent,
viable, and unique political concept. Charles Gati's dis-
cussion of these ideological positions is probably the best
to date. First, the Eurocommunists persistently demand that
each party be free to apply the teachings of Marxism-Leninism
according to national needs and circumstances. This, of
course, is tantamount to rejecting the universal validity
of the Soviet "model" and experience and to denying any
leading role of the CPSU in the international communist
movement. Second, the Eurocommunists disavow any desire to
obtain a monopoly of power, thus rejecting the concept of
the "dictatorship of the proletariat." They claim, instead,
their committment to Western democratic and parliamentary
traditions, pluralism, human and civil rights, and the
various "freedoms" currently enjoyed within the Western
political systems. Third, the Eurocommunists maintain an
20
interest in and an insistence upon the creation of a broadly
based coalition of political forces to seek the resolution
of pressing economic and social problems, proposing the
cooperation of diverse political elements all sharing a
common program aimed at the reduction and eventual elimination
13
of the power of monopoly capital.
Although there is much evidence to suggest that Euro-
communism is much more than a momentary aberration in the
communist drive for world domination, the jury is still out
on the notion that these communist parties have permanently
and irrevocably internalized the values and rules of the
Western democracies. Certainties in human events are scarce,
but the continued evolution and development of Eurocommunism
may well result in the creation of a new, independent, and
eclectic communist movement that could be integrated, as an
equal and responsible member, into the democratic political
systems of the West without undo fear or suspicion. Should
this development occur, then misgivings and apprehensions in
the West will surely dissipate and those in the East, espe-
cially in Moscow, will only grow more severe. A thoughtful
and analytical assessment of the recent past regarding the
growth of the Eurocommunist phenomenon will serve to highlight
the direction in which the current trend is going.
13 Ibid., pp. 541-542.
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III. EUROCOMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT - SCHISM OR CHARADE?
A. THE BEGINNINGS
By 1914 socialism was a strong force in the political
life of Europe. There was, however, no unified socialist
movement, despite the existence of a Second Socialist Inter-
national since 1889. The socialist stream was made up of
several major and minor currents: Marxism, appealing to
middle-class intellectuals and self-educated workers; Syn-
dicalism and Anarchosyndicalism based upon the doctrines of
Proudhon, Bakunin, and later of Sorel; agrarian socialism;
German economic socialism; Christian socialism; labor-oriented
socialism; and the British Fabians (a highly respected although
relatively small group) , along with some continental revision-
ists, who were convinced of the superiority of democracy
. . 14
over other political systems.
This far from homogeneous bloc was concerned with at
least three major practical problems: structure of the
socialist organizations (and therefore of the future social-
ist societies) ; methods to be used for the conquest of power;
and relations with non-socialists, particularly with the
progressive liberals. On the first issue, there was con-
flict between the advocates of a democratic structure and
14Massimo Salvadori, The Rise of Modern Communism
(Dryden Press: Hinsdale, 1975), pp. 9-10.
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advocates of a disciplined, authoritarian structure. On
the second issue there was bitter debate between the pro-
ponents of revolution and those willing to use the means
available within liberal democratic regimes (parliamentar-
ianism, freedom of the press, and freedom of association).
On the third issue there was conflict between the advocates
and opponents of collaboration. The socialist right wing
"urged collaboration with the other parties of the left" and
insisted that "the workers could improve their lot within
the framework of the existing societies." In the extreme
left wing, leaders such as Rosa Luxemburg and V. Lenin opposed
collaboration in any form and were convinced that "the
upheaval of the proletariat . . . would organize a collec-
tivist society instead of the existing individualistic one."
Where democracy was concerned, the right wing was as demo-^
cratic as nonsocialist democrats and the left wing rejected
17it completely, even if limited to socialists only.
World War I dramatically deepened the cleavages in the
socialist movement and, in fact, split it into three separate
factions: the social patriots, the pacifists, and the revo-
lutionaries. The latter faction was the smallest and its
most prominent spokesmen were Lenin and his Bolsheviks.
15
F. Borkenau, World Communism (New York: Norton,
1939), p. 19.
16 T , .,Ibid.
17 Salvadori, Rise, p. 11.
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They broke from the rest of the socialist movement not
simply because of a conflict in program, but more accurately
because of a conflict in temperment: the humane tolerance
of the social patriots and pacifists versus the violent
intolerance of the leftist revolutionaries. World War I
helped to crystallize the difference between democratic
socialism acting within the European liberal tradition and
authoritarian socialism, later communism, rejecting the
18ideas, spirit, and institutions of democracy.
There is some evidence to suggest that the "taproot"
of the current Eurocommunist phenomenon may be found lodged
somewhere within the Second Socialist International, espe-
cially within it right and central wings. Even if this
assertion is valid, the fact remains that all the communist
parties formed after the successful Bolshevik Revolution of
1917 lined up willingly and quickly behind the CPSU and
actively sought and readily accepted the leadership of Lenin,
and later Stalin. By 1924 every communist party supported
Stalin's assertion that communism's main enemy now was "the
parties of the Second International . . . The mortal sin of
the Second International was that it overestimated the
importance of the parliamentary forms of struggle, that it
19





19Josef Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York





With the triumph of the Stalinist faction in the late
1920' s, international communism in reality became the pro-
jection of Soviet communism. All communist parties took
orders from Moscow and those that defied Moscow's orders
risked being disbanded, as the Polish communist party was
20in 1938. Soviet leadership of the communist movement was
unquestioned and through such organizations as the Comintern,
and later the Cominform, the CPSU was largely successful in
controlling and directing the activities of virtually every
communist party.
In the West, liberals and conservatives alike expressed
their abhorrence of the direction the communist movement
had taken after the Revolution of 1917. Communist advocacy
of violence, terror and armed revolution created a deep-
seated fear of communism in the West and, although numerous
communist parties were established in the Western nations,
their influence was minimal and their programs and methods
were strongly and continually opposed. Undaunted, however,
these parties consistently espoused the beliefs of Lenin
and Stalin and also looked to the Soviet Union for guidance,
direction, training, and financial and political support.
By the late 1930 's, the Western nations had come to so fear
the Soviet-inspired communist ideology that several of the
20The Economist (3 January 1976), p. 32.
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soon-to-be Allies seriously considered joining forces with
Nazi Germany in order to crush, for all time, the communist
21threat to Western democracy. But the Russo-German non-
aggression pact of 1939 and Hitler's subsequent invasion
of Poland launched Europe into a massive war which, two
years later, found the liberal Western democracies fighting
hand-in-hand with their communist allies in order to thwart
the designs of Germany's Thousand Year Reich. In 1943,
Stalin dissolved the Comintern and at the same time, Euro-
pean communists began to win a new respectability because
of their work in the struggle against the Facist enemy.
B. THE POST-WAR METAMORPHOSIS
Immediately after the war, the communists joined several
Western European governments, enjoying their greatest
successes in Italy and France. In the first post-war French
elections, the PCF obtained the support of more than one-
fourth of the voters and participated actively in coalition
governments for nearly three years after the liberation of
the country. In Italy communist ministers sat in coalition
governments from April 1944 to May 1947. Receiving one- fifth
of the total vote in the general elections of 1946, the PCI
and her fellow-travelers grew rapidly into the second-largest
21Juergen Bruhn, The German Resistance to Hitler and





group in the Italian parliament by 1948. Similar, although
smaller communist party gains were to be seen in Scandanavia/
22
Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
These early successes, however, were to be short-lived.
In 1947, Stalin set up the Cominform as a successor to the
Comintern in hopes of stepping up the communist struggle
against America and its allies in Europe. Moscow ordered
the Western communist parties into the streets to strike
and demonstrate, but when their efforts failed to stop the
consolidation of capitalist Europe, the communist parties
found themselves out in the cold. Their credibility was
further shaken by economic failures in Eastern Europe just
when Western capitalism, newly revitalized, was scoring its
most notable successes. An even more crippling blow was
dealt to the Western communist parties by the rapid and
complete establishment of Soviet hegemony over and the for-
mation of communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe. As the
Cold War gained momentum, communist influence in the West
declined rapidly and several communist parties were actually
declared illegal and forced to operate underground or in
exile. With so many millstones around their necks, Western
European communists appeared condemned to remain out of power
forever.
22Salvadori, Rise, pp. 86-88
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But as Cold War developed into "peaceful coexistence,"
the Western attitudes toward communism began to change, as
did many of the Western communist parties themselves. Although
still ardently opposed to communist ideology and dogma, the
West now felt constrained to accept their native communist
parties in the belief that they posed no real threat to
their respective nations or systems of government and, due
to the strength of the Western political and economic sys-
tems, the communist parties would simply remain an inconve-
nience on the left fringe of Western political life. Events,
however, were to take another course.
Being accepted as part and parcel of the various national
political scenes, numerous communist parties in the West
began to slowly re-organize, adapt their methods to the
prevalent pluralistic and democratic system, take part in
local and national elections and to grow. This growth was
especially evident during the late 1960 's and early 1970' s,
when parts of Western Europe began to be shaken by severe
economic difficulties and political instability. The success
of their efforts to date is seen most clearly in France and
Italy. The Italian Communist Party wields enormous political
power and may only be a matter of years away from assuming
a parliamentary majority on the national level. In France,
likewise, there exists an excellent possibility that the
French Communist Party, in concert with the French Socialists,
may indeed gain a parliamentary majority in 1978; an event
made all the more likely by the March 1977 victory of the
28
Socialist-Communist "Union of the Left" in the nation-wide
municipal elections in which this coalition received the
23
support of over 52% of the French electorate. In Spain,
too, communist efforts have met with success. On 10 April
1977, the Spanish government legalized the Spanish Communist
Party for the first time since the end of the Spanish Civil
War in 1939.
In the cases of Italy and France, the West may be faced
soon with the heretofore impossible reality that two of
Europe's largest and most industrialized nations will be
governed by communist regimes voted into positions of power
through electoral processes. The electoral gains of the
communist parties in Western Europe have truly shaken the
old order. What was earlier regarded as an inconceivable
event is now seen as a highly likely possibility and was,
at first, met with both overt and covert admonitions and
threats, especially toward the Italians. The long-standing
Western distrust of communism, combined with the ramification
of the events of 1974-75 in Portugal, caused distinct rumblings
of economic, political, and military sanctions in some of
the major capitals of the Western world.
There is, however, a distinct dilemma facing these
shocked Western governments. Not only are these communist
23Christian Science Monitor (22 March 1977), p. 5.
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parties achieving remarkable electoral successes, but they
are also espousing, and have been for several years, a
political program vastly different from what had become,
in the West, the accepted Communist Party line. These
Eurocommunists , a name created by the Western media in an
attempt to conceptualize the new political thrusts of the
Western European communist parties, particularly the PCI,
PCE, and the PCF, proclaim themselves to be truly democratic.
According to their parties' spokesmen, Eurocommunism stands
for freedom of choice; pluralism, human and civil rights;
liberty, religious freedom, peaceful change; the non-ideologi-
cal nature of the state; secret, direct, and proportional
ballots; independent trade unions; freedom for scientific
research and cultural and artistic endeavors; and open dialogue
and cooperation with others, even those of a different politi-
24
cal and/or ideological persuasion. Supporting continued
cooperation with the United States, the Common Market, and
even NATO, these parties also challenge Soviet authority
and control, proletarian internationalism, the Soviet social-
ist model, any form of dictatorship including the dictatorship
of the proletariat, international coercion, ideological
orthodoxy and dogma, and the status quo. Instead, they
argue for equality, independence, sovereignty, non-intervention,
24 Triska, "Diversity," p. 1
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national identity, peaceful change, and free consensus of
25
and for all communist parties.
Although the temptation is great, one should not regard
the Eurocommunists as a bloc. As one could easily demon-
strate, there can and does exist within the framework of
Eurocommunism significant differences of emphasis and apparent
committment to the above beliefs. The point is, however,
that these Eurocommunist parties represent themselves not
only as unlike their Eastern European and Soviet counter-
parts, but also, on many occasions, as diametrically opposed
to them. Whether this is a strategic shift or a tactical
charade is still an issue under heavy debate within govern-
mental, journalistic, and academic circles. But it is this
author's contention, supported by the research of Jan Triska,
Neil Mclnnes, Kevin Devlin and other scholars, that these
Eurocommunist parties have indeed changed and, as such,
represent yet a third major schism in the communist movement.
If the Western governments face a dilemma over the Euro-
communists (which indeed they do) , it is of trifling import
when compared to the dilemma the Eurocommunists present to
the Soviet Union, the CPSU, and the entrenched leadership
in Eastern Europe. In the West there is certainly concern,
but in the East one cannot help but sense a feeling of
Ibid.
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confusion, apprehension, frustration, and at times near-
panic. It is as if the rise of Eurocommunism in Western
Europe has raised the specter of doom within the Soviet
orbit and that a "life or death" struggle has already begun
in which the Kremlin can only foresee eventual defeat unless
the Soviet Union is able to respond quickly and effectively
to this new and ominous challenge.
In order to understand and appreciate the profound
changes that have occurred within the communist movement
during the past quarter-century, and thus the basis for the
growing Soviet concern, it is necessary to critically examine
the evolutionary, political developments which created the
Eurocommunist phenomenon of the present day.
32
IV. THE LOOSENING OF THE BONDS
During the almost sixty years that have passed since
the Revolution of 1917, two distinct qualities have char-
acterized the international communist movement. The first
has been the continual Soviet effort to subordinate the
interests of the foreign communist parties to those of the
CPSU; the second has been the equally strong desire of many
of these foreign parties to resist such CPSU pressure and
2 fi
to set out upon their own independent "paths" to socialism.
For the first thirty years of the movement, however, the
CPSU had little difficulty in maintaining control of these
"rebellious" foreign communist parties.
Also during the first three decades of the communist
movement, one witnessed numerous protestations of independence
from Moscow and declarations of support for democratic prin-
ciples by many foreign communist parties that were purely
tactical moves designed to screen off the actual extent of
CPSU control and the actual goals and programs of these par-
ties. Thorez was boasting in 1936 that French communist
policy was set in Paris, not in Moscow, at a time when his
speeches were being written by a Comintern emissary — who
Gati, "Europeanization, " p. 539.
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also had taken Thorez's wife as his mistress. in 1944,
Jozsef Revai of the Hungarian Communist Party commented,
"I declare that we do not regard the national collaboration
of the several parties as a passing, political coalition,
as a tactical chess move, but rather as a long-lasting
2 8
alliance. We will stand by our given word." As World
War II came to an end, the German communists arrived back
from twelve years of exile in Moscow with pamphlets lauding
"national" communism, which had been printed by the CPSU.
At the same time, the PCF was publicizing its differences
with the Soviet Union over the future of the German Ruhr —
again asserting its independence of Moscow while it was toeing
29the Soviet line. Later in 1945, Georgi Dimitrov, the
Bulgarian leader, proudly proclaimed to the world that "the
assertion that the communists allegedly want to seize full
power ... is a malicious legend and slander. It is not true
that the communists want to have a single party government."
Finally, in 1946, Poland's Wladyslaw Gomulka stated that the
27
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Polish road to socialism was "significant because it does
not include the necessity of a violent, revolutionary,
political upheaval . . . [it has] eliminated the necessity
31
of a dictatorship of the proletariat."
As Fred W. Neal correctly points out, the term "Euro-
communism, " as far as it signifies independence from the
Soviet Union and a different socialist system, was more or
32less invented by the Yugoslavs. In 1948 Yugoslavia
became the first true dissenter from the international
strategy of the CPSU when Stalin publicly expelled that
country from the communist movement. For a long time,
Yugoslavia was alone; not one communist party came to its
defense, nor was there any criticism of or protest against
Stalin's treatment of this small Balkan state. In fact,
many communist parties denounced the "heresy" of Tito's
33
regime well into the 1950 's.
Meanwhile, the Spanish Communist Party leader, Santiago
Carrillo, moved to give the PCE an image independent of and
even antithetical to the USSR. During the early 1950 's
31Wladyslaw Gomulka, "People's Democracy: The Way to
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Carrillo staked out a forward position in opposition to
Moscow's hegemonic ambitions within the communist movement
and plunged into bitter debates with the CPSU over such
issues as China, democracy, and the sovereignty of each
i 4.34national party.
Nikita Khruschev's speech at the 20th Soviet Party Con-
gress in 1956 confused and irritated many of the Western
European communist parties, but more importantly, gave to
these parties a license they had previously not possessed.
After this speech, the Italian Communist Party began to
press its separate development in conditions of now-approved
"peaceful coexistence" and became the first communist party
35
to take a pro-Yugoslav stand. Additionally, the PCI,
under Togliatti's leadership, began to openly propose a
peaceful Italian road to socialism within the context of
a "polycentric" communist movement, with no one party dominating
it. These independent initiatives were strongly criticized
in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe and Khruschev con-
tinued to urge the Western European communist parties to
imitate the Czech communists who had seized power in a coup
in February, 1948. Another unexpected outcome of Khruschev's
Warren Zimmerman, "Western European Communists and the
Soviet Union," Paper presented at CSIS Seminar, Washington,
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19 56 speech was the gradual emergence of PCE, PCI and later,
PCF criticism of the illiberal features of the Soviet society,
beginning with the condemnation of the trial of Siniavsky
and Daniel and the publication of anti-Semitic literature
37in the Ukraine.
Until 1956-1957, except in Yugoslavia the communist
leadership of European and minor Asian states controlled by
communists and China was subordinate to that of the Soviet
Union. Since 1943 world communism had been directed by the
Presidium of the CPSU with the collaboration of a few
prominent communists from other countries. But during
1956-1957 the power-struggle factionalism led first to a
series of disturbances and then to a weakening in the
cohesion of the communist bloc.
The communist regimes in Poland and Hungary lacked a
strong mass following and were faced with numerous dissi-
dent groups which provided a foundation for factionalism.
The weakening of Soviet control, the result of inter-party
strife in Moscow, facilitated its increase which resulted
in semiparalysis in the communist parties of these two
countries in 1956. There were strikes in Poland in June
and open revolt in Hungary in October.
In Poland, however, the timely death of Bierut allowed
the Polish communist leadership to rally around Gomulka,
37Mclnnes, Eurocommunism, p. 14.
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whose concessions to the peasants, the Catholic Church, and
3 8the intellectuals enabled Poland to escape a revolution.
In Hungary, however, the rift between opposing factions was
more severe and after months of unrest a revolution broke
out in October. For about ten days the Hungarians were
free, but in November, Soviet troops intervened and reestab-
lished communist control. This Soviet intervention caused
a minor crisis among communists in democratic countries and
39
a major one among fellow-travelers.
In Peking, the factional quarrels among Soviet leaders
were looked upon with serious misgivings but there was hope
that unity would soon be reestablished in Moscow. After
trying for nearly a year to maintain a deferential attitude
toward the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership finally
sided with the Stalinist faction. Malenkov's and Khruschev's
policy of pseudocoexistence with "capitalism" had no supporters
in Peking and the more Khruschev's faction strengthened its
hold in the USSR, the more independent the PRC became. At
the western end of the communist world, a process similar
to that in China developed in small and isolated Albania.
By the end of 1957, there were actually three separate and
3 8Salvadori, Rise, pp. 110-111
39Jy Ibid.
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independent centers of communist power: Moscow, Peking,
40
and Belgrade.
These developments had a dramatic impact on the communist
parties of the West. By 1962, there were about 2.5 million
party members in twenty-six Western democracies. Of that
total, more than two million were in Italy and France — a
considerable decline from the more than three million of
the immediate post-war period. In the European democracies,
the number of votes received by communists in general elec-
tions held immediately after the war had reached over sixteen
million. Over a decade and a half later, in considerably
41larger electorates, the vote was down to thirteen million.
Although the decline in communist dynamism in Western
Europe was in no small measure the result of the post-Stalin
factional struggle within the CPSU, more important was the
Wirtschaftswunder of continental Europe and the realization
that through welfare measures and the introduction of so-called
stabilizers, economic security and stability could be achieved
within the framework of democratic, pluralistic institutions,
and that it was possible to keep the major advantages of
the free enterprise system while eliminating many of the






many Western Europeans, especially within the intelligent-
sia, had embraced communism during the 1930* s and 1940' s in
the strong and sincere conviction that it was the road to
the ultimate fulfillment of democratic aspirations and goals:
belatedly, they came to realize that, Stalinist or Khruschevite
,
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communism was the negation of such goals and aspirations.
Even within the Western European communist parties there was
dissatisfaction with the direction the CPSU had taken and
a growing realization that continued blind obedience to Soviet
directives was counter-productive and not in the interests
of these parties' political growth and electoral success.
The dismissal of Nikita Khruschev in 1964 brought severe
criticism from the Spanish communists and in the same year,
the Dutch Communist Party made a dramatic break with the
CPSU, proclaiming its autonomous, independent line, its
primary concern with national electoral politics as opposed
to "requirements" of the international movement, and its
wish for collaboration with socialists, for pluralism, and
43
for the electoral road to political power. Simultaneously,
the Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej began to criticize the
concept of "proletarian internationalism" and indicated
publicly that Romania should follow its own road to socialism.
42
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Beginning in 1965, his successor, Ceausescu, actually did
44begin to take a "Romanian road."
The year 1965 also witnessed the startling declaration
by the Swedish Communist Party (SKP) that it accepted the
principle of "democratic alternation of political parties;"
that it could be voted out of power just like any other
45party. Meanwhile, directly across the Gulf of Bothnia,
the moderate wing of the Finnish Communist Party began to
speak openly of their peaceful way to power, civil liberties,
46
and adherence to party plurality.
Throughout 1966, the new regime in Moscow was obliged
to cope with numerous threats to its leadership and control.
Although there were strong signs of declining Soviet influence
within the Western communist parties, it was the threats to
Soviet control in Eastern Europe that caught and held the
primary attention of the CPSU. Romania's efforts to water-
down the Warsaw Pact were met by a conference of Warsaw Pact
nations in Bucharest in July 1966. The net effect of this
Soviet-inspired conference was failure to tie the hands of
Romania or any other Pact member who might wish to follow
47Romania's example in pursuing independent policies.
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The most notable sign that the Bucharest conference
had not produced a workable formula for a united policy
front came on January 31, 1967, when Romania took the
independent step of establishing diplomatic relations with
the Federal Republic of Germany, thus openly breaking the
common line on West Germany. The possibility now arose
that other Eastern European countries might be tempted to
follow suit, with Hungary and Czechoslovakia among the
more likely candidates. During that same month, the French
and Polish communist parties put out a call for a pan-
European communist party conference and the CPSU quickly
seized upon this request in the hopes of reforging inter-
national communist unity and reasserting Soviet leadership
within the communist movement. The conference was held in
April 1967 in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, but it was a
bitter disappointment to the CPSU. Not only did the Soviet
hopes of turning this conference into a united front against
Peking not materialize, but neither was Moscow successful
in achieving a unanimous endorsement for its European policy
line, inasmuch as six European communist parties — the Yugo-
slav, Rumanian, Albanian, Dutch, Icelandic, and Norwegian
48parties — refused to attend. All that was achieved was
the adoption of a collective document calling in general




by its very generality the already divergent political
49interests of both East and West European communist leaderships.
Ever since the fall of 1966, there had been a percepti-
ble increase in Soviet-encouraged lobbying for a new inter-
national communist conference. The last such conference
had met in Moscow in 1960. In October 1967 statements from
numerous Soviet supporters resulted in the declaration that
conditions were finally "ripe" for a "consultative meeting"
50to make "practical preparations" for such a world conclave.
One month later, invitations were issued for such a meeting
and the stage was set for what Pravda foresaw as a major
step toward restoration of "communist unity" with no attempt
to "excommunicate" any party from the world communist
4- 51movement.
On February 26 1968, the preparatory meeting opened in
Budapest with sixty parties represented, but a number of
important parties missing; Yugoslavia had not been invited;
China, Cuba, and Albania refused to attend; North Vietnam
and North Korea stayed away, and four Asian non-ruling par-
ties did not put in an appearance. The conference proved
less than a resounding display of unity and after three days
the Romanians, whose misgivings had been voiced in advance,
49Kevin Devlin, "The Challenge of Eurocommunism,"
Problems of Communism (January-February 1977), p. 2.
50Wolfe, Soviet Power
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pulled out of the consultative talks. They charged that
the Soviets had violated their assurances that there would
be no criticism of China and asserted that to hold a world
conference under existing conditions of discord would "only
flagrantly illustrate on a world scale the lack of unity
52between communist parties." When the Budapest session
closed on March 5, it issued a statement ignoring the
Romanian walkout and stating that a formal world party
conference would be tentatively scheduled to be held in
53Moscow during November-December 1968.
This particular world party conference, however, was
never called to order for quite suddenly the unexpected
occurred. Early in 1968 the anti-Stalinist faction of the
communist party of Czechoslovakia compelled the Stalinist
Novotny to abandon the leadership of the party and the con-
trol of the state. Alexander Dubcek emerged as the new
leader and became the rallying point, not only for communists
who had had enough of Stalinism, but also for the reformist
wing of the CZCP and Czechoslovak non-communists, all of
whom supported Dubcek ' s program of pluralistic socialism.
A decision had to be made in Moscow: the success of reformism
in Czechoslovakia could spur similar developments in Poland
and Hungary and would isolate East Germany. The Soviet
52New York Times, 1 March 1968
53Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 356
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decision, made after long reflection, was very sensible from
a Soviet, and also an orthodox Marxist-Leninist, point of
view. Much could be tolerated from fellow communists as
long as the position of the Soviet Union was not militarily
endangered and as long as the Leninist monopoly of power
and conformity were enforced. This was the case in Romania.
In Czechoslovakia, however, the communist regime was at
stake, not just Soviet influence. Ceausescu was committing
54
only a venal sin; Dubcek, a mortal one.
The leadership of the CPSU, acting on behalf of the
Warsaw Pact, ordered the occupation of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968. This action not only shook Eastern Europe to
the core and horrified the Western world, but also, more
than any other issue, aroused and solidified the emerging
Eurocommunist position and its opposition to the CPSU.
54Salvadori, Rise
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V. PRAGUE SPRING AND IT'S AFTERMATH
The basic conflict between the Western communist parties
and the Soviet Union had existed long before the repressive
intervention by the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia. In
varying but increasing degrees, as the foregoing discussion
has demonstrated, the Western communist parties were taking
the path of revisionist adaptation to their pluralistic,
democratic environment; committing themselves to the consti-
tutional pursuit of reform through electoral alliances and
to the preservation of "bourgeois" liberties. This conflict,
although obvious, was muted and restrained, due to habits
of solidarity with the CPSU and an awareness of some conver-
gent interests on other levels. But the events of 1968 were
to dramatically alter this relationship. Indeed, the
Czechoslovak crisis was to be a turning point in the inter-
national communist movement comparable to the expulsion of
Yugoslavia and the Sino-Soviet rift.
The course of events during the Czechoslovak crisis
is highly complex and an in-depth discussion of these events
is well beyond the scope of this work. Most readers, no
doubt, are already generally familiar with the Czechoslovak
crisis, so the following discussion will deal only with




The developments in Czechoslovakia after the January
Plenum represented a direct challenge to the Soviets who,
at that time, were in a mood of defensive conservatism.
To the CPSU, this sudden liberalization meant a further
weakening of the bloc and a marked increase of "ideological
subversion", with the virus of infection coming not only
from the West but from a communist state centrally and
strategically located in Eastern Europe. To the Eurocommunists
,
however, the changes in Czechoslovakia opened up new and
exciting prospects: here, at last, was to be a socialist
society to which the Eurocommunists could point as a rele-
vant example, without having to endlessly insist that their
paths would not emulate the existing communist regimes.
Although most Western communist parties were, at first,
cautious, the PCI supported the Czech reformers from the
5 ft
very start and were soon joined by the communist parties
57in Britain, France, and Austria. The support of the PCF
was a significant act for although the PCF had for years
pursued revisionist domestic policies, they had yet to
5 8
oppose the CPSU on a major foreign policy issue. In April
the Secretary-General of the PCF publicly pledged solidarity
with the Prague reformers and wished them "great successes
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in the application of their program aiming at the expansion
* • i • .,59of socialism.
"
As bloc pressure was increasingly being applied to the
Dubcek regime, primarily by the Soviets, Poles, and the East
Germans, the Eurocommunists , lead by the PCI and the PCF,
began to play a growing role in the developing struggle.
PCI General-Secretary Longo flew to Prague in May and after
three days of talks with Dubcek and his supporters stated,
"what is happening in Czechoslovakia today is an experiment
which will also help certain socialist countries, and in
particular the communist parties of the capitalist coun-
tries, in the struggle to create a new socialist society —
young, open, and modern."
Eurocommunist support grew more outspoken and principled
during the period of increasing Soviet pressures during June
and July. Finally, on July 14, around the time of the
Warsaw Pact conference in Poland which dealt with the
"heresies" in Czechoslovakia, the PCI and the PCF sent a
three man delegation to Moscow; the first time the two most
powerful communist parties in Western Europe had taken a
joint initiative against Soviet policies. During their
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reforms but also warned "the parties concerned . . . that for
us only a political solution was admissible, and that any
kind of armed intervention would be unacceptable." Several
days after the delegation's return from Moscow, the PCF pro-
posed a meeting of all European communist parties to discuss
fi 2
the Czech situation and "the problems arising from it:"
a proposal almost immediately accepted by fourteen European
communist parties. Although this conference was never held,
probably as a result of Soviet and Czechoslovak pressures,
the proposal itself did two things: (1) it publicly estab-
lished the Czechoslovak crisis as a Eurocommunist concern,
and (2) it mobilized written and verbal Eurocommunist support
for the Dubcek regime.
64With the publication of the Soviet bloc's "Warsaw Letter"
on July 17, only fifteen of the non-ruling communist parties
supported it (about one-fifth of the total) . Out of the
twenty-one communist parties in Western Europe, only four
took a pro-Soviet stand: the Luxembourg CP, the Greek party
(KKE) , the West German KPD, and the West Berlin SED. The
61L'Unita , 10 September 1968, cited in Ibid.
62Devlin, "New Crisis", p. 60.
Ibid.
64For the full text of the Warsaw Letter (and the




two German parties were so dependent upon the Ulbricht
regime that their alignment can be seen as having no politi-
cal significance and, regarding the Greeks, only one faction
of the KKE's exiled leadership endorsed the Warsaw Letter;
the rival faction and the clandestine party apparatus inside
Greece took a pro-Dubcek stand. In reality, support for
the Soviet bloc Warsaw Letter in Western Europe was limited
to the Luxembourg Communist Party with an estimated member-
ship of 400-500 people.
As Warsaw Pact troops and armoured vehicles poured into
Czechoslovakia on August 21 in order "to afford every assis-
tance to the Czechoslovak working class and the whole Czecho-
slovak people," they also ran over the last vestiges of
international communist solidarity. The Italian and Spanish
communist parties were the first to condemn the invasion
and they were quickly joined by the communist parties of
France, Great Britain, Finland, Austria, Greece, Belgium,
Holland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Romania, and even Japan and
Australia. The Secretary-General of the Swedish party went
so far as to suggest that diplomatic relations between
65 Ibid.
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Stockholm and Moscow should be suspended until the occupa-
6 Q
tion ended. However, when the invasion failed to produce
a "counterregime" and the resistance of the Czechs demonstrated
that the political struggle was not ended, but rather had
entered a new phase, the Eurocommunists moved quickly from
simple condemnation to direct and assertive pro-Czechoslovak
action, with the aim of assisting the Czechs in salvaging
as much as possible of the "democratization" program and in
regaining as much as possible of their sovereignty.
The Eurocommunists were especially forceful in their
rejection of Soviet-bloc arguments justifying the invasion
and the occupation. "The arguments about tens of thousands
of armed counter-revolutionaries, hidden caches of arms,
loans from the West, moves to leave the Warsaw Pact ... and
so on, have all been countered or refuted by the Czechoslovaks
and can in no way amount to a counter-revolutionary situation,"
69
stated the spokesmen of the British CP. The Eurocommunists
also attacked the violations of "non-interference" as promised
by the Soviet-bloc in their Moscow Agreement. In all cases,
Eurocommunist opposition to the invasion was based upon
principle — communist principle accepted by the entire world
movement. The following PCF declaration perhaps best
expressed this Eurocommunist perception:
68Devlin, "New Crisis", p. 61.





"In truth, the tragic decision of this
month of August is wrong not only
according to our opinion but according
to our law
,
the law of the Communist
parties of the whole world . . . Tftio took
the responsibility for the intervention?
Not the Communist parties, since the
French Communist Party, the Italian party,
the very great majority of the 81 parties
that signed the 1960 declaration, were
opposed to it, as was that declaration
itself, but some Communist parties, setting
themselves up, on their own authority, as
judges without appeal. "^0
The invasion also forced the Eurocommunists to do more
than temporarily disassociate themselves from the Soviet-
bloc action. It also forced them to reassess their relation-
ship with the CPSU and to repudiate both the theory and
practice of totalitarian communism. Calls for such a
reassessment came quickly from the Italian, French, Austrian,
and British communist parties, among others. As a result,
the Eurocommunists began to link the intervention with the
"increased resistance of the political superstructure [in
71Eastern Europe] to the necessary adaptations and renewals,"
and to the Soviet desire for hegemony in the bloc and its
resistance to "ideological subversion" from any source.
Although the ability of the Eurocommunist parties to
influence the Soviets was, of course, limited, they continued
to attempt to bring pro-Czechoslovak pressures to bear upon
70Andre Wurmser, "Le mois Tragique," France Nouvelle
(4 September 1968), as quoted by Devlin, "New Crisis", p. 62
71Rinascita, 27 September 1968, (FBIS)
.
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the CPSU. The PCI generated an unprecedented round of
interparty meetings, sending delegations to Paris, Bucharest,
Sofia, Belgrade, London, Vienna, Moscow, and Latin America,
in the hopes of coordinating the opposition to the Soviet
occupation. Focusing on the long-planned world conference
of communist parties scheduled for Moscow in November 1968,
the PCI went on record as in favor of its postponement,
stating that until the crisis in Czechoslovakia had been
satisfactorily settled, it would "not be opportune or useful,
72
or perhaps even possible" to hold the conference. Since
the Hungarians, at Soviet insistence, had already sent out
invitations for a preparatory meeting in Budapest in late
September, the stage was set for a confrontation.
By late September, the Austrian, Belgian, British, French,
Italian, Swiss, and Spanish CP ' s stated that they would attend
the preparatory meeting only for the purpose of demanding
the postponement of the Moscow conference. The Swedish,
Norwegian, and Icelandic CP's refused to attend even the
Bucharest session. At the same time, the Eurocommunist
parties let it be known that they were considering a separate
conference of Western European parties to discuss the crisis
and its consequences. In addition, they also brought up
the Czechoslovak issue within the World Federation of Trade
Unions, since the invasion had "implications that affected
72 L'Unita, 8 September 1968, (FBIS)
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the future of the international trade union movement and
73the very survival of the WFTU.
"
September also witnessed the first enunciation of what
came to be known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine." Sergi Kovalev,
writing in Pravda dismissed the "formal-legal arguments"
of "those who speak about the illegality of the actions
of the socialist countries in Czechoslovakia" and declared
that the socialist states could not remain "inactive in the
name of some abstract idea of sovereignty when they saw how
the country was exposed to the danger of anti-socialist
75degeneration." Two weeks later, a similar article appeared
in the Kommunist warning that no state could be "absolutely
independent of the system of states in which it exists" and
that "proletarian internationalism . . . considers it necessary
to guarantee the defense of any socialist state's sovereignty
7 fi
when it is threatened by the machinations of the imperialists."
To the Eurocommunists, this was tantamount to saying that
the Soviet Union refused to recognize the sovereignty of any
73L'Unita / 20 September 1968, (FBIS)
.
74Brezhnev's name became associated with this doctrine
after he expounded some of its features at the Polish party
congress in November 1968, although by that time both Soviet
theoreticians and other Kremlin leaders had already begun
to spell out the doctrine in detail.
75Pravda, 26 September 1968, (FBIS).
76Kommunist, October 1968, pp. 96-97, (FBIS).
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communist state within the reach of Soviet military power,
since its enunciation left ambiguous the doctrine's appli-
cability to previously non-communist countries in which the
communist party might achieve power, by parliamentary means
or otherwise. Construed to apply in such cases, even a
"temporary" communist electoral victory in a European coun-
try would have to be regarded as irreversible. Since several
subsequent statements by Brezhnev failed to set any terri-
77torial limits to this doctrine, the Eurocommunists
immediately condemned it and continued to widen the politi-
cal and ideological distance between them and the CPSU.
When the Budapest "preparatory" meeting for the inter-
national communist conference was held in November, the
Eurocommunists forced the Soviets to postpone this world
conference until May 1969. Subsequently, another "prepara-
tory" meeting was substituted for the world conference in
May, and the date for the conference was put off until June
1969.
The aborted conference, however, was the only real
success that the Eurocommunists were to savor in their
fight for Czechoslovak "democratization." Gradually, it
became apparent that Dubcek was being forced into one con-
cession after another and new men, sensing the futility of
77Alexander J. Groth, Eastern Europe after Czechoslovakia ,





continued struggle against Soviet power, were coming forward
to help by quietly reimposing party and police controls
and adopting a stance of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
When anti-Soviet demonstrations broke out in Prague during
April 1969, the CPSU dispatched Minister of Defense Grechko
and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Semenov to the scene
and threatened that additional occupation troops might
7 8follow. Quickly Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak as
First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party while
other changes in the party's Presidium resulted in the return
to power of several pro-Soviet leaders and the expulsion of
a number of "reformist" members. Once the Soviets had
restored a facade of Soviet-Czechoslovak harmony under
the Husak regime, much of the ground for open opposition
was cut from under the Eurocommunist parties. The damage,
however, had already been done and the Eurocommunist parties
continued to give moral support to Dubcek and his followers
and routinely publicized their views and comments in the
Western communist press.
The public anti-Soviet stand being pursued by these
Eurocommunist parties not only engendered opposition from
79Eastern Europe, but had domestic impact as well. Each
78New York Times , 3 & 13 April 1968.
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In October 1968 ideological polemics broke out openly,
beginning with the East German theorist Kurt Hager's condemna-
tion of the modern revisionist heresies of the Austrian CP,
Italian CP, and other communist parties of Western Europe.
(See Neues Deutschland, 29 Oct 68, pp. 3-6)
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party's attitude became a source of internal disunity and
in some parties, a large proportion of the rank-and-file
and some of the leaders were outraged by the condemnation
of the Soviet Union. The point should be made, however,
that in no case did these critics succeed in altering a
party's stand on the invasion and occupation. Jeannette
Vermeerch, the widow of Thorez and a member of the PCF
Politburo, was the most notable example of pro-Soviet dissi-
dence and in October 1968 her objections were rejected by
the PCF ' s Central Committee who quickly moved to accept her
resignation from the Politburo and the Central Committee
as well. The Eurocommunist parties' leaderships held fast
to the position that the Czechoslovak crisis clearly
demonstrated the Soviet relapse into Stalinism.
The invasion and occupation #also led the Eurocommunist
parties to strengthen their committment to revisionist
positions in domestic affairs in an effort to lessen the
political losses inflicted by the Soviet action. These
actions received greater attention after the Eurocommunists
witnessed the electoral setbacks of the Swedish and Finnish
parties. Even though both parties had condemned the Soviet
and Warsaw Pact actions, their electoral support dropped
dramatically in the elections held during the immediate post-
invasion period; the Swedish CP's votes dropped by over 50%
and they lost 5 of 8 seats, while in Finland the communist-
80front SKDL lost over 20% of its electoral support.
8 Devlin, "New Crisis," p. 67n
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At the same time, being communists, the Eurocommunist
parties were led to formulate their differences with the
Soviet and Eastern European regimes in ideological terms,
a factor which made the rift even wider, deeper, and more
enduring. In their efforts to gain more independence from
the Soviet Union the Eurocommunists were stimulated to seek
mutual contacts and support, and they increasingly began
to use exclusively national strategies to reach national
goals. Thus, the Eurocommunist direction began to be set,
since cooperation with socialists and non-communists required
81
even greater distance from the CPSU. As was indicated
earlier, the conflicts within the communist movement were
relatively restrained and muted prior to August 1968. With-
out any doubt, it was the invasion and occupation of
Czechoslovakia that provided the crucial jolt and thereby
loosened the tongues of the revisionist communist parties,
especially in Western Europe. The last major vestiges of
an international communist movement led by the CPSU were,
as the vindictive Albanians put it, crushed to death "under
82
the chains of the Soviet tanks that occupied Czechoslovakia."
As the Western European communists began to recognize
that international communist unity actually represented
8
1
Triska, "Diversity," p. 12
82
Zeri i Popullit , 8 October 1968, cited in Devlin,
' :New Crisis," p. 64.
58
Soviet state interests cleverly couched in the ideological
term of "proletarian internationalism," their committment
to this "unity" quickly collapsed. The Yugoslavs, as early
as 1948, had seen the concept of proletarian internationalism
as merely a cover for Soviet domination of all communist
parties, and by 1964 Togliatti of the PCI was calling it
8 3
a "forced exterior uniformity. " The invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, in Triska's words, not only exposed proletarian
internationalism as "Soviet great-power chauvinism and
national egoism, " but also resulted in the erosion of
relations between ruling and non-ruling parties alike,
. . 84
adversely affecting their allegiance and participation.
By the mid-1970 's, the concept of proletarian internationalism
had lost numerous supporters. After the schismatics, China
and Albania, the independents, such as Yugoslavia, Mexico,
Iceland, and Holland, the neutrals, such as Romania, Vietnam,
North Korea, Laos, and Malaysia, and the split parties,
such as Canada, Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, joined with the
Eurocommunist parties and became heretics. Communist unity
under the banner of proletarian internationalism is now
8 5
almost totally dead.
83New York Times , 5 September 1964, p. 2
84Triska, "Diversity," p. 14.
Ibid., p. 20.
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The sacred communist shibboleth of the dictatorship of
the proletariat has met a similar fate. The Italian Communist
Party never made use of the slogan and although many Western
European CP's had encorporated the concept into their pro-
grams, they have gradually deleted it over the years. The
British party dropped all references to it from its statutes
in 1951, and the French stopped using it after 1968, although
it was not officially proscribed until 1976. The Finnish
party suppressed it in 1969, the Portuguese, for purely
political convenience, in 1974, and the Spanish party did
so in 1976. At this writing, the abandonment of this doc-
trine by the Eurocommunist parties is almost complete — to
the utter disgust of the CPSU and other doctrinaire,
ideological purists.
The early 1970 *s also saw the decline of the dogma of
democratic centralism within the major Eurocommunist parties,
most likely an outgrowth of the Eurocommunist rejection of
Soviet hegemony over the movement and its denial of
8 7
allegiance to proletarian internationalism.
Another victim of the schism between the Eurocommunists
and the CPSU has been the Soviet model of socialism. The
Leninist model of the single party socialist state run






dictatorial party was rejected in the early 1960 's by both
the PCI and the PCF; the Danish and Spanish parties followed
suit later in the decade. By the 1970 's, it would be
reasonable to assert that virtually all the electoral
communist parties, especially within Western Europe, have
voluntarily disgarded the Soviet elitist party concept.
The Leninist notion of the avant-garde party, an active
minority anticipating the direction of social change and
forcing the pace by means of spectacular, possibly violent,
actions, such as holding on illegally to power legally
acquired, was also rejected by the Eurocommunist parties.
The PCI and PCE had disgarded the concept by 1974 and the
first real test of their sincerity came in 1975 when the
Portuguese Communist Party tried to apply this Leninist
strategy after its electoral minority was proven in national
elections. The PCI and PCE immediately condemned the actions
of the PCP and, after the Soviets threw their support behind
the PCP, the French Communist Party also joined the condem-
nation and officially dropped the avant-garde party concept
8 8
at its February 1976 party congress.
The climate of the post-1968 environment also encouraged
an increased willingness on the part of the Eurocommunists




Soviet Union in the area of civil and human rights, and to
extend that criticism to the regimes of Eastern Europe.
Although originally low-key, the condemnations gradually
became stronger so that by 1974, all the parties, with the
one exception of the PCF, were criticizing the banishment
8 9
of Solzhenitsyn. The tactics of the Portuguese Communist
Party during 1975, which smacked of Soviet-style illiberalism,
were an embarassment to the Eurocommunists , including the
PCF, and when a BBC film on a Soviet labor camp appeared on
French television in late 1975, the PCF joined the Eurocommunist
ranks with its open and firm condemnation of the Soviet Union.
By January 1976, the PCF/CPSU polemics had become so bitter
that Marchais stated that he could no longer usefully meet
with Brezhnev, as planned. Adding insult to injury, Marchais
also commented that the PCF would continue to do its best
to correct the misguided Soviet practices in these matters.
Finally, when Kirilenko (from the Soviet Politburo) attended
the PCF party congress the following month, the PCF denied
90him the floor. Thus, the PCF fell quickly into line with
the rest of the Eurocommunist parties in their opposition
to Soviet and Eastern European political suppression.
On top of everything else, the late 1960 's and early




of European integration, the EEC, and the continuation of
91the NATO alliance. In addition, the same period found
Eurocommunist parties making solid alliances with non-
communist parties. The PCF joined in a Common Program with
the French Socialist Party in 1972, their common candidate,
Francois Mitterand, almost winning the presidential election
in 1974. Moving beyond the position he accepted in the
Common Program, Marchais announced in 1976 that, in addition
to advocating "democratic alternation of parties," the PCF
would henceforth regard the dictatorship of the prolectariat
92
as an obsolete concept. In Italy, the PCI, following the
Dutch CP's initiative of 1964 and learning from the collapse
of the Allende coalition in Chile, proclaimed that it would
strive for an "historic compromise" with the Christian
Democrats! The regional elections in June 1975 brought the
PCI to within two percentage points of the Christian Democratic
vote and made the "historic compromise" more than an academic
93question.
By early 1976, the disputes between the Eurocommunists
and the CPSU had reached tremendous proportions and revolved,
in general, around three major issues. The first was a
classical issue in the history of the Communist movement:
the degree of control Moscow was to exert over the other
91
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communist parties. The second was the universal validity
and permanence of communist dogma; were the concepts of
proletarian internationalism, dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, democratic centralism, the Leninist party model,
etc., really obsolete and inoperative, or were they still
valid for all communist parties? And the third major issue
derived from, yet went beyond, the Eurocommunists ' tactics:
their verbal and apparently sincerely held committment to
pluralism and other vital aspects of Western democracy.
It was in this atmosphere of polemics, confusion, dis-
trust, and struggle that the 25th CPSU Party Congress met
and, later, the long-anticipated pan-European conference of
communist parties was held. Both events, and especially
the activities leading up to the latter, were highly
significant and merit close examination.
64
VI. FROM MOSCOW TO EAST BERLIN AND BEYOND
In Soviet histories, the party congresses mark epochs
in the historic struggle of the party for the building of
the perfect society. According to the Soviet press, the
25th CPSU Party Congress was no exception; claiming that
it "persuasively demonstrated the unity and solidarity of
94the international Communist movement." Yet, underneath
these boasts, the average Soviet citizen must have noticed
that the congress had been, unlike previous congresses,
exceedingly dull and without any fireworks. The adulation
of Brezhnev appeared endless and universal and the only
apparent consequential business was the naming of a new
Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat. There was
no indication in the press that the congress had found any-
thing to be seriously wrong or that there were any problems.
No mention was made of the bad harvest, the lowest in a
decade, or of the general economic slowdown and technological
lag. No new policies, no changes of party or governmental
structures or rules were announced, nor was the succession
problem addressed in any way. Not only was little decided,
but the congress was not even used to bring up any possi-
bility of change. It seemed only to reflect the desire of
94 Pravda, 25 March 1976, (FBIS)
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the CPSU that everything must be for the best and should
continue as far as possible without change. As Robert
Wesson stated, the 25th CPSU Party Congress seems to have
been little more than a formality, reflecting the latest
stage in the evolution of vital revolutionary emotions
into the placid, comfortable existence of a ruling elite
for which social change is past and all questions are
answered.
What the Soviet press, however, neglected to tell its
readers was that the 25th CPSU Party Congress marked the
first formal display of the scope, intensity and rate of
differences and disagreements between Moscow and the Euro-
communist parties. Brezhnev, perhaps in anticipation of
this dissent, had underlined the importance of proletarian
internationalism in his opening speech and had criticized
the deviant parties without openly naming them. Brezhnev's
theme was totally endorsed by most of the ninety foreign
parties in attendance. The Eurocommunists, however, in
front of 4,998 delegates representing over fifteen million
communist party members, took to the podium, as Jan Triska
put it, to "profess, emphasize, and demand principles,
policies, and strategies NEVER professed, emphasized, or
96demanded at a CPSU congress before."
Robert G. Wesson, "The Twenty-Fifth Soviet Communist
Party Congress," Current History (October 1976), p. 129.
96 Triska, "Diversity," pp. 2-3.
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The Swedish CP ' s speaker, Lars Werner, mentioned the
right of each communist party to find its own special way.
The British speaker, Gordon McClelland, went much further
and outlined a socialist system far different from the
Soviet, stressing plurality of parties, independent trade
unions, religious and cultural freedoms and calling for
the right of all communist parties to express differing
97
views.
Georges Marchais of the PCF had refused to attend the
congress and had sent Politburo member Gaston Plissonnier
in his place. In his speech, Plissionnier was generally
unprovocative but afterward he called a press conference
in the Kremlin press center and declared the following:
"The abandonment of the notion of the dictatorship of the
proletariat [by the PCF] is not negotiable ... We have not
come to Moscow to negotiate ... As for proletarian inter-
nationalism, if this is reduced to a mere identity of views
among Communist parties, it would be better to finish quickly
with the rudimentary form . . . The PCF does not share Leonid
98Brezhnev's assessment of French foreign policy."
When Enrico Berlinguer of the PCI took to the rostrum,
he spoke of the independence of communist parties with their
different views and experiences, of the necessity for under-
standing various progressive forces, and of the Italian
7Wesson, "The Twenty-Fifth," p. 121
QO
Le Monde, 2 March 1976, (FBIS)
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way to socialism including democracy, freedom for differing
political forces, and the pluralistic system.
Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Communist Party also,
like Marchais, failed to attend the congress and instead,
went to Rome for talks with Italian politicians, calmly
explaining that this trip was "more important." While in
Rome, Carrillo stated that Soviet socialism was "in the
primitive stage," and Western socialism, when it came, would
have to be profoundly different: "In the West we can have
socialism only if the democratic and pluralistic systems
are respected, and if it is based on majority consensus,
with a readiness to give up power if this majority ceases
to exist." Asked whether Moscow might condemn this idea of
communism, he responded: "By what right could they condemn
us? They can criticize us, as we criticize them. Condemna-
tion is excommunication from a church, and the Communist
movement was a church but now no longer is one."
In his concluding remarks at the congress, Leonid
Brezhnev congratulated the delegates on their "unanimity"
and Pravda proudly proclaimed that "the 25th CPSU Congress
was a genuine triumph of proletarian internationalism.
"
The Eurocommunist parties, however, had openly thrown down
"wesson, "The Twenty-Fifth," p. 121
100Devlin, "Challenge," p. 11
101Pravda, 25 March 1976, (FBIS)
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the gauntlet and the challenge to the CPSU was to reach
even greater proportions at the Conference of European
Communist and Workers' Parties held in East Berlin in June
1976. Given the importance and implications of this con-
ference, the secret negotiations, drama and intrigue which
preceded it are worthy of mention.
As indicated earlier, the initial calls for another
pan-European conference — and for a world conference to
follow — came from the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and West German
communist parties in November 1973. Only after eleven
months of secret interparty negotiations was an open consul-
tative meeting set up in Warsaw; a session attended by
twenty-eight parties in October 19 74. Prior to this Warsaw
meeting, the Soviets had high hopes for this second pan-
European conference of communist parties. The conference
was to address the "struggle for peace, security, cooperation,
and social progress in Europe," and was to be held in East
Berlin "no later than mid-1975." Linked closely with the
Helsinki conference and the 30th anniversary of the victory
of the World War II anti-Facist alliance, the CPSU hoped that
the conference would produce a collective ideological inter-
pretation of detente in Europe that would offset the Soviet
bloc concessions with regard to "Basket 3" of the Helsinki
Accords and, at the same time, reaffirm the status of the
CPSU as primus inter pares in the European communist
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movement. Additionally, the CPSU leadership and the
influential personalities in the "loyalist" communist parties
were looking forward to the reaffirmation of such concepts
as proletarian internationalism, democratic centralism, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, the binding laws governing
the construction of socialism, recognition of the leading
role of the CPSU, and of the integral and exemplary role of
"real socialism. " They viewed the conference as supportive
of one coordinated political, social, and ideological system
throughout the Soviet sphere of influence, even to the extent
of demanding a judgment of "treason" against China, and saw
it as a first step toward calling a world conference and as
a great opportunity to establish a program of action binding
103
on all the participating parties. The Soviets and their
allies, however, were to be greatly surprised and sorely
disappointed.
After the Warsaw meeting and the first proper preparatory
session in Budapest in December 1974, secrecy descended over
the proceedings. The reason for this was quickly clear.
In discussions regarding the content of the conference's
final document, the Eurocommunists , along with the Yugoslavs
and the Romanians, were totally opposed to the Soviet and
"loyalist" party aims. If there was to be a collective
102Devlin, "Challenge," p. 3.
103B.A. Osadczuk-Korab, "Brezhnev's Pyrrhic Victory:
The Pan-European Conference of Communists in East Berlin,"
International Journal (Winter 1976), p. 180.
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document at all, it would have to be based on consensus.
The essence of the Eurocommunist position was that the
concepts of proletarian internationalism, democratic cen-
tralism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, general
binding laws, recognition of the leading role of any party,
the priority of any specific "model" of socialism, the
criticism of any party, present or absent, as well as the
idea that the conference was to be considered a step toward
a world conference, were all totally out of the question.
The Eurocommunists and their allies not only insisted that
the final document be binding on no party, but also that it
emphasize the recognition of the principles of a variety
of ideological and organizational forms for a party, of
independence, autonomy, and sovereignty of each party, and
of non-interference, as well as of the free exchange of
104
views, of free discussion, and of mutual tolerance.
The initial debate over these points lasted until April
1975 and ended in deadlock when the East Germans presented
a first draft document that was quickly rejected by the
105Eurocommunist parties and their fellow-travelers.
A group of eight parties (Yugoslavia, Romania, Italy,
Spain, East Germany, France, Denmark, and the USSR) then
met three times between April and mid-July in an attempt
104
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to reach agreement. These meetings also failed when the
East Germans presented a second draft document that was as
unacceptable to the Eurocommunists as had been the first
draft. The mid-1975 conference hoped for by the CPSU was
now impossible and in August 1975, a PCI commentary in
L' Esspresso declared:
"both East German drafts contained statements
of political and ideological principle that
were frankly unacceptable — and not only
to the PCI ... The third [chapter] concerns
the strategy of the Communist parties,
and here it is said that they play a van-
guard role, pursue identical objectives,
and are guided by a single ideology. We
believe, and we are not the only ones,
that these parts of the document do not
reflect the reality of the Communist move-
ment and the orientations that were
expressed by its components on various
subjects." 106
The eight-party group continued to meet during September,
but with no results; it was obvious that the confrontation
would have to be transferred back to the wider forum that
had originally met in Warsaw and Budapest.
On October 9-10, a full group of twenty-seven delega-
tions met and was presented with a third East German draft
which represented significant concessions by the CPSU.
The PCI regarded the draft as requiring "elaboration and
clarification," but asserted that it could be "taken as a
107basis for discussion." Based on the East German draft
106L'Espresso , 31 August 1975, (FBIS)
107L'Unita, 11 October 1975, (FBIS).
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and the interparty discussions of October 9-10, it was
agreed that the full Editorial Commission would meet in
November 1975 to draw up a final draft. But this apparent
Eurocommunist victory was short-lived, for in November
when the Editorial Commission met the Soviet position had
unexpectedly changed again. Instead of adopting a final
draft and setting a date for the conference, the Editorial
Commission decided on another December meeting to discuss
the document and a session in January 1976 to "consider"
108
setting the date. Why the sudden change?
Evidently, the Soviets and their allied parties reintro-
duced their demands for a more ideologically pure document
at the November meeting, demands that were rejected by the
Eurocommunists. Quite possibly these demands reflected the
desires of the Soviet delegate, Konstantin Katushev, who
had replaced Ponomarev at the deliberations. Whereas
Ponomarev was concerned with the international aspects of
the movement, Katushev 's interests were focused primarily
on Eastern Europe. It is likely that Katushev did not
approve of Ponomarev' s previous compromises with the Euro-
communists and was striving to reassert ideological purity
at the November meeting in order to strengthen his "control"
over the Eastern European states. Additionally, it appears
108Devlin, "Challenge," p. 7.
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that the French, Polish, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and
especially the Soviet parties desired to have the conference
postponed until after their respective party congresses
109had met in early 1976. Thus, the fourth East German
draft went down to defeat.
The Soviets softened their stance again at the December
meeting in which Vadim Zagladin, reasserting Ponomarev's
previous position, indicated the CPSU's willingness to
drop certain controversial sections of the November draft
and to reconsider certain sections held to be essential by
the Eurocommunists. Finally, a session lasting nine days
in early January 1976 brought agreement on most of the
text, but left the major issues unresolved. This fifth
East German draft discussed in January clearly indicated
that the tide was now moving in the direction of the
Eurocommunists
.
The remainder of January and most of February 1976 was
devoted to various party congresses, but this fact did not
deter the various advocates from continuing their pressures
to bring the pan-European document into the perspective
they envisioned for it. The PCF-PCI coalition, formed the
previous November, continued to push for their version of
109Morning Star , 2 December 1975
110Devlin, "Challenge," p. 9.
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the document while the CPSU had high hopes that their party
congress would rally sufficient support to their side so as
to frustrate the Eurocommunists ' goals. As was indicated
earlier, the 25th CPSU Party Congress was hardly successful
in that regard.
Although another preparatory meeting was held in mid-
March, it was not perceived as achieving anything conclusive.
As a result, the Polish and French parties suggested the
conference be postponed due to Soviet intransigence, but
this move was rejected. Evidently Brezhnev felt that a
postponement would expose the profound schism within the
Communist movement and preferred to take his chances with
a document he kept hoping would be improved to the Kremlin's
... - .. Ill
satisfaction.
In early May, the Editorial Commission released a communique
stating that the "final" commission meeting would be held
in early June and that the conference itself would take
place in the near future. But clouds were still on the
horizon. A flurry of interparty diplomacy took place during
the remainder of May, and in June the Soviets sent word that
they were willing to discuss the Eurocommunist proposals
during the conference; the reply came from the French,
Yugoslavs, Romanians, Spanish, and Italians that they would
stay home unless the CPSU accepted their proposals as the
final document.
Tad Szulc, "The Stalled Momentum of Eurocommunism,"
New Republic (13 November 1976), p. 19.
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The Soviets were trapped - and they compromised. In
mid-June, Katushev flew discreetly into Bucharest and Bel-
grade bringing the word that the CPSU would accept all the
demands which until that moment it had opposed. The
Editorial Commission adopted the consensual text on June 11
and adjourned until June 24. When they reassembled, it was
to announce that the conference would take place on June
29-30. It was only on 26 June, however, three days before
the conference was to open that the Eurocommunists had all
113indicated publicly that they would attend.
It is indisputable that, with regard to the final con-
ference document, the Eurocommunist parties achieved almost
a total victory; a victory underscored by the unexpected
attendance at the conference of the Dutch Communist Party,
which had boycotted every one of the preparatory meetings.
The text, based on the new principle of consensus, itself
a formal recognition of the equality and autonomy of all
communist parties, contained no criticism of the Chinese,
dealt with political action and not with ideology, and was
not binding on any party. The sacrosanct formula of
"proletarian internationalism" was omitted, as was any
reference to a special status for the CPSU or the USSR.
It contained an emphasis on the communist parties' dialogue
112Devlin, "Challenge," p. 14
113 Szulc, "Stalled," p. 20.
76
and collaboration with non-communist political forces and,
in effect, institutionalized diversity within the European
114Communist movement.
More interesting than the final document were the
speeches presented at the conference. The consensus appar-
ently had altered little. The Soviets and their allies,
having reluctantly agreed to the dropping of "proletarian
internationalism" and the abandonment of special status
for the CPSU, proceeded to insist on the continued validity
of both. Based upon the content of the speeches, one
could easily conclude that at present European communism
is divided into two camps — the traditionalists and the
autonomists. To the former group would belong the parties
of the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland, the latter two being somewhat less conservative
than the others. These parties are supported by a number
of non-ruling parties including Portugal, West Germany,
West Berlin, Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Turkey. The autonomist
group is composed of the parties of Italy, Spain, France,
Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Romania, and San Marino. Between
the two camps lies a group of weak parties such as those
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This open display of disagreement and dispute certainly
made the East Berlin conference the first of its kind. The
day after the conference, the PCF indicated that it was
also most likely to be the last. Italian and Yugoslav
communist leaders have described the conference as the
116
"point of no return" in communist relationships. Also
apparent is the fact that the Eurocommunist parties have
made it clear to Moscow that they oppose any plans for a
world communist conference and would not attend, even if
the CPSU were to be successful in arranging one.
The Conference of European Communist and Workers 1
Parties in East Berlin was a clear victory for the forces
of Eurocommunism; they had come "eyeball-to-eyeball" with
the Soviet Union over fundamental issues and it was the
Soviets who blinked. The paramount conclusion must be that
the conference in East Berlin marked the beginning, not the
end, of the communist ideological struggle.
If the East Berlin conference demonstrated that the
differences between the Eurocommunists and the CPSU were
deeper and broader than were announced at the 2 5th CPSU
Party Congress, the events in the post-Berlin period cer-
tainly reflect an even more rapidly growing divergence.
Since most of the activities undertaken by the Eurocommunist
116 Szulc, "The Stalled," p. 19
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parties since June 1976 are matters of recent history,
there is no pressing need to detail them at this point.
Several actions, however, are deserving of mention in that
they highlight or underscore the direction the Eurocommunist
parties have chosen to take.
Immediately after the East Berlin conference, the
Soviet and Eastern European media clamped tight censorship
on their coverage of the Eurocommunists ' speeches, attempting
to present the conference as a triumph of the "loyalist"
point of view and as a reaffirmation of the unity of the
communist movement based upon "proletarian internationalism.
"
The Eurocommunist parties reacted quickly and labeled this
assessment as a "falsification of the consensus reached
• « i • ..117in Berlin,
"
The death of Mao Tse Tung was seized upon by the Euro-
communists as another event that would allow them to empha-
size their independence from the CPSU. A September 1976
article in L' Unita bluntly welcomed the fact that Mao's
death had become an occasion for a "new rift between the
Soviet CP and the great communist parties of Western Europe."
The article went on to blame the Sino-Soviet schism on Soviet
desires for hegemony, to criticize the Brezhnev doctrine of
"limited sovereignty," and to assert that the aspirations
of the Western European communists could only be achieved
117Borba
,
(Belgrade) 14 August 1976, as cited in
Devlin, "Challenge," p. 17
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when Soviet hegemony over the lives of the parties of
Eurocommunism had been shaken off completely. 118
In early October, the PCF responded to a Hungarian
assertion that all communist parties must perform the
function of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the
following retort:
If one considers that in order to install
socialism in France it is necessary to
have recourse to the dictatorship of the
proletariat, as was done in Hungary (and
also in the Soviet Union and elsewhere)
,
[then] it is necessary to state that one
must ban opposition parties, establish
censorship, deprive part of the population
of the freedoms of expression, association,
demonstration, etc., and one must tell
the French workers, "This is one of the
consequences of what the Communists propose
to you," because the dictatorship of the
proletariat, no matter what its form, is ,
q
exactly (not entirely, but exactly) this.
After Berlin, too, the Eurocommunist parties increased
their criticism of Soviet-bloc violations of the Helsinki
Accords, claiming these intolerant actions also violated
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the final
document of the recent East Berlin conference, and the
constitutions of the Soviet-bloc states themselves. The
PCI, objecting to the internal repression of the Husak
regime in Prague, even broke relations with the Czechoslovak
party — a gesture that the less rigid Eastern European
Kevin Devlin, "Mao's Death Widens Gap Between Loyalist
Regimes and Eurocommunists, " Radio Free Europe Research Report ,
No. 196 (16 September 1976), p. 6.
119France Nouvelle , 5 October 1976, (FBIS)
.
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parties (like Poland and Hungary) are loath to criticize
publicly. The PCF also increased its attacks against
Soviet treatment of its dissidents and when TASS criticized
the French attacks as a "dirty undertaking", the PCF
announced it would print seven million copies of Pierre
120
Juquin's speech denouncing the illiberal treatment and
121
the PCI added that they would print six million copies.
The PCI and the PCF also launched attacks against the
Polish CP for its actions stemming from the worker's distur-
bances in the summer of 1976.
When, in November, the East Germans stripped poet Wolf
Bierman of his citizenship and refused to allow him to return
to the DDR, the Italian, French, Spanish, Belgian, and
Swedish communist parties were quick to come to Bierman'
s
support. L' Unita stated the Eurocommunist case concisely:
"Our position on the Bierman case is extremely clear . .
.
The punitive measure through which the authorities of the
DDR decided to prevent his return to the country and thus
122to silence him in his own country is unacceptable."
The publication of "Charter 77" and the subsequent
treatment accorded the signatories by the Czechoslovak
government is still an on-going issue at this writing.
120
Devlin, "Challenge," p. 18.
121 Szulc, "Stalled," p. 21.
122Kevin Devlin, "Bierman and the Eurocommunist
Comrades," Radio Free Europe Research Report
, No. 241
(26 November 1976), p. 3.
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Suffice it to say that the Eurocommunist reaction has been
strong. L'Unita condemned the Czech government and stated
that their action "leaves no doubt as to the spirit and
methods with which the Czechoslovak authorities intend to
confront the problems posed by Charter 77." Rinascita
asserted that "the question of the realization of democratic
socialism in Czechoslovakia remains unanswered." The PCE
called the lack of freedom in socialist states "particularly
125
scandalous." In January 1977 L'Unita again commented:
"Since 1968 there has been in Czechoslovakia a continuous
fundamental political problem which we have denounced more
than once and which we cannot avoid denouncing again today . .
.
the CPCZ organ has preferred to resort to degrading labels and
drastic threats rather than countering with arguments."
Probably the most scathing attack came from the PCE in
February: "... our attitude toward the dissidents in
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR and the rest of the
socialist countries is clear ... It calls the repressive
methods used in these countries against the signatories of
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127 Radio Independent Spain , 19 February 1977, Press
Release reported in FBIS, W. Eur. (22 February 1977), p. N-6.
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Finally, in an act clearly in violation of Soviet and
CPSU authority, the PCF, PCI, and the PCE held a Eurocommunist
"summit" in Madrid during early March 1977. In 1974, the
CPSU had warned that no communist party had the right to
organize a congress without inviting a Soviet delegation,
neither had they the right to organize regional meetings
128
of communist parties either. But, in spite of this,
these three communist parties held their "summit" and agreed
that their parties should be known as "Eurocommunist" —
meaning that they had the right to adapt communist tenets
to the conditions of their own countries and to retain
129independence on the international plane. Although the
PCI and the PCF attempted to downplay the significance of
the meeting, insisting it was not a party conference but
merely an exchange of views between party leaders, the dis-
tinction was more one of degree than substance. The three
parties had met, had discussed issues of national and regional
concern, and no Soviet delegate was asked to attend.
Clearly, then, Eurocommunism is a reality and those
parties which subscribe to the Eurocommunist view are not
highly concerned about following the dictates of the CPSU.
The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 was, without a doubt, the great
128Mclnnes, Eurocommunism
, p. 53.
129New York Times , 4 March 1977, p. A4
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catalyst, but it was the 1976 East Berlin conference which
institutionalized the current diversity and lack of unanimity
In reality, instead of attaining a personal apotheosis as
he originally had planned, Leonid Brezhnev at East Berlin
had to preside over something like a dissolution of his
empire — and he dare not tell his own people what has
happened.
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VII. THE CAUSES OF THE SHIFT
It has been argued that the Berlin document and Euro-
communism in general are merely hoaxes perpetrated by the
Western European communist parties on Moscow's orders in
order to achieve domination in a changed political context.
There are, to be sure, many contradictions in the positions
of these independent parties and there may be valid reasons
for continued Western skepticism over this new face of
European communism. But common sense tends to militate
against such extreme interpretations. The East Berlin docu-
ment and the current inter-party polemics are the products
of a communist evolution in Western Europe over the last
decade or so; an evolution which has been punctuated by
dramatic events such as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia
which these Eurocommunists have found repugnant and
unacceptable.
Those who would assert that the Western European communist
parties have not changed, that they still hold strong
allegiance to Moscow, and that they are insincere about
their committments to democracy and pluralism usually base
their case upon one or a combination of four major arguments.
The most common approach is the historical analogy. By
pointing to the public comments and political programs of
the Eastern European "people's democracys" during the 1940 's,
which turned out to be hollow promises and committments, the
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advocates of Eurocommunist insincerity would have their
readers believe that what the Western European communists
are saying today are merely repeat performances of the same
tactical acts.
A second common theme is that the continued presence
of pro-Soviet hardliners in the Eurocommunist parties
demonstrates the continued presence of pro-Soviet attitudes
within the party that will surface immediately if a Euro-
communist party achieves political power and control of
government on a national level.
Third, the Eurocommunists ' failure to formally break
relations with the CPSU is regarded as proof of their
insincerity and undemocratic character.
Finally, the Eurocommunist parties are regarded as
untrustworthy since past Western experience with Communism
adequately demonstrates their sinister nature, lack of
credibility, and subversive techniques. Although, on the
surface, these arguments appear to have some validity,
a closer examination will reveal some critical, often fatal
flaws.
Comparing the professed intentions of the Eurocommunist
parties with those of the "people's democracies" of Eastern
Europe after World War II is a very misleading analogy.
It totally ignores the fact that the circumstances existing
in Eastern Europe in the post-war period are in no way
similar to those in Western Europe in the 1970' s. In
post-war Eastern Europe, the political allegiance of those
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nations was ultimately determined by the proximity of the
USSR and the presence of Soviet troops. In addition, the
West could provide little more than verbal support to the
native, non-communist political forces who, except in
Czechoslovakia, were poorly trained and experienced in
political democracy in any form.
In contrast, Western Europe is distant from the USSR
and no Soviet troops are present within its borders. Not
only can the West provide verbal support to indigenous non-
communist political parties, but they can apply economic
leverage as well in order to gain political influence;
the experience in Portugal should suffice as an excellent
example. Additionally, the non-communist parties in Western
Europe are strong and are not emasculated as they were in
post-war Eastern Europe. The interdependence created by
the EEC, NATO, and the other transnational organizations
and agreements within Western Europe also militate against
a repeat of the Eastern European performance of the 1940' s.
And finally, since 1945 the Western European communist par-
ties have participated in the national governments of eleven
Western European nations and have managed or participated
in the management of hundreds of towns and municipalities.
In fact, a great part of their present appeal stems from
their efficiency and integrity while serving on local and
130Gati, "Europeanization, " p. 544
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national governing bodies. 131 Thus, although making for
interesting reading, the historical analogy approach to
criticism of the Eurocommunist parties lacks substance - it
fails to address the political, social, and economic realities
of present-day Western Europe.
The charge that pro-Soviet elements still exist within
the Eurocommunist parties is, of course, valid, but the
charge that they will emerge as the true leadership of these
parties once they attain political power is simply fallacious.
The old guard within these parties has virtually ceased to
exist and the personal ties with the CPSU are extremely
132limited. Although those pro-Soviet elements which do
exist within the Eurocommunist parties are vocal, they wield
little influence within the parties' decision-making process.
Even during 1968, when their numbers were much larger, the
pro-Moscow faction failed to change even one party's official
stand on the Czechoslovak reforms and the subsequent Warsaw
Pact invasion and occupation. Even a cursory glance at the
current programs and policies being pursued by the Euro-
communist parties should adequately demonstrate the absolutely
limited impact these small, pro-Soviet elements have upon
the political direction of the Eurocommunist parties. That
these elements do exist cannot be denied, but to credit them
131
Ibid., pp. 544-545.
132Arrigo Levi, "Italy's "New" Communism," Foreign Policy ,
No. 26 (Spring 1977), p. 30.
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with sufficient political power and popular support to
assume the leadership of a Eurocommunist party smacks of
a lack of objective assessment at best.
Many critics of the Eurocommunist parties have dismissed
their liberalization as a charade simply because they have
failed to formally reject the CPSU and break relations with
it. In other words, the critics claim that only a formal
break with the CPSU can prove the democratic character of
the Eurocommunist parties. This criticism is both unrealis-
tic and unfair. What these critics obviously would desire
is a situation in which the Eurocommunist s would adopt a
pro-West, Cold War attitude toward the CPSU while the rest
of the world operated in an atmosphere of detente and
peaceful coexistence. To satisfy these particular critics,
the Eurocommunist parties would have to be more anti-Soviet
than virtually any other Western party. For many reasons,
this is an unreasonable political demand.
First, an examination of the relationships between the
Eurocommunists and the CPSU over the past decade or so
reveals that a de facto break has indeed occurred on a
myriad of issues and the Berlin document may reasonably be
interpreted as a de jure break with the CPSU. The Euro-
communist parties have already rejected the Soviet model,
Soviet leadership of the communist movement, Soviet inter-
pretations of numerous communist dogmas and principles,
and Soviet interference in the other parties 1 own roads to
socialism.
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But, the Eurocommunists are not about to sever, volun-
tarily, the bonds which tie them to the party and country
of the October Revolution. As Timmermann points out, this
relationship is not only a great part of their history,
but also of their ideological, political, and structural
identity; a relationship that the party leaders continue to
regard as a necessary bulwark against the danger that their
parties might simply become merely social democratic parties
133
on the left of the political spectrum. It is very apparent
that, for political reasons, the Eurocommunist parties
still desire some ties with the CPSU. But the fact that
they maintain these ties should not mask completely the
depth and breadth of their committment to democratic prin-
ciples, the extent of their liberalization, and their
remarkable independence of Moscow, although this committment,
liberalization, & independence does vary from party to party.
The Eurocommunist parties are, themselves, aware of the
problems these CPSU ties create in some quarters of the
Western political scene. A PCI spokesman, Giorgio Napolitanp,
recently best expressed their position on this matter: "We
could probably cut a good figure among many by saying that
the Soviet Union is not a socialist country and then sever
our links. But it would appear to be tactical and opportunist
I "3 "3
Heinz Timmerman, "West European Communism in Flux,"
Problems of Communism, (November-December 1976) , pp. 75-76
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and be seen as positions we took merely to achieve certain
ends." Thus, the formal rejection the critics of Euro-
communism seek is not to be forthcoming from these parties
of their own accord and yet does not negate the relative
impact of the massive differences which separate the CPSU
from the communist parties in Western Europe. However,
that this "formal" break may come from an opposite direction,
i.e. Moscow, is an issue that will be discussed in a later
section of this work.
Finally, the argument that Eurocommunism must not be
trusted because of past Western experiences with Communism
also suffers from a lack of appreciation of current realities.
To assert that a communist party can change is less surprising
than it at first seems. Throughout the history of the move-
ment, communists have differed from one another, although
Moscow usually succeeded in keeping these differences under
tight control. Moscow's ability to do so now, however, is
extremely limited and, in some cases, non-existent. Addi-
tionally, as Levi asserts, the roots of the present-day
Eurocommunist parties can be found in the ill-fated his-
torical experience of the people's democracies in the post-
war years and even further back in the horrible sufferings
135
of non-Russian communist leaders under Stalinism. The
134New York Times , 2 February 1977, p. 3
135Levi, "Italy's," p. 30.
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Eurocommunist parties have also undergone a long period of
democratic pressures, the "old guard" is a dying breed,
and ties with Moscow grow more limited with each passing
year. Soviet actions have alienated most Eurocommunist
politicians and party members on numerous occasions to the
point that Berlinguer himself has proclaimed that it would
be easier to build socialism in the West than on the other
side of the Iron Curtain. And finally, the Eurocommunist
parties of today are not the communist parties of years past.
They are electoral parties, run by generally moderate leader-
ships and supported by voters who have no intention of
choosing anything remotely similar to the system currently
employed in the USSR by the CPSU; a situation strongly
lamented by those conservative party stalwarts who still
remain.
The Eurocommunist parties have indeed undergone signi-
ficant change and there appear to be several causative fac-
tors which can be advanced to explain these shifts of pro-
grams and policies and to demonstrate the sincerity behind
and committment to the current political direction these
parties have elected to take.
First, the general European environment in recent years
has provided the Eurocommunist parties with unique oppor-




detente has aided in reducing the polarization of domestic
politics stemming from the days of the Cold War and in
bringing the Western European communist parties out of
political isolation. Additionally, the Eurocommunist parties
have benefited from the economic problems that have beset
the Western European neo-capitalist model of development;
problems the traditional ruling parties have been unable
137to adequately address. It is also apparent that in Italy
and Spain the Eurocommunists have not normally had to compete
with strong Socialist parties for the support of the political
138left; a situation highly hospitable for Eurocommunist growth.
Given this political atmosphere, one would normally
expect the communist parties to develop along traditional
lines, espousing pure Marxist-Leninist doctrine, demanding
radical solutions for social and economic problems, and
rejecting completely the "bourgeois democracies" as totally
incapable of serving the needs of the people. Surprisingly,
however, just the opposite occurred. The Eurocommunist
parties adopted programs and policies that openly rejected
many Marxist-Leninist doctrines, pressed for moderate solu-
tions to current difficulties, and even embraced the democratic
and pluralistic system of government as the only viable system
137 .Timmerman, "West European," p. 74.
138 Zimmerman, "Western", p. 3.
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for meeting the needs of the people. These shifts were
not merely tactical moves by the Eurocommunist parties but
rather were strategic shifts of political perspectives dic-
tated by national and international realities. At least
five major factors appear to have caused these changes. A
brief examination of each of them should serve to substan-
tiate the sincerity of the Eurocommunist committment to
them.
Surely obvious from the previous discussion of the
development of the Eurocommunist phenomenon in Western
Europe is the fact that one of the major factors causing
their political shifts has been the actions and activities
of the Soviet Union and her "loyalist" regimes in Eastern
Europe. The CPSU's treatment of Yugoslavia, Albania, and
China did not go unnoticed by the Western European CP's,
nor did the Soviet activities in Eastern Europe in 1953,
1956, 1961, 1968, 1970, and later. As the Eurocommunists
gained in self-confidence, their criticism of the illiberal
policies pursued by the CPSU and the like-minded parties
in Eastern Europe grew more vocal and more frequent. The
Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia was,
without a doubt, the watershed in Eurocommunist-CPSU relations
Combined with increased domestic support, it dramatically
influenced the Eurocommunist parties to turn away from
Moscow's line. Heavy-handed Soviet diplomacy since 1968,
designed to bring the Eurocommunists back into the CPSU's
camp, has simply back-fired and has driven them further away
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than ever. Repression within the USSR, Soviet-inspired
repression within Eastern Europe, and the CPSU's failure
to adhere to the spirit of the Helsinki Accords and the
Berlin Accord have only added to the Eurocommunists ' disen-
chantment with Soviet-style communism, as has Moscow's
continual insistence upon the eternal validity of prole-
tarian internationalism and other obsolete Marxist-Leninist
shibboleths. The more the CPSU demands to be recognized
as the leader of the Communist movement, the more indepen-
dent and autonomous the Eurocommunist parties strive to
become. Rejection of the "Soviet model of socialism" by
the Eurocommunist parties is virtually complete and has
been caused primarily by the actions of the CPSU itself.
This disenchantment runs so deep that Santigo Carrillo of
the PCE has even gone on public record as asserting that
the Soviet Union is not even a socialist country but rather
139
a dictatorship of one segment over the whole of Soviet society.
Another factor on the international level which has
quietly, but effectively done its part in causing the
shifts within the Eurocommunist parties has received sur-
prisingly little emphasis or attention in the pertinent
literature. This ofter-overlooked factor is that the United
States is no longer on the moral defensive as it seemed to
be, especially during the war in Vietnam. Rather, it would
139New York Times, 20 February 1977, p. 3
95
seem that the Soviets are on the moral defensive — the roles
have been reversed in terms of general international
perception.
There was a time not very long ago when America's friends
and allies felt that they had to make excuses for their
association with the United States. The Western Europeans,
in particular, felt that many things the United States did
were either foolish, unworthy or unwise. The general per-
ception was that the United States backed bad causes while
the Soviet Union backed good ones. But things are not like
that anymore. Communist parties everywhere in the world
outside the range of the Soviet armed forces, not only in
Western Europe, are embarrassed by the actions the Soviets
have taken against their own people and against the populace
of Eastern Europe. For a long period of time, America was
perceived as the ruthless and careless giant while the USSR
was perceived in some circles as being more concerned with
the welfare of people. This perception has not changed
because of propaganda and no one has manipulated this change.
It has somehow happened; Soviet propaganda does not seem to
work anymore. It has somehow lost the power to persuade
not only its own people and fellow-travelers, but the rest
of the world as well.
Perhaps the American disengagement from Vietnam has been
the major factor; the United States is no longer dropping
napalm and bombs on "little men in black pajamas" trying to
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hide in the jungle. The United States is not using its
military forces against any nation that is smaller or
poorer, nor is it attempting to coerce any nation against
its apparent or alleged wishes. The United States can no
longer be accused of backing old colonialism, nor practicing
any new colonialism or imperialism.
There is, however, a fear of Moscow; a fear of repression,
suppression, and coercion, of Soviet force wherever it is
permitted to dominate, and of Soviet imperialism and/or
aggression. Dissidence in Eastern Europe & the USSR itself
has been increasing in intensity, as has Soviet-bloc reac-
tions against it, and it is apparent that the Soviet Union
is now on the propaganda defensive. It is quite likely
that the Eurocommunists have turned away from Moscow, not
only because of Soviet actions and activities, but also
because of a realization on their part that the aims,
aspirations, and political concepts of the West are not
diametrically opposed to their own, as previously believed,
but rather far preferable to those offered by the CPSU and
the regimes in Eastern Europe.
Dissatisfaction with the CPSU and growing hospitality
to things Western introduced a third factor within the Euro-
communist parties which has contributed to their political
shifts. As Soviet influence fell, these parties turned
more and more to the national scene for their political
outlook and gradually deleted the concept of proletarian
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internationalism from their party programs and policies — a
move that had far-reaching impact.
As the Eurocommunist parties began to participate actively
in their national electoral processes, they discovered the
concept of proletarian internationalism to be little more
than an albatross around their necks. The electorates
increasingly demanded national communist parties offering
policies and programs addressed to domestic needs; demands
that forced the Eurocommunist parties to acknowledge that
the ideology of one country cannot serve as the ideology
of an international movement, nor as the ideology of another
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sovereign nation. As the Eurocommunists adapted to these
electoral demands, they discovered that their electoral
support increased. Indeed, Eurocommunist responsiveness to
the electorate's demands has increased largely because greater
responsiveness has meant more votes. Now, like all political
parties, the Eurocommunists have come to understand that
electoral victories mean success and the electoral defeats
mean failure — not only for the party membership, but for
the leadership as well. Additionally, success at the polls
means easier and greater access to resources — money, offices,
respectability, prestige, and political influence - thereby
untying the strings attached to aid from the CPSU. Therefore,
140Triska, "Diversity," p. 17
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torn between their own needs and the demands of the CPSU,
the Eurocommunist parties have had to choose and they have
chosen not to give in to Moscow any longer, not without a
fight. By departing from the Bolshevik party model and
by no longer challenging national political processes, the
Eurocommunist parties have ceased to be viewed as national
adversaries. To return to "pro-Soviet" positions or to
suggest continued allegiance to Moscow would be tantamount
to committing political suicide and would virtually destroy
all the political successes these parties have achieved
during the past quarter-century.
Heavily tied to the concept of electoral support is the
fact that the very structure of the Western European politi-
cal system has contributed dramatically to the political
shifts of the Eurocommunist parties. Unlike the two party
system in the United States, the Western European systems
of proportional representation have proved hospitable to
the growth of the Eurocommunist parties. If they can attract
a substantive vote, they are rewarded just like any other
party. Thus, as the Eurocommunist parties shifted their
emphasis to the national scene and away from the CPSU, as
was most notably done in Italy, the leadership was able to
justify these moves to its membership through virtually




succeeds like success and the continental political systems
provide the fertile ground in which Eurocommunism could take
hold and grow.
Finally, as the Eurocommunist parties altered their
function within the Western European political scene, their
structure also underwent profound changes. In 1975, Neil
Mclnnes asserted that the Eurocommunist parties had a struc-
ture consisting of three major and distinct factors all in
equilibrium; the party bureaucracy who benefited from the
electoral road to power, the Leninist party members who
still supported the CPSU and opposed cooperation with non-
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communist forces, and the Soviet influence itself.
Although this may have been the case in 1975, it is certainly
not true in 1977. As Jan Triska correctly points out,
"equilibrium" is a thing of the pas^t and the structure of
the Eurocommunist parties has shifted irrevocably in favor
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of the party bureaucracy.
Any objective analysis of the Eurocommunist parties would
demonstrate the greatly reduced influence of Moscow and the
CPSU. Additionally, such an analysis would reveal that "pro-
Soviet" hardliners have either died or have been generally
relegated to positions of low priority, low visibility, or
low esteem. It is the party bureaucracy that leads, controls,
Ibid., pp. 27-28.
Mclnnes, The Communist Parties , pp. 140-156, 204
144Triska, "Diversity," see pages 28-29, 34-35.
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and directs the activities of the Eurocommunist parties
and it has been through their efforts that the Eurocommunist
parties have been able to function within the parliamentary
systems and to compete with other political parties for
electoral support. The bureaucracy has realized that if a
communist party gives up "revolution" and "proletarian
internationalism" in favor of the electoral road to power
it must win votes. In fact, except in a coalition, it must
win a majority of votes to get into office. To do these
things, the Eurocommunist parties need allies and to secure
them, the Eurocommunist parties must downplay their major
liability, namely their supposed loyalty to and support
for the CPSU. Once an alliance is achieved, the Eurocommunist
parties are forced to support that alliance in order to main-
tain their credibility, no matter how difficult the honoring
of that contract might be. Most importantly, in order to
justify these alliances to their members, the alliances must
be successful and winning ones. Success means more jobs for
the Eurocommunist parties and more jobs mean that the bureac-
racy becomes even more influential. Thus, in order to remain
in office, the party bureaucracy must vest its interest in
national strategies and pay less and less attention to any
Soviet/CPSU connections that might remain. The over-riding
fact is that now that the party bureaucracies are in control
of the Eurocommunist parties a return to the "Soviet camp"
is virtually impossible. The organization and structure of
the Eurocommunist parties would disintegrate and all past
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gains would be destroyed. In sum, the Eurocommunist
parties are captives of their own liberal democratization
145
and political integration.
The evolution of Eurocommunism is far from complete,
but it can be safely asserted that its rejection of the
Soviet model, Soviet leadership, and Soviet ideology is
sincere and that their committment to the pluralistic and
democratic political systems of Western Europe is not a
sham nor a charade designed to cloak sinister motives. For
all the concern that the Eurocommunist parties have generated
in Western circles, it is of mild significance when compared
to the concerns Eurocommunism has generated within the CPSU
and the regimes of Eastern Europe. While some Western
political analysts see Eurocommunism as a potential threat
to NATO, the EEC, and possibly the Western European political
system itself, it would not be unreasonable to assert that,
given the economic and political strengths of the West,
Eurocommunism can and will be integrated into the Western
European political scene. To the Soviet Union, however,
Eurocommunism represents a monumental threat, not only to
her satellite states in Eastern Europe, but to the very
legitimacy of the CPSU itself. An examination of the impact
of Eurocommunism in Eastern Europe and the responses it
has engendered will more than adequately demonstrate the
depth and the validity of these fears.
Ibid,
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VIII. THE IMPACT OF EUROCOMMUNISM
It has become increasingly apparent, especially over
the past decade, that the emergence of Eurocommunism has
created a significant shift in the direction of initiative
and influence within the world communist movement. For
many years, the CPSU was the center of the communist world
and all truth emanated from the Kremlin. Those persons or
parties in conflict with the Soviet path were, if possible,
simply purged or removed from positions of influence. If
these tactics failed to achieve the desired compliance, the
CPSU merely labeled the offenders as revisionists and/or
traitors to Marixism-Leninism and publicly expelled them
from the world communist movement; a tactic well-illustrated
by the Soviet treatment of Yugoslavia and China. Thus,
prior to the emergence of the Eurocommunist phenomenon,
only Moscow held the political initiative and wielded the
main political influence within world communism.
This one-way flow of communist methodology and ideology,
however, is no longer the case. It was, of course, somewhat
blunted by the defections of Yugoslavia, China, and Albania,
but with the rise of Eurocommunism the flow was not only
blunted but was to a large degree reversed. As the Euro-
communist parties gained in confidence and support they
began to regard their conceptions of "socialism" not only
as a national goal for themselves but also as an applicable
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and valid goal for both Western and Eastern Europe, if not
quite for the entire world. The Eurocommunist parties have
gone far beyond simple criticism of single events in Eastern
Europe and the USSR and are now engaged in actively pro-
moting their vision of "socialism with liberty" as a necessary
and viable vehicle of political change in Eastern Europe
and eventually the USSR itself.
That this effort is a conscious one on the part of the
Eurocommunist parties is perhaps best illustrated by Lucio
Radice's comment to the press in late 1976. Radice, a
leading PCI spokesman and a member of the PCI's Central
Committee, linked Eurocommunism with the dissident movement
in Eastern Europe and stated that it was "inevitable that
the Italian, French, or Spanish "model" should become a
political problem for the ruling communist parties . . . one
can no longer conceive of Eurocommunism as the regional
variant of a strategy ordained by the official Marxism of
the socialist countries. The truth is that there is a
clash between two general perspectives. What is at stake
is that relationship between socialism and liberty, and the
way that relationship is worked out is equally relevant
147
to the socialist and capitalist countries.
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Given the CPSU' s reaction to Eurocommunism and the
reactions of the Eastern European ruling elites, an area
that will be amplified later in this report, it is quite
obvious that Soviet ideological and political activities
have shifted from an offensive to a defensive posture.
The ideological "street" is no longer a one-way road and it
may well be, as Gati would assert, that Eurocommunism has
reversed the flow of influence and initiative and is
challenging the very legitimacy of the Eastern European
A a • 4- 148and Soviet regimes.
This shift of initiative and influence has had dramatic
impact upon the Soviet Union in many ways. The Eurocommunist
parties and their allies have forced the CPSU to face the
fact that Moscow is no longer regarded as the hub of the
world communist movement. CPSU primacy and leadership were
successfully challenged by the Eurocommunists at the East
Berlin conference in 1976 and the concept of proletarian
internationalism was not even included in the final East
Berlin document. It is interesting to note also that the
East Berlin conference was adjourned even without the
delegates raising their voices for the singing of the
Internationale
. No longer being acknowledged as primus inter
pares
,
the CPSU has also had to face that controlling other
communist parties as they had done before would be more
148Gati, "Europeanization, " p. 553
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difficult. Moscow certainly has not given up its efforts
to exercise control over these parties, but the results of
the East Berlin conference and other Eurocommunist activi-
ties have certainly reconciled the Kremlin leadership to
149doing so indirectly, if at all.
Eurocommunist political successes and their committment
to pluralism and Western-style democracy has severely
undermined the greater portion of Soviet ideology, has set
ominous precedents, and has caused the CPSU traumatic dis-
comfort. The Eurocommunist parties have dismissed proletarian
internationalism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and
the Leninist party model as "obsolete" concepts and have
significantly undercut democratic centralism, the concept
that virtually assured strong party control. Their
support of NATO and the EEC must have the Kremlin leadership
deeply concerned and their endorsement of parliamentary
democracy, political pluralism, and democratic alternation
of political strikes a direct challenge to the CPSU's tra-
ditional claim to a monopoly of power. Indeed, the Euro-
communists' insistence upon democratic communism must seem
like the idea of "fried snowballs" to the CPSU leadership,
especially when one remembers that it was precisely such a
149The Economist , 3 July 1976, p. 36
150 Zimmerman, "Western," p. 14.
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challenge to Soviet dogma which led to the invasion and
151
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Although the East Berlin conference was certainly their
greatest success, the Eurocommunists have also affected the
CPSU by their growing criticism of Soviet domestic policies -
political repression, violations of human rights, actions
taken against dissidents, censorship, the content of Soviet
"social democracy," etc. Calling for independence and
autonomy was one thing, but by attacking these internal
Soviet policies, the Eurocommunists touched a sensitive
Soviet nerve. Soviet power and prestige is, therefore,
152
at stake, as is the legitimacy of the CPSU itself.
Moscow is painfully aware of the fact that the relation-
ship between the Eurocommunists and Soviet dissidents is
mutually reinforcing. The Eurocommunists constantly monitor
events within the USSR and new developments in the West are
not lost upon the Soviet dissidents, in spite of CPSU cen-
sorship. The dissidents appeal for Eurocommunist moral
support and generally quickly receive it, along with a
measure of Eurocommunist criticism of CPSU excesses. The
dissidents in the Soviet Union firmly believe that the
Eurocommunist parties support them and it is this belief,
151Morton Schwartz, "Moscow and Eurocommunism," Paper
presented at the California Conference on Eurocommunism and
United States Foreign Policy, La Jolla, CA. , 15-16 April
1977, p. 3.
152Triska, "Diversity," p. 30.
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among others, that sustains them. The dissidents see the
CPSU as sensitive to public criticism, especially from the
French and Italian communist parties. "Keep up the pressure,"
said one Soviet dissident. "We are the ones who will have
to take the effects. We will." "Keep speaking out," said
a well-known Soviet physicist, "It might not be good for us
153here, but it will help Jews everywhere." As Morton
Schwartz accurately points out, the very existence of the
Eurocommunist parties has created an "independent pole of
154
reference" for dissident communist elements.
Additionally, there are strong indications that the
CPSU is plainly worried that the unorthodoxy of the Euro-
communist parties could lead to the formation of an indepen-
dent bloc of communist parties stretching from Spain to
155
Yugoslavia, taking in some of the northern parties as well.
Should such a bloc actually emerge, the CPSU would face
ideological attack from two sides, from China on the one
hand and from the Western European communists on the other.
It was basically this fear that motivated the CPSU to push
for the East Berlin conference in the first place and, given
the outcome of this conference, it would appear that the
price they paid for the conference was too high and that
153Christian Science Monitor , 29 Mar 1977, p. 19
154 Schwartz, "Moscow," p. 4.
The Economist, 3 January 1976, p. 33.
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they may have accelerated such an eventuality rather than
have forestalled it.
The jolts that the Eurocommunist parties have given the
CPSU to this point have, indeed, been dramatic and signi-
ficant. However, they may be merely the tip of the iceberg
when one considers the potential impacts yet to emerge.
A contingency for which Moscow is truly unprepared is
that fact that sometime soon one of these Eurocommunist par-
ties may come into power. If this party enters government,
plays by the rules, and then steps down as the result of an
election, the CPSU's claim that communism is on the march
in Western Europe would be fatally undercut. If, moreover,
this party would enter government and then be expelled for
acting in a "Stalinist" manner, that event would give the
CPSU a worse name, complicate its efforts for good relations
with Western governments, and leave it with fewer assets
157in Western Europe than it started with.
To make matters worse, a Eurocommunist party that succeeded
in holding power through democratic and pluralistic processes
would be even more damaging to the CPSU. If the party fails,
it is merely an embarrassment for Moscow; but if its succeeds,
it may become a critical threat by offering to the entire
Osadczuk-Korab, "Brezhnev's," pp. 192-193
157 .Zimmerman, "Western," p. 14.
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world an alternative to Soviet-style communism that could
have far-reaching effects in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union itself. Should the CPSU fail to prevent a Eurocommunist
infection within Eastern Europe, the Soviet empire would
begin to collapse as the Eastern European nations began
to alter their political systems to satisfy presently
unfulfilled national aspirations and goals.
Indeed, even a partial introduction of Eurocommunism
into Eastern Europe would be a profound challenge to Soviet
theory and practice. The adoption of the Eurocommunist
model within Eastern Europe would be seen by the CPSU as
a grave threat to their survival for they would fear the
gradual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the weakening
of bi-lateral economic ties, the fading away of COMECON,
the destruction of what is left of their ideological primacy
and universalist pretensions, and the emergence of strong
domestic pressures for similar reforms in the Soviet Union
itself.
It is quite obvious that the Eurocommunists see this
potential themselves. Carrillo, the PCE leader, has often
spoken of a "Western reference point for the world workers'
movement" to which the people's democracies in Eastern Europe
159
would increasingly look. In 1976, Carrillo flatly
158 Gati, "Europeanization, " p. 550.
159L'Unita, 1 November 1975, (FBIS)
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asserted that, "communist participation in democratic
systems in the West will aid in the democratization of the
16
socialist countries of the East." Even a cursory review
of the Western European press would demonstrate that Carrillo's
views are shared by the rest of the Eurocommunist parties.
To assert that Eurocommunism has affected the CPSU is, in
reality, a gross understatement. That Eurocommunism threatens
the ultimate legitimacy of CPSU rule would be more in line
with current realities and more descriptive of the Soviet
perception.
The impact of Eurocommunism, although strongly felt in
Moscow, has profoundly affected Eastern Europe as well.
Although Eastern European reaction is diverse and subject
to the amount of Soviet pressure and the leaderships' vested
interests in each nation, it is apparent that numerous ele-
ments regard Eurocommunism as a viable within-system alterna-
tive to the Soviet model. This perception has gained ground
simply because the concept is sponsored by communist parties
with whom Moscow maintains comradely relations and because
it has gained "legitimacy" in the world communist movement;
a fact underscored by the outcome of the 1976 East Berlin
conference. This alternative could prove to be a most
potent foreign stimulus.
Zimmerman, "Western," p. 16.
161
Gati, "Europeanization, " p. 547
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For some Eastern European countries, the concept of
Eurocommunism has become an oft-cited source of justification
and political leverage in their attempts to engender greater
independence from the CPSU. Eurocommunism has also tended
to reinforce the traditional belief that Eastern Europe
represents a "bridge between East and West" and, especially
in recent times, provides a half-way point for the eventual
introduction of Western ideas into the Soviet Union. It is
also significant to note that Eurocommunism is not an
"ideological stranger" in this region. Its forerunner,
national communism, was born in Yugoslavia and was attempted,
not always successfully, in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
16 2
and Romania. Not only the masses, but also the Eastern
European elites are drawn to Eurocommunism because they have
found, through past experience, that international develop-
ments can and do influence internal change and, in fact, these
elites have relied upon the international scene for pursuing
their national objectives and thus modifying the political
profile of Eastern Europe. The Sino-Soviet rift permitted
Albania to evade Soviet domination and allowed Romania to
diverge from the CPSU's international positions. The
uncertainty projected by the post-Khruschev leadership
between 1964 and 1968 contributed greatly to the success of
the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism and the initial successes
162 Ibid., p. 546.
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of Dubcek's reforms in Czechoslavakia. Today, East Europeans
are widely predicting and earnestly anticipating the effect
of Eurocommunism on their region.
In assessing the impact of the Eurocommunist parties upon
Eastern Europe, one quickly notices numerous conflicts and
differences within the Warsaw Pact nations and other Eastern
European countries. The Romanians, Albanians, and Yugoslavs
are now anxious to promote and protect their own national
"paths" to socialism; Yugoslavia has even adopted many of the
foreign and domestic policy planks of the Eurocommunist plat-
form. At the same time, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Czecho-
slovakia appear opposed to the Eurocommunist thrust into
Eastern Europe and tend to parrot the perceptions of the CPSU.
In Hungary and Poland, however, there appears to be a rather
ambiguous approach to the Eurocommunist phenomenon which is
suggestive of an intra-party split over the issue; loyalists
maintaining that identification with the Eurocommunists would
damage the relations with the CPSU and "autonomists" believing
that across-the-board rejection of Eurocommunism would only
164engender instability and domestic strife at home.
The Eurocommunist parties' responses to the Eastern
European regimes' treatment of their dissidents has also had





internal dissenters and exiled reformers constantly appear
in the Eurocommunist parties' press organs and the Euro-
communists' editorials and commentaries consistently decry
the harsh treatment given the dissenters and fully support
their calls for greater liberalization and democratization.
Several examples may serve to illustrate the relative
effectiveness of the Eurocommunist criticism.
In June 1976, Polish trade unionists appealed to the PCI
to pressure the Polish government into moderating their stand
against workers involved in protesting food prices. This
pressure was immediately forthcoming and apparently successful
Adam Michnik, the dissident Polish historian, assessed the
impact of the Eurocommunist parties' support in an interview
in L' Espresso during late 1976 and stated that, "...we owe a
great amount to the Italian Communists. Not only has their
intervention helped to free many Polish workers from prison
but it is also thanks to the PCI that people consider it
possible to create socialism with a human face in East Europe
or elsewhere." Of late, it has also become clear that
largely due to Eurocommunist pressures the Polish government
has made some significant concessions in order to diffuse
1 4- •* 166its internal strife.
The German Democratic Republic was profoundly embarrassed
by the vigorous protests of the PCI over the murder of an
165L'Espresso , 5 December 1976, (FBIS)
.
166Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 1977, p. 34.
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Italian truck driver (and a PCI party activist) by GDR border
guards in Berlin. The Eurocommunists have also supported the
dissident activities of Wolf Bierman and Robert Havemann.
They were quick to condemn the GDR for stripping Bierman of
his citizenship and are clearly presently involved in
attempting to prevent the same action from being taken
against Havemann. L'Unita has not only published Havemann *s
dissident views but also his demand for a "public guarantee
from the GDR authorities" that he would be permitted to return
167
to the GDR should he decide to visit Western Europe.
Finally, according to Wolf Bierman, "the Eurocommunists have
encouraged dissidents to become more daring, less embarrassed,
1 6 R
more courageous, and more clear-sighted."
The open dialogue between the Eurocommunist parties and
the Czechoslovak dissidents has, without a doubt, been the
most visible and consistent manifestation of Eurocommunist
intervention in Eastern Europe. Needless to say, the roots
of this relationship go back to 1968 and "Prague Spring" and
the Eurocommunists have maintained cordial and supportive
relations with the pro-Dubcek element within Czechoslovakia
since that time. According to Michael David, an alternative
to the official Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has grown
up, known as the "Party of the Expelled," which looks toward
the Eurocommunist parties for its justification. They, along
167L'Unita
, 2 March 1977.
1 6 R
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with other Czechoslovak dissidents, see themselves as sharing
the purpose of the broad movement of European communism and
look to the communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain
for their allies. Eurocommunist support for the Czech
dissidents has been consistent and vocal and the exchange of
polemics between Rude Pravo and the Eurocommunist press has
been constant, and, at times, bitter. When Charter 77 was
first published, Eurocommunist pressures upon the Husak
regime resulted in moderate CPCZ reactions and it appeared
that Husak was willing to take the Eurocommunists * suggestions
to avoid actions that would widen East-West communist party
170disagreements. Although this attitude was short-lived, it
does demonstrate the remarkable impact of Eurocommunist
criticism.
It is interesting to note also that Romania and Hungary
have issued only placatory reactions to dissident activities.
Romania's ties to the Eurocommunist parties are understandable,
given its own autonomous goals, but that the Romanian leader-
ship should be so quiet on the dissident issue may indicate
their sympathy with and support of Eurocommunist principles
runs deeper than one would at first imagine. This assertion
gains even greater credibility when one considers that Radio
Independent Spain (the PCE's clandestine radio station),
1 6 9
Michael David, "The Czechs Look to Italy," New Statesman
(9 July 1976) , pp. 3-4.
17 Christian Science Monitor, 24 January 1977, p. 11.
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which represents the most vocal anti-Soviet and pro-
Eurocomraunist political party, has been broadcasting seven
times daily over eleven separate ratio frequencies directly
171
from Romania since the mid-1950' s. Hungary, too, provides
radio transmission facilities for the PCE and has adopted a
relatively neutral position on the dissident issue, although
claiming Charter 77 to be an "all-European issue" certainly
172
cannot be regarded by the CPSU as a neutral stance.
With the exception of Czechoslovakia, even in light of
the Bulgarian and East German rhetoric, it would appear that
Eastern Europe prefers to maintain a low profile on the
dissident issue in general, leaving the greater part of an
"anti-Eurocommunist" initiative to the Soviet Union. This
attitude may not be simply a result of Eurocommunist influence
alone; all Eastern European nations, regardless of their
relative loyalty to Moscow, highly value the openings that
have been made into the West in recent years and they know
173that these could be reversed by new East/West conflicts.
The Eurocommunist parties are also finding political
allies in Eastern Europe, although their support varies from
issue to issue. Romania joined with the Eurocommunist s in
threatening to boycott the East Berlin conference, in addition
171As reported by Foregin Broadcast Information Service,
Washington, D.C. in telephone conversation with author on
5 May 1977. Data based upon 1974 BBC report.
172 ...Christian Science Monitor
,
24 January 1977, p. 11.
173 . .Christian Science Monitor, 2 March 1977, p. 4.
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to supporting the Eurcommunists ' opposition to the East
German/Soviet draft documents. Surprisingly enough, the
Eurocommunist parties received East German and Czech backing
in their demand that the East Berlin conference end with a
declaration on civil liberties. Romania, naturally, supported
the Eurocommunist call for clear party autonomy and all the
Eastern European nations supported the Yugoslav-Italian draft
of the conference's final document. While Romanian satisfac-
tion with the East Berlin conference is not difficult to
understand, the reactions of the Poles and the Hungarians is
quite surprising. Both parties have openly stated that "each
party is free to interpret the document as it sees fit" (a
view not shared by Moscow) and the Poles feel so attracted
to the Eurocommunists that they believe that they have much
to gain from "exchanges of experiences" with the Western
174European communist parties. It is also noteworthy that
neither Poland nor Hungary has yet seen fit to publicly
criticize the PCI for breaking relations with the Husak regime
in Czechoslovakia. In fact, Kadar ' s position on Eurocommunism
in general must be causing severe tremors inside the Kremlin
walls. Janos Kadar has not only publicly disagreed with the
175know their own conditions best. The prevalent view among
long-time Eastern European observers is that "the Hungarians
are playing footsie under the table with the Italian
comrades and the other Eurocommunists but are afraid of
176being caught by Moscow." Additionally, a communist
theoretician in Budapest recently noted that "the current
experiments of the Italian comrades — autonomy from Moscow
and cooperation with bourgeois parties — appeal to Kadar,
although he will never even concede that Eurocommunism
177
exists." The "infection" of Eurocommunism is also evident
in the Hungarian press. Various party press organs have
conceded that individual parties have different roads to
socialism and that there can be no leading "center" (that
is, Moscow) or outside interference in internal affairs. A
classic line from a recent issue of Nepszabadsag must have
caused deep concern within the CPSU. "Obviously," the
article concluded, "in capitalist countries with a developed
industrial base, socialism will be obtained by different
178
methods from those adopted by Lenin in backward Russia."
The point of the preceding examples and the discussion
which accompanied them should be obvious, but, should the
175Christian Science Monitor , 9 March 1977, p. 9.
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gravity of the Eurocommunist impact upon the Soviet-bloc
nations have escaped the reader, a brief review of its
major elements might at this point be extremely useful.
In reference to Eastern Europe, it is possible to dis-
cern that numerous elements, including some of the ruling
elites, see Eurocommunism as a viable model for socialist
development in their own countries. Many political forces
within Eastern Europe are using Eurocommunism as a justi-
fication in their search for more independence from Moscow;
in some cases suggesting a splitting of the communist party
involved into "loyalist" and "autonomist" factions. Euro-
communist support for Eastern European dissidents is strong
and consistent and the Western European communist parties
have become a "touchstone" for the dissidents themselves.
Because of the freedom of access the Eurocommunist parties
enjoy in Eastern Europe, the dissidents are able to contact
them almost directly and at will and thus get their points
of view published in the West, being denied that right in
the East. Numerous Eastern European regimes have been
supportive of Eurocommunist goals, aspirations, and criti-
cisms, although this support varies from issue to issue.
Several Eastern European regimes also supported the Euro-
communist positions prior to and at the 1976 East Berlin
conference and it has become glaringly apparent that there
are obvious differences within the bloc towards not only the
Eurocommunist parties but also the concept of Eurocommunism
as well. All of these activities are all the more remarkable
120
when one realizes that they have taken place in a region
highly accessable to the KGB and well within the reach of
Soviet bayonets.
The Eurocommunist impact upon the Soviet Union has been
no less severe. The Western European communist parties,
especially the PCI, PCE, and the PCF have managed to reverse
the flow of communist initiative and influence within the
world communist movement. The flow is now West to East,
not East to West, and the CPSU has been forced onto the
ideological defensive. The Eurocommunist parties have
successfully challenged the CPSU's leadership and primacy,
formalized and institutionalized diversity and autonomy
within the communist movement, and have gone on record as
being opposed to any international communist conference,
thus short-circuiting a long-desired Soviet objective.
They have made direct control of a communist party by Moscow
an unjustifiable act, undermined much of the Marxist-Leninist
ideology, and have dismissed the Soviet model of socialism
as not only obsolete but also as "incorrect." The Eurocommunist
parties have openly criticized Soviet domestic policies and
have lent comradely support to Soviet dissidents. Their
activities across the board have caused the CPSU to regard
the formation of a Eurocommunist bloc from Spain to Yugo-
slavia as a real possibility; a situation that would place
the CPSU in the position of having to wage a two-front
ideological war - against China in the East and against the
Eurocommunists in the West. Most critical of all is the fact
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that the CPSU has become aware that Eurocommunism can and
does offer an alternate model to Soviet-style totalitarian
communism. If this new model were to be introduced into
Eastern Europe, the Soviets might well be faced with a
weakened Warsaw Pact, greatly diluted bi-lateral economic
ties with Eastern Europe, the eventual termination of
COMECON, a massive loss of prestige, influence, and whatever
is left of the CPSU's leadership pretensions, and finally,
strong and vocal domestic pressure for similar reforms
within the Soviet Union itself.
All this being considered, it just may be that Victor
Zorza was not exaggerating when he wrote the following lines
in 1975:
"Those Soviet leaders who seem bent on
picking quarrels with European communists
are not cutting off their noses to spite
their own faces. They see West European
communists as a greater menace to the
Soviet system than any political threat
posed to it by Western capitalism." 179
179Washington Post , 5 November 197 5
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IX. REACTION AND RESPONSE IN EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE USSR
Given the magnitude of the challenge posed by the Euro-
communist parties and their "revisionist" ideologies, it
should come as no surprise that the Soviet-bloc regimes have,
for years, sought to negate both its internal and external
effects. What is surprising, however, is that the Eastern
European and Soviet reaction and response has been largely
ineffective and, in some cases, even counter-productive.
While it is impossible to detail the entire spectrum of the
Soviet-bloc response, what follows is an attempt to highlight
its general direction and political substance.
Prior to the emergence of Eurocommunism, Moscow could
deal with challenges to itself by simply liquidating the
offending persons or parties, by forcefully bringing the
party to heel, or by insisting that the recalcitrant party
sacrifice its own interests to the requirements of Soviet
policy. Internally and within Eastern Europe these tactics
worked generally well and in the two cases they did not,
Yugoslavia and Albania, the offending parties were merely
expelled with the sure knowledge that they would either return
to the fraternal fold or would wither and die in diplomatic,
economic and political isolation. During the era of the
Comintern and Cominform, the Western European communist
parties were under direct Soviet control and, in line with
123
the CPSU's historical interest in the spread of socialism
beyond Soviet territory, these parties were encouraged to
make some ideological and tactical compromises in order to
take better advantage of domestic political opportunities.
They entered into united fronts, popular fronts, and national
fronts; into all sorts of alliances with non-communists.
Indeed, Moscow did not object to these moves and in fact
Khruschev's suggestion that they follow this course was made
public at the 20th CPSU party congress in 1956. Khruschev's
pronouncements at that congress sent shock waves througout
the communist movement and touched off a decade of doubt
and indecision for the Western European communist parties;
instead of beginning a revolution, the Western CP's had
one forced upon them.
Although most Western communist parties exercised caution
and recognized that Khruschev's speech could only lead to
polycentrism and splittism, the PCI, under Togliatti, recog-
nized the situation as an opportunity rather than a threat.
A short four months after the 20th CPSU party congress
Togliatti shocked the CPSU with the following comment: "The
Soviet model cannot and must not any longer be considered
obligatory ... The whole system is becoming polycentric,
and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak
William McLaughlin, "Stalinism, and the Western CP's:
Ten Years After," Radio Free Europe Research Report , No. 226
(24 February 1966), pp. 3-4.
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of a single guide .... It will be up to us to work out our own
181
method and life..." While the British, Dutch, Danish, and
Luxembourg CP's initially questioned Togliatti's initiative,
it was immediately praised by the Belgian and Finnish com-
munist parties. Khruschev's speech, along with the impact
of the Hungarian revolt, was beginning to cause splits
in Western communist parties; machinery of authority was
breaking down and many vested interests were being threatened
The CPSU reacted to these developments on 30 June 1956 by
issuing a statement intended to deal with "our friends
abroad who are not completely clear on the question of the
182personality cult ..." The statement went on to say that,
"in particular one cannot agree with the question posed by
Comrade Togliatti as to whether Soviet society may have
reached certain forms of degeneration . . . the Comintern and
Cominform have ceased their activities, but it does not
follow from this, however, that international solidarity
and the need for contacts among revolutionary fraternal
183parties have lost their significance." It is significant
to note that even at this early date, June 1956, the CPSU
recognized the main threat to its own position among the
Western parties: polycentrism, autonomy, and revisionism
were under attack.
181Nuovi Argomenti
, 16 June 1956, cited in Ibid, p. 4
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Although the CPSU managed to prevent open controversy
throughout the next five years, the debates within the
Western European parties still went on in smoke-filled rooms.
Togliatti's heresy surfaced again in 1961, assisted by the
Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet-Albanian rift, and Moscow's
confused policy toward the international communist movement
in general. Togliatti now publicly asserted that "poly-
184centrism has become a necessity," and, this time, Moscow
was unable to contain open debate; the umbilical cord to
Moscow had been cut and no CPSU statement could repair the
gathering damage.
Faced with the fact that verbal admonishments were no
longer effective in silencing "dissent," the CPSU quickly
fell back on its Comintern and Cominform experience and
attempted to "organize" revisionism out of the world communist
movement; a tactic that was doomed in advance due to increasing
pluralism and growing assertions of autonomy by individual
communist parties. The CPSU managed to arrange two meetings
of all the parties, one in November 1957, and another in
November and December 196 0. In both cases, however, they
were ended with joint statements either trivial or deceptive.
The November 19 57 meeting agreed only to a joint "informa-
tional" monthly publication and in 1958, Prague began to
publish Problems of Peace and Socialism (known as World
104
L'Unita, 12 November 1961, cited in Ibid, p. 5
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Marxist Review in the West). In I960, the meeting simply
backed Khruschev* s request to drop the special status
accorded to the CPSU as primus responsible for the conduct
of all parties. Beyond these activities, all Soviet efforts
to establish an all-communist organization or international
secretariat during the Khruschev period failed. Calls for
a world communist conference continued throughout the early
1960 's, but were opposed not only by the Chinese, but also
by the "neutralists" as well as the "revisionists" and
"autonomists" in the West. Finally, in 1964, Khruschev
managed to get a drafting commission together to prepare
for a world conference of communist parties. However, before
it could meet Khruschev was removed from power and his
successors postponed the meeting.
Brezhnev managed to assemble this drafting commission
in Moscow during March 1965, but it was more of a defeat
than a victory. The weak resolution it adopted was in
reality an admission of its inability to agree on anything
and in true Marxist-Leninist tradition Brezhnev attempted
to turn a sow's ear into a silk purse by declaring that
among communists "there can be different approaches to the
solution of these or other specific problems, differing
18 5Alexander Dallin, "The USSR and World Communism,"
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interests on these or other concrete questions of internal
18 6
or foreign policy."
Between 1965 and 1967, the CPSU continued to make attempts
at setting up another international communist conference, but
these attempts, too, were futile. One effort was made to get
such a conference together to support "united action" on
behalf of North Vietnam. The CPSU encouraged the Polish and
French CP's to send out invitations, but the North Vietnamese
themselves refused to attend and the idea collapsed. After
the cultural revolution began in China, the CPSU issued
another call for an international conference at the Bulgarian
party's congress in November 1966. But again, the call was
in vain; only the CPSU and the Czech and French parties
supported the idea, and it was opposed or ignored by nine
18 7
ruling communist parties.
As indicated earlier, the CPSU did manage to get a pan-
European conference into session during April 1967 at Karlovy
Vary, Czechoslovakia. Called in hope of strengthening inter-
national communist unity and reasserting CPSU leadership, the
conference was more of a setback than a success. It produced
no condemnation of China, no united support of the CPSU's
European policy, and six European parties actually refused
to attend.
186Pravda, 9 April 1965, cited in Ibid., p. 219
187
New York Times, 17 & 21 November 1966.
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In late 1967, it appeared that after long and difficult
Soviet efforts an international conference would take place
in 1968. Although numerous preparatory meetings were held,
Soviet desires to reestablish "unity" in the international
movement under the "leadership" of the CPSU were irrevocably
crushed by the international reaction to the Soviet-inspired
Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968.
By 1968 it was obvious that the CPSU had been unable
to find a formula for dealing with international communism.
They had failed to organize the movement, failed to rally
the various parties behind joint action programs, failed to
make proletarian internationalism or the Leninist party
model palatable to many of the parties, and failed to stop
the gradual erosion of Soviet initiative and influence.
Given these failures, it is not surprising that the CPSU,
in its search for cheap means to reassert its influence,
began to reluctantly acknowledge differences within the
communist movement. Between roughly 1964 and 1968 the CPSU
tended to close its eyes to the activities of some parties
in exchange for their solidarity with the Soviet Union. Thus,
Moscow chose not to debate the PCI, not to criticize Castro,
and not to actively reject the substance of programs and
policies initiated by Ceausescu in Romania. This meant a
blurring of ideological positions in exchange for inter-
national support and with each compromise made by the CPSU
129
its negotiating position became further and further
w -i 188weakened.
Although Moscow was willing to accept some deviations,
other deviations were clearly unacceptable. Unfortunately,
Moscow's control within Eastern Europe was slipping; "bloc"
integration had failed; Stalinist Gleichschaltung had failed;
economic, ideological, and military pressures had failed;
and Yugoslavia and Albania were already outside the camp
and Romania was demonstrably independent. To make matters
worse, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were initiating economic
and political reforms and Poland was preoccupied with inter-
nal dissent and economic problems. Because of all this,
the CPSU adopted a stance opposing any change within the
ruling communist regimes and initiated a policy opposing
liberalization in domestic affairs as well. Soviet appre-
hension grew throughout the mid-1960' s and this attitude was
reflected - in the CPSU's response to the dismissal of Rankovic
in Yugoslavia, the growing tension with Romania during
1966-1968, and most dramatically in the confrontation with
18 9
the Dubcek regime in the fall of 1968.
During the first three months of 1968, the CPSU was
relatively silent on the Czechoslovak developments and the
declarations of support Dubcek was receiving from the Euro-
communist parties. This silence was probably due to
188 Dallin, "The USSR," pp. 219-220
189 T , . -Ibid.
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misgivings as to what course to follow, a desire to isolate
the Soviet population from the unrest in Eastern Europe,
and a prudent decision not to exacerbate that unrest by
critical public comment from Moscow. In late March, however,
the dam broke and a domestic propaganda campaign began.
Pravda began to stress the need for vigilance against "bourgeois"
190
and other unhealthy outside influences and later ran an
article aimed directly at the Eurocommunist demands that
Czech liberalization should be allowed to continue unimpeded.
This article asserted that "ideological saboteurs are dis-
playing particular zeal in their effort to present in a
false light the nature of relations between the CPSU and the
CZCP, resorting to the hackneyed device of Soviet inter-
191ference." At the same time, the East German and Polish
parties began their open criticism of Dubcek and his supporters.
The propaganda attacks were stepped up during April and
May and revolved around the general theme of "antisocialist"
elements in Czechoslovakia being exploited by the West to
sow discord within the Warsaw bloc. In June, an article
again appeared in Pravda entitled "Marxism and Leninism:
One and Indivisible." A brief look at some of its content
is illustrative of the fact that the attack was not only
190Pravda, 14 March 1968, (FBIS)
.
191Pravda, 28 March 1968, (FBIS).
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against Dubcek, but the "revisionist" Eurocommunist parties
as well:
"The bourgeoisie and its ideologists and
politicians continue to sing the same old
song that Marxism is a 19th-century theory,
that it is out-dated, has entered into conflict
with reality and is undergoing profound crisis
... Attempts to present a different, non-Leninist
interpretation of Marxism have become the vogue
among present-day revisionists... The revision-
ists howl against the monolithism of Marxism. .
.
seek to break up Marxism into national compart-
ments... and are trying to give a theoretical
basis to an anti-internationalist policy that is
aimed at splitting the world Communist movement.
We have struggled and must continue to struggle
against those who advocate opportunism, some
sort of bourgeois philosophic system or
eclectic combination, tolerance and concilia-
tionism toward bourgeois ideology, and a diffuse
mishmash of scraps and borrowings from bourgeois
theories. "192
In early July, the CPSU launched an attack against the
publication of "The 2,000 Words," labeling it a call for
counterrevolution. In criticizing the Western supporters of
this document, among whom were the Eurocommunists , the CPSU
claimed that its supporters were "the same people who have
more than once called for putting an end to the CZCP's
guiding role and for returning to a democracy . . . who are
seeking to present the 2,000 words as the last word of some
193
sort of socialist democracy.
192Pravda , 14 June 1968, (FBIS)
.
193 Pravda, 11 June 1968, (FBIS).
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Since the majority of the Eurocommunist parties, along
with the Yugoslavs and the Romanians, strongly supported
Dubcek, and since the CPSU leadership was still divided on
a course of action, the CPSU Politburo agreed to meet directly
with the Politburo of the CZCP in late July — an act unprec-
194
edented in the history of the communist movement. Not
only had Eurocommunist pressures helped to force this meeting,
but also they had decidedly influenced Suslov and Ponomarev,
both of whom at this point were committed to a political
solution of the Czech crisis. Suslov* s motivation for such
a solution was made apparent directly after this meeting when
he commented: "The Czechoslovak question must be settled by
agreement if great harm is not to ensue for the international
195Communist movement and its unity."
As the Warsaw Pact forces roared into Czechoslovakia in
August, the Soviet-bloc press organs loudly proclaimed wide
international communist support for the "fraternal assistance."
At no point did these press organs take public note of the
condemnations coming from the Eurocommunist and other parties
throughout the world. Although there was some muted criti-
cism of the Eurocommunist position throughout August and
September, it was of a general nature. An excellent example
of this approach is Sergei Kovalev's article in Pravda
:




"It is impossible to ignore the allegations
being heard in some places that the actions of
the five socialist countries contradict the
Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and
the right of the nations to self-determination
... Such arguments are untenable. .. socialist
countries and Communist parties have and must
have freedom to determine their country's path
of development. However, any decision of
theirs must damage neither socialism in their
own country, nor the fundamental interests of
the other socialist countries, nor the world-
wide workers movement.
. .Whoever forgets this
is placing sole emphasis on the autonomy and
independence of Communist parties, lapsing into




Each Communist party is free to apply the
principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism
in its own country, but it cannot deviate from
these principles (if, of course, it remains a
Communist party) . .
.
There is no doubt that the actions taken in
Czechoslovakia by the five allied socialist
countries will be increasingly supported by all
who really value the interests of the present-
day revolutionary movement, the peace and -.
qfi
security of peoples, democracy, and socialism."
196Pravda , 26 September 1968... Upon reading Kovalev's
justification, it is ironic that the invasion also coincided
with the publication of a book in the USSR claiming the CPSU
was a proponent of diversity within the bloc and that
military pressure against another socialist state was
unthinkable . To quote: "Socialist states are advocates of
non-intervention in each other's internal affairs; they
respect the laws and traditions of the fraternal countries,
and consider it impermissible to utilize any means of
economic, political, and military pressure in their mutual
relations. They fight against any acts in inter-state
relations designed to discredit or replace the composition
of the party and the state organs which the people have
entrusted with the administration of the country." (A. P.
Butenko, ed. , The World Socialist System and Anti-Communism ,
Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, p. 148) . Evidently, the
publishers didn't get the word! !
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In October, however, open polemics broke out with the
publication of an article in Neues Deutschland which denounced
the heresies and revisionism of the communist parties of
197
Western Europe, especially the Austrian and Italian parties.
Simultaneously, the CPSU began to take actions against many
Eurocommunist parties; actions including mail propaganda
campaigns, embassy contacts with conservative party elements,
and threats to withhold commissions earned by "front firms"
198
and other forms of aid and assistance. These tactics,
however, were ineffective, and in announcing the postponement
of the world party conference, the CPSU avoided any reference
to the fact that disunity and discord in the Communist move-
ment stemming from the Czech invasion had irrevocably forced
199the delay of this conclave of parties.
Given the massive toll that the Czechoslovak "solution"
had taken within the international communist movement, it
is not surprising that the international conference finally
held in June 1969 was not a great success, although Moscow,
of course, professed to be pleased with its results. The
final document said little except for the general agreement
that the assembled parties were opposed to imperialism and
Maoism. In fact, this final document was the end result
197Neues Deutschland
, 27 October 1968, (FBIS)
198 Devlin, "New Crisis," p. 68.
19 9Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 3 97n.
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of four hundred amendments, one-quarter of which found
their way into the final text. Not only did ten communist
parties refuse to attend the conference, but five parties
attended only to refuse to sign the final document. In
addition, at least fifteen parties expressed clear and sharp
dissent and the conference participants openly split into
"autonomist" and "pro-Soviet" factions. Although the con-
ference reaffirmed the "defense of socialism" as a communist
duty, it explicitly rejected the concept of a "leading cen-
ter of the international communist movement" and implicitly
rejected the notion of a "general line" binding on all
parties. Again, Soviet hopes for unity were dashed; the
results of the conference were ambiguous at best.
Due to the deep conflicts that the Czech intervention
engendered and the obvious failure of the June 1969 con-
ference to ameliorate them, the CPSU quickly turned to
attempts to "normalize" its relations with the Eurocommunist
and other parties. These attempts were marked primarily
by pressures and factionalist intervention. Throughout
1969 and 1970, the CPSU continually pressed their "fraternal"
parties to not only reconsider their opposition to and
enstrangement from the CPSU but also to purge their parties
of the more active "anti-Soviet" elements. Roger Garaudy,
himself thusly purged by the PCF, recounts in his book,
200Dallin, "The USSR," p. 221
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Toute la verite ,that such pressures were applied, not only
to the PCF, but also to the parties of Finland, Austria,
Britain, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Devlin's research indi-
cates that Sweden and Venezuela could also be included in
20!
this group.
In this effort, the greatest CPSU successes were to be
found within the Austrian Communist Party. After a long
and bitter struggle, the pro-Soviet faction managed to
expell from the party both Ernst Fischer and Frank Marek
(two very outspoken anti-Soviet party members) and to reverse
the party's official stand on the invasion of Czechoslovakia -
the only party in the entire world communist movement to
202have done so.
Pressures against the PCI resulted in the expulsion of
the Manifesto group in late 1969, and in Britain the Soviets
were able to gradually but far from completely convince the
BCP to soft-pedal the issues raised by CPSU actions in
Czechoslovakia. CPSU pressures against the PCE were designed
to bring that party back into line and the Soviets chose
to back two pro-Soviet party members against Carrillo. These
attempts, however, failed and both members, Eduardo Garcia
and Augustin Gomez, were expelled from the party in early
201Kevin Devlin, "Interparty Relations: Limits of




1970, as was the pro-Soviet exiled General Enrique Lister
r: 4_u 1 203a few months later.
Within the PCF, CPSU pressures certainly contributed to
the ouster of Garaudy in 1970 and also the dismissal of the
PCF party poet, Louis Aragon, who highly displeased the
CPSU by asserting the Czechoslovak "normalization" was, in
reality, "the Biafra of the human spirit." Although
Garaudy 's expulsion could be interpreted as a CPSU success,
that judgement must be questioned to a great degree. Gradually
the same party that had unanimously expelled him also has
recently unanimously and officially accepted his policies,
although he, himself, still remains outside of the party
205proper.
Another interesting event took place during this period
that, although occurring in South America, also sheds light
upon the CPSU's growing opposition to the Eurocommunist
phenomenon and ideology. Teodoro Petkoff, a Bulgarian
emigrant, had surfaced within the Venezualan Communist Party
and, due to the Czech invasion, had become an ardent opponent
of neo-Stalinism. His two books — Czechoslovakia: The Problem
of Socialism and Socialism for Venezuela — aroused heated
203 x , ., ~ nIbid.
, p. 30
.
204Mclnnes, Eurocommunism, p. 14
one:
John E. McCarthy, "The Development of Eurocommunism:
A Case Study of Italy and France," Master's Thesis, Monterey
Institute of Foreign Studies, April 1977, p. 107.
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debate within the PCV and also within the CPSU. A Soviet
review of the latter book, published in 1970, accused
Petkoff of "blackening the socialist countries, and above
all the Soviet Union, in a tone of the most glaring anti-
communism and anti-Sovietism, " and added that his arguments
on behalf of "pluralism of political parties in socialist
countries, freedom of the press, the need for the Communist
party to give up its leading and directing role in the
state," etc., were based on a "superclass" approach "entirely
2 Ofi
alien to Marxism. " The CPSU strongly urged the PCV to
expell Petkoff and his followers, which they did in December
1970, but Petkoff promptly founded a rival political party.
Before officially leaving the PCV, however, Petkoff summed
up the progressives' demands for more independence and less
dogmatism in the following words, words that could have
easily come from the PCI, the PCE or even the PCF: "I am
not working for an anti-Soviet, anti-Chinese or anti-Cuban
party, but for an unaligned party. That is why I have
sounded the alarm against the loss of independence. . . The
Stalinists of the Communist Party . . . want a party that




Voprosy filosofii (No. 10), 1970, cited in Devlin,
"Interparty Relations," p. 31.
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The Soviet pressures continued throughout 1970 and 1971,
increasing in intensity as the 24th CPSU Party Congress
approached. Prior to the congress, many of the Eurocommunist
parties conveyed their message to the CPSU that the congress
should not, under any circumstances, attempt to rehabilitate
Stalin or Stalinism. The Eurocommunist parties correctly
realized that due to the crisis in Czechoslovakia, the
problems in Poland, and the persistent internal political
dissent, the CPSU had come to harbor an obsessive dread
of "subversive" ideas, including those expounded by the
Western European communist parties. Brezhnev's response to
the Eurocommunist warnings was to forego "restalinization,
"
but to insist upon "de-Khruschevization. " There would be
tighter party control, but no reign of terror.
Brezhnev's opening remarks at the congress, although
critical of right-wing and left-wing revisionism and nationalism,
were relatively moderate. But when Masherov, the Belorussian
party leader, rose to speak, the gloves came off. Masherov
accused the right-wing revisionists of forming alliances
with "openly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet elements," and
of engaging in "pseudo-scientific discussions about a
certain "rejuvenation" of Marxism, in a sorry effort to
represent Leninism as a limited, local phenomenon, in talk
about the so-called pluralism of Marxism, the plurality of
140
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national models of socialism, and so forth." The PCI
reacted immediately to Masherov's charges since they had no
doubts as to Masherov's target. Neither had the Yugoslavs,
who promptly commented
:
"Masherov gave no names, but observers conclude
that he meant not only the Italian Communist
Party but also all other Western Communist
parties which reject a blind and unconditional
support of Soviet policy. "209
Masherov's attack upon the Eurocommunists supported the
positions taken by Soviet theorist S.M. Kovalev in a Pravda
article released just prior to the congress in which he
criticized unidentified Western communist parties for
suggesting that "the parties in power in socialist countries
should adapt their political practice" to the view that
socialism is compatible with certain bourgeois political
institutions, "particularly the right of activity for opposi-
tion parties." He summed up his article by asserting that
"to give free play to all political forces in the socialist
countries in the present atmosphere would mean the suicide
xz • -. ..210of socialism.
In a strong sense, the CPSU had hoped that the 24th
CPSU Party Congress would be a congress of "normalization."
Unfortunately for the Soviets, the normalization that did
2 08Pravda
, 1 April 1971, cited in Ibid.
209Devlin, "Interparty Relations," p. 35.
210 Znamia
, February/March 1971, cited in Ibid,
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occur fell far short of their aspirations. This fact,
however, did not prevent the CPSU from portraying the congress
in glowing terms:
"During the days of the Congress, Soviet
Communists were able to convince themselves
once more of the fact that the representatives
of the fraternal parties warmly approve
of the Leninist course of the CPSU and the
principled line that it follows in the
world Communist movement. "211
Berlinguer and the PCI, however, apparently disagreed:
"At the Congress we were able to note again
the existence of assessments different
from ours on some important questions con-
cerning the international workers 1 movement,
relations between Communist parties, and
the development of socialist thought. It
is not only a question of the problems
posed by the Czechoslovak events, regarding
which our well-known positions remain
unchanged
, but also of more general questions
such as, for example, the need to respect
fully the independence of each party, each
state , and each socialist state, which
remains a fundamental issue for us. "212
(Emphasis added)
Throughout 1971 and into 1972, the Eurocommunist/CPSU
polemics continued to grow but since the Soviet propaganda
campaign was largely ineffective in controlling the actions
of the Eurocommunist party, a curtain of censorship descended
upon the Soviet-bloc nations designed to insulate that
213populace from the possibility of infection.
211Pravda, 13 April 1971, cited in Ibid., p. 25
212L'Unita , 2 April 1971, cited in Ibid., p. 25
213Mclnnes, Eurocommunism, pp. 55-56.
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In early 1972, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the
CPSU Central Committee released an article entitled "The
Falsifiers of the Theory of Scientific Communism and Their
Bankruptcy," in a further escalation of the Soviet attack
upon the Eurocommunist heresy. Although one would have to
read the article in its entirety to fully grasp the bitterness
of its tone and the zeal of its arguments, perhaps a few
excerpts will assist the reader in judging how far the
opposition to the Eurocommunists had gone by early 1972.
It is important to note that the following statements are
not the words of some obscure writer in Pravda, but those
of the Central Committee of the CPSU!
Gambling on disuniting the communist and
entire revolutionary movement constitutes
one of the main principles of imperialism's
anti-communist strategy. Here the imperial-
ists are placing special hopes on the
subversive and splittist activities of
revisionists ... In persistently speaking
out against imperialism, the communist
and workers parties are simultaneously
waging an implacable ideological and political
struggle against right and left opportunism
in the contemporary revolutionary movement . .
.
... in many instances right and left opportunism
are merging with nationalist tendencies and
with the most reactionary and barefaced
anti-communism and anti-Sovietism ... Therefore,
dealing a rebuff to all forms of opportunism
has been and remains a supremely important
task for all Marxist-Leninist parties . .
.
... In the political sphere, revisionism has
in fact attempted to revise the foundation of
Marxism, the doctrine of the class struggle.
Political freedom, democracy and universal
sufferage destroys the soil for the class
struggle . . . Attacks on the dictatorship of
the proletariet betray their intentions to
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emasculate the revolutionary content of
Marxism-Leninism, to render the working
class leaderless and to remove its most
aware and militant part . .
.
. . .
The contemporary revisionist have reached
the point of denying the historic mission
of the working class and the necessity of
socialist revolution and the dictatorship
of the proletariet . . . Their aim is to
design a "model of socialism" which would,
essentially, be a "hybrid society", unite
the features of both socialism and capitalism.
The revisionists conclude that the communists
must perpetuate bourgeous democracy . .
.
... As historical experience testifies, under
socialism grounds disappear for the exis-
tence of any kind of opposition parties
which oppose the communist party . .
.
. . . The modern revisionists are particularly
actively opposing the leading role of the
communist parties in socialist countries . .
.
events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed
the grave consequences of abandoning Leninist
principles . . . The activity of the revisionists
plunged that country into a profound crisis and
jeopardized the socialist gains . .
.
. . .
revisionists are striving ... to destroy
the party itself, having corrupted it
ideologically and organizationally . . . The
revisionists strive to present Leninist
principles . . . merely as a product of specifi-
cally Russian conditions . .
.
... It is primarily the modern revisionists who
attack the principle of democratic centralism ..
Behind this verbiage can be perceived a per-
sistent aspiration to transform the party
into a formless association . . . Theoretical
discussion is one thing, the political line
of the party and the political struggle are
another matter. We are not a discussion
club . .
.
. . . The views of the revisionists represent a
definite danger for the revolutionary forces
because they are exploiting for reactionary
purposes the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, . .
.
passing themselves off as "rennovators" of
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Marxism, . . . and receiving the active support
of the monopolistic bourgeoisie's propaganda
machine . .
.
. . . The uncompromising struggle against the
splitting activity of the revisionists and
against their attempts to distort the theory
of scientific communism is an important
condition for achieving the ideological,
political and organization unity of the
communist and workers' parties. (Emphasis
added) 214
Over the next several years, the exchange of polemics
between the Eurocommunist parties and the Soviet-bloc par-
ties continued to grow, both in frequency and bitterness.
In general, the disputes centered around the varying
interpretations of traditional communist dogma, civil
liberties, dissent, parliamentary institutions, defense
policy and NATO, European integration, political alliances,
inter-party relations, party autonomy, internationalism,
militancy, and the negotiations which preceded the pan-
215European conference in East Berlin. The events and
conflicts leading up to the 25th CPSU Party Congress in
February 1976 and the pan-European conference in June of
that same year have already been adequately reported in
Section VI. It might be well, however, to look at some
other developments during that period so as to shed further
light on the widening distance between the Eurocommunists
and the CPSU.
214Kommunist, 22 February 1972, pp. 101-105.
215For an excellent, in-depth discussion of these and
other important issues, see Mclnnes, Eurocommunism .
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By 1975, not only due to Eurocommunist intransigence
during the pre-conference negotiations but also due to
other Eurocommunist policy decisions, programs, and pro-
nouncements, the activities of these "revisionist" parties
were becoming nearly intolerable and the Soviet-bloc began
to respond with even stronger criticism. The propaganda
offensive appears to have opened in April 1975 at about
the same time as the first East German draft was being
offered to the Eurocommunist parties in preparation for
the East Berlin conference. An article in The World Marxist
Review
,
written by its editor, Konstantin Zaradov, accused
the Eurocommunists of abandoning the revolutionary struggle
and severely attacked their tactic of using the electoral
means to come to power. Appearing as it did, just prior to
the elections in Portugal, Zaradov seems to have been
calling, too, for a more militant stand on the part of the
Eurocommunist parties, in particular the Portuguese, and
for a more "activist" Soviet role in the promotion of
Communist revolutions. He stated that these policies could
now be pursued because of the strength of the "socialist
world system." In other words, the military power of the
Warsaw Pact would deter any attempt by the West to intervene
should Western European Communist Parties adopt a more
militant stand. The Zaradov article brought a strong
rebuttal from the PCI, the PCE, and the PCF.
2 1 fiStephen F. Larabee, "New Light on the Zaradov Contro-
versy," Radio Liberty Research Report , RL 413/7 5 (29 September
1975), pp. 1-4.
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In June, Ladislav Novotny, the Czechoslovak ideologist,
atacked the PCI's "historic compromise" with the Christian
Democrats as revisionist, opportunist, and "destructive of
217
the revolutionary movement." Two months later, Zaradov
again attacked the Eurocommunists, this time in Pravda, and
called for the "hegemony of the proletariet" and reasserted
the validity of the Leninist party model in support of the
Portuguese CP's struggle for power. Additionally, Zaradov
condemned the alliances of the PCI and the PCF as impure
and warned that such opportunism would lead them into an
ideologically amorphous bloc, which was purely "Menshevik
218logic." Zaradov continued his critique in the August
edition of The World Marxist Review stating that "we find
the opportunists suggesting various recipes for diluting
the communist parties in ideologically amorphous coalitions,
election blocs and alliances, without any conditions what-
ever. All such proposals are motivated, we are told, by
concern for unity. But the real purpose is to dull the
anti-monopoly orientation of democratic alliances and weaken
219their most militant element, the communists."
Brezhnev, who up to this point had maintained a rela-




Pravda, 6 August 1975, (FBIS)
.
219World Marxist Review, August 1975, pp. 34-35
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elected to meet publicly with Zaradov; an event that received
front-page coverage in Pravda. Although many explanations
have been offered for this unusual meeting, the most plausi-
ble one is that Brezhnev met with Zaradov for internal
political reasons. As Thomas Hammond has pointed out, there
have been and remain serious differences of opinion among
the CPSU elite as to the policy to follow regarding the
Eurocommunist parties; a dispute between "cautious gradualism"
220
and "ideological fervor and militancy." Brezhnev, in
September 1975, probably felt the need to buttress his
support from the more conservative members of the leadership
and saw the meeting with Zaradov as one way of doing this.
This interpretation gains further credibility when one con-
siders the events occurring simultaneously in the pan-European
conference negotiations. The East Germans had submitted a
third draft document, written between July and September,
and it appeared that it was much more acceptable to the Euro-
communist parties. When the Editorial Commission met in
November to discuss this draft, however, the Soviet position
had changed again and Katushev, the CPSU delegate, again put
forward the Soviet demands for a more "ideologically pure"
final document. It seems likely that Brezhnev wished to
wait until after his leadership position was reconfirmed
Thomas T. Hammond, "Moscow and Communist Takeovers,"
Problems in Communism (January-February 1976) , p. 65.
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at the 25th CPSU Party Congress before he would sanction
any further watering-down of the Soviet demands. Addi-
tionally, he was certain to have believed that this move
would strengthen his position in "conservative" party
circles and that the CPSU party congress would serve as
an additional stimulus to pry concessions from the Western
221CP's. x
Late 1975 also saw continued polemics in the Soviet
press. Vadim Zagladin, from the CPSU's Central Committee,
denounced the electoral preoccupations of the Eurocommunists
claiming they would lead them into association with social
democrats, thus risking the loss of their revolutionary
nature. He strongly asserted that "Marxist-Leninists con-
sider it inadmissable to cultivate compromises which could
involve the loss of revolutionary identity in order to gain
an ally or a thousand votes ... a costly price will later
222have to be paid." In December, Zagladin was sent to
negotiate with the PCI, but this mission apparently failed
to alter the PCI's position.
221A New York Times article later asserted that "non-
Communist experts now speculate that the switch in the
Russian position might not have been a real change in Mr.
Brezhnev's line, but was just a decision by the Soviet
leader that the concessions demanded were too much to
accept shortly before the Russian Congress and therefore
represented a deferral of their acceptance." (New York Times ,
24 June 1976, p. 12C)
222Kommumst, November 1975, (FBIS) .
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In February 1976, the CPSU dispatched Kirilenko to the
PCF's party congress in the hopes of convincing Marchais
to attend the forthcoming Soviet conference and of softening
the PCF's stand on the pan-European conference document.
Kirilenko was not only denied the floor at the congress
but had to be content with speaking at a meeting in a Paris
suburb at which he declared that "all the fuss about the
2 2 3
rights of man in socialist society" was merely anti-Sovietism.
The same day Rude Pravo ran an editorial which, without
mentioning the PCF, denounced the rejection of the doctrine
of the dictatorship of the proletariat as "righist revisionism"
stating that those who disavowed the doctrine could not be
224
called socialists. A similar but more virulent attack
against the Western European communist parties appeared in
the CZCP theoretical journal Nova Mysi
,
published in Prague,
at roughly the same time as the Kirilenko visit to France.
Several excerpts should demonstrate the direction the
"pro-Soviet" polemics were taking just prior to the 25th
CPSU congress:
"The theory of national communism and specific
models of communism is one of the weapons
used by imperialism to fight the revolutionary
movement . . . Nationalism and particularism
undermine the unity of the progressive forces
and above all the unity of the international
working class and the communist parties . .
.
other weapons of imperialism are speculation
22 3Mclnnes, Eurocommunism , p. 16.
224 Rude Pravo, 6 February 1976, (FBIS)
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on limited or unlimited sovereignty, Maoist
great-power chauvinism, the multiple versions
of anti-Sovietism, and reservations about the
validity of the principle of proletarian
internationalism. .
.
...Specific national characteristics, national
traditions and interests are interpreted in
such a way as to place them in clear conflict
with the interests and intentions of the
progressive forces...
.. .Nationalism. . .and chauvinism are the common
denominator of a vast range of ideological and
political trends which today play an objective
role in favor of international reaction and
anticommunism, weakening the international
revolutionary movement and the anti-
imperialist front. "225
The activities at the 25th CPSU Party Congress were
discussed extensively in Section VI, but several additional
events should be brought out at this point. First, Brezhnev's
remarks to the assembled delegates were unprecedented in
their sharpness of the implied criticism of the Eurocommunist
parties. He accused them of ignoring "proletarian interna-
tionalism," harming the communist movement through "oppor-
226tunism" and of playing into the hands of the "class enemy."
When Masherov took the platform, his attacks were more direct.
He charged the Western parties of "rightwing opportunism,"
attempting to "modernize Marxism. . .and to cut it up into
225
As quoted by ANSA (Rome) , 31 January 197 6 (FBIS Daily
Rpt.
,
E. Eur., 3 February 1976, p. D-3)
.
"? 7 ft
Triska, "Diversity," p. 18.
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national slices." Finally, when Berlinguer attempted
to speak, the Soviets strongly insisted that he make over
fifty revisions to his speech. Only Berlinguer' s threat to
walk out, thus joining Marchais and Carrillo, forced the
Soviets to back down and to allow Berlinguer' s speech to
be presented unchanged.
Immediately after the congress, the CZCP official, Josef
Kempny, denounced the "transformation of Marxist-Leninist
parties into opportunistic parties of a Social Democratic
228type." Mikhail Suslov, the Politburo member in charge
of the international communist movement, shortly thereafter
echoed both Brezhnev's and Kempny 's criticism and added the
point that "regional or national" versions of Marxism harm
the cause of the working class. He then branded as "enemies
of Marxism" those who interpret communist ideology in their
own fashion: "They slander real socialism, try to wash out
the revolutionary essence of Marxist-Leninist teaching, and
229
substitute bourgeois liberalism for Marxism.
"
In April, KGB Chief Yu. V. Andropov, until this point
relatively silent on this issue, joined the "anti-
revisionist" bandwagon. In a speech commemorating Lenin's
106th birthday Andropov insisted that the CPSU "regards
227Pravda , 25 February 1976, (FBIS)
.
228Nova Svoboda (Ostrava), 15 March 1976, (FBIS)
229Pravda, 18 March 1976, (FBIS).
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fidelity to Leninism as an immutable law" and the distorting
of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat has
"a single goal — representing [it] as the antithesis of
democracy." Andropov further asserted that "the Party
assigns over-riding importance to the interests of the Soviet
people and the interest of communist construction. That
which is at variance with these interests we reject," he
quoted Brezhnev, "and no one can persuade us that this
230
course is the wrong approach." Further such attacks were
common in most Soviet-bloc press organs during the period
leading up to the pan-European conference in East Berlin.
The activities surrounding and the events occurring at
the pan-European conference of Communist parties have already
received much attention, including Brezhnev's low-key, yet
insistent support of the continued "validity" of "proletarian
internationalism." It is, however, also interesting to note
that at the conference itself the Soviet delegates continued
to demand that the text of the final document include a very
restrictive definition of the "permissable" types of alliances
230 Izvestia, 23 April 1976, (FBIS) . Ponomarev echoed
Andropov's sentiments in his article for the World Marxist
Review (May, 1976). Ponomarev claimed the 25th CPSU Con-
gress was pervaded with the militant spirit of proletarian
internationalism, asserted Marxism-Leninism was the only
valid theory, and accused the right-wing revisionists of
distorting and undermining the entire movement and of
attacking the Soviet political system. These comments
were quite obviously aimed at the Eurcommunists , not the
Chinese.
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a communist party could contact and that the joint declara-
tion of all the parties serve as the platform for any such
agreement with non-communist forces. These demands were
rejected by the Eurocommunist parties and their allies and
there appears to be little doubt that the East Berlin con-
ference had dealt a massive blow to Soviet prestige and the
legitimacy of the CPSU and the regimes in Eastern Europe.
In this regard, one of the best assessments of the East
Berlin conference was made by The Economist :
Anybody who had seen what actually happened
at last week's conference of European
communists in East Berlin, and then read
Pravda '
s
version, may have wondered whether
the Soviet newspaper's men had attended




clearly, the Soviet leadership is terri-
fied of its own subjects' reactions to the
change. It could not silence, or even
denounce, the heresies that were uttered in
Berlin, Yet it could not admit to the
peoples of the Soviet Union that they had
been uttered. The sands are likely to run
out on Mr. Brezhnev before he can get anywhere
near resolving this contradiction. 232
In addition to placing rigid censorship upon the
"revisionist" attitudes expressed at the conference, the
CPSU lost no time in launching again its critiques of the
"Eurocommunist path to socialism. " Immediately after the
conference, Zagladin stated that "the independence and
231Mclnnes, Eurocommunism
, p. 42.
232 The Economist, 10 July 1976, p. 50
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self-dependence of the fraternal parties is a precondition
for the development of equal cooperation among them. . . But
one must not forget for a moment the natural laws and truths
of universal significance by which every party must be guided
in order to fulfill successfully its historic mission . .
.
one of these natural laws of universal significance is
233proletarian internationalism . " (Emphasis added) A July
article in Pravda was even more explicit in its assault
on the policies of the Eurocommunist parties:
"... experience refutes the fantasies of
bourgeois theoreticians and revisionists
who allege that the principle of prole-
tarian, socialist internationalism pre-
supposes renunciation of the independence
of individual detachments in favor of a
single center . .
.
. . . Bourgeois ideologists today prefer to
criticize socialism, setting up against it
not the capitalist systems but so-called
"democratic socialism" which is a distorted
form of the new society or a camouflaged
form of the old ... At present, bourgeois
ideologists and the reformists and revision-
ists affiliated with them are placing
special emphasis on the diversity of paths
to socialism ... There is, however, a
certain limit to the interpretation of
diversity. Those who, under the banner of
diversity and national features, emasculate
the main content of socialist principles
cannot see or do not wish to see this
limit." 234
One of the more vitriolic attacks against the "heresies"
of the Eurocommunist parties was made by Masherov in a speech
233
Pravda
, 30 June 1976, (FBIS)
234 Pravda, 23 July 1976, (FBIS)
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in Minsk. The general tone of Masherov's remarks was a far
cry from the "gentle urgings" for ideological compliance
which came from the Kremlin in the late 1960 *s:
"Our Party preserves an invincible loyalty to
the principles of Marxism-Leninism and prole-
tarian internationalism, uncompromisingly
defending this great revolutionary teaching
against reformists and revisionist distortions
...In the pseudo-scientific research of bour-
geois ideologists and all manner of falsifiers
of Marxism-Leninism, it has become fashionable
to declare as dogmatism and as obsolete every-
thing that. .. indicates steadfast, undeviating
adherence in theory, policy, and practice to
the fundamental principles and tenets of the
Marxist-Leninist science of victory...
...With the aid of a revisionist ideology
marching under the banner of "creative develop-
ment" and "renovation" of Marxism-Leninism, our
enemies pursue a far-reaching goal: to emasculate
and drown in the swamp of opportunism the
essence of Marxist-Leninist teaching and to
disarm ideologically the revolutionary forces
of today. "235 (Emphasis added)
By mid-Fall 1976, any serious reading of the Soviet-bloc
press made it readily apparent that the Eastern European
regimes had actively joined with the CPSU in their attacks
upon the "revisionists" and "falsifiers" in Western Europe.
In November, Rude Pravo characterized the PCI's criticism of
Czech oppression of priests as "anti-Czechoslovak slander...
unprecedented in the history of the communist press" and
inferred that the Czech government would get better treatment
2 T f.
from many "bourgeois journals." A short time later,
235Pravda , 2 October 1976, (FBIS)
.
236Rude Pravo, 23 November 1976, (FBIS)
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Todor Zhivkov and his BCP joined the campaign with Zhivkov's
assertion that Bulgaria "sacredly keeps the purity of
Marxism-Leninism, its loyalty to internationalism" and his
criticism of the Eurocommunists ' non-compliance with the




In mid-December, the "loyalist" regimes held an ideological
conference in Sofia to work out their "political line." At
this conference, the Bulgarian delegate, Aleksandur Lilov,
characterized Eurocommunism as "tearing apart the inseparable
dialectical unity of the common, spearate and individual
features of social progress" and stated that "the classical
tenet of Marx and Engels on proletarian internationalism
remains the greatest idea of proletarian revolutionary
strategy; an attitude that finds its expression in the
2 38
support of the CPSU and the USSR." Konstantin Zaradov
was also in attendance and publicly added his condemnation
of the Western "revisionists" for their attitude of acceptance
toward the "multiparty pluralistic system" and their alliances
with "leftist democratic forces. Zaradov ended his speech by
pointing out the "necessity of conducting a struggle against
our ideological opponents, who will undoubtedly attempt to
diminish the importance of the contemporary significance of
237Rabotnichesko delo , 1 December 1976, (FBIS)
.
2 38 Rabotnichesko delo, 16 December 1976, (FBIS)
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the lessons of the Great October Revolution..." 239 Mean-
while, Rude Pravo was proclaiming that "a really Marxist
party, defending the interests of the working class, can
never renounce proletarian internationalism" since it would
deprive "the communist parties... of a strong and well-proved
240
weapon." A Yugoslav commentary accurately portrayed the
growing debate in its statements of 17 December 1976:
"...the principles of independence and the
right of every party to independently deter-
mine the directions of its internal and
foreign policy are becoming increasingly
manifest. .
.
...The Berlin Conference of European Commu-
nist and Workers Parties significantly
encouraged the discussions [which] include
sharp polemics on Stalinism, national paths
to socialism, Eurocommunism, the socialist
community and other terms... The national
paths to socialism and the insistence on
independence and equality of parties is now
described as anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.
What is pitted against the different paths to
socialism is... the so-called "real socialism"
— that is, the path of the Soviet Union...
...The Bulgarian Communist Party and the
Czechoslovak Communist Party have taken on
the task of exposing Eurocommunism and every-
thing that is understood by this term as
"revisionism. . .
"
...West European communist parties, however —
and above all the communist parties of Italy
and France — do not agree with such
assessments. . . "241
239Rabotnichesko delo , 17 December 1976, (FBIS)
.
240 Rude Pravo , 10 December 1976, (FBIS).
241SUNDIC Commentary (Zagreb) , 17 December 1976 (FBIS
Daily Rpt. , E. Eur., 20 December 1976, p. 1-12).
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The final important attack against the Western European
communist parties in 1976 was delivered by Todor Zhivkov in
his article in Problemy Mira I Sotsializma in which he
stated that Eurocommunism "represents a new kind of anti-
communism. " The BCP party organ, Rabotnichesko Delo , further
elaborated Zhivkov 's position by proclaiming "the struggle
against anti-Sovietism is an order of the epoch," and
identified anti-communism with anti-Marxism and connected it
with "nationalist suggestions." The BCP organ demanded that
all attempts at defending "national and other models of
socialism" should be "unmasked as anti-Marxist and anti-
scientific," since their purpose was to "deny real socialism
in the USSR, and thus also the principles of scientific
communism." The Soviet periodical, Novaya I Noveyshaya
Istoriya backed up the Zhivkov pronouncements and stated
that "revisionists operating under the banner of national
communism" as well as "right-wing opportunists" were trying
to pit numerous "national models" against "really existing
socialism. " The Soviet article further accused the
"revisionists and opportunists" of "confronting national
perculiarities with general laws" and of "helping the
dissemination of a nationalist ideology in the proletarian
242
circle." Asked if he agreed with Todor Zhivkov' s assess-
ment of Eurocommunism, Vadim Zagladin of the CPSU's Central
242As quoted by Belgrade NIN, 26 December 1976, (FBIS)
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Committee responded by stating that the term "Eurocommunism"
was invented by Zbigniew Brzezinski and could be understood
in different ways. Zagladin did, however, support Zhivkov's
denunciation of a "Eurocommunism" that would break the
"unitary front of the international movement with an anti-
243Soviet aim.
"
The year 1977 introduced two additional factors into the
interparty debates within the world communist movement. Not
only did Charter 77 and other associated dissident activities
apparently catch the Soviet-bloc regimes unprepared, but also
the sudden emergence of the President of the United States
as a human rights activist jolted the CPSU and her Eastern
European allies. The impact of these two new phenomena,
combined with the continued Eurocommunist activities, appears
to have momentarily shaken the confidence of the "hard-liners,"
introduced a great deal of uncertainty as to the proper
response, and revealed some rather large "splits" within the
Soviet-bloc itself. The CPSU announced that it would conduct
"more heated and open polemics with all those interpreting
in an incorrect and ill-intentioned manner the substantive
questions of strategy and tactics in the struggle for
socialism." These public "polemics" were to be directed not
only at the "enemy ideology," but also at the "different
anti-Marxist currents" and "fellow minds or people having
243L'Espresso, 26 December 1976, (FBIS)
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close positions." This revelation was definitely a
dramatic change in Soviet policy. The need for "public
debates" had been denied for years since the CPSU believed
that it could do more harm than good and that no evidence of
"discord" within the communist community should ever be
245
revealed "in face of the class enemy." A Zagladin
article on proletarian internationalism shortly following
this announcement seemed to indicate a more conciliatory
246
attitude toward the revisionism of the Eurocommunist parties.
Meanwhile, the Czechoslovaks, Bulgarians, and East Germans
continued their strong attacks against "right-wing revisionism"
and carried out hard-line policies against dissident activities.
In Hungary, however, a different approach could be
observed. Janos Kadar had previously openly disagreed with
Zhivkov's assessment of Eurocommunism as but a new form of
anti-communism. In January, the periodical Tarsadalmi Szemle
even advanced the notion that socialism could be achieved
247
under the conditions of a multiparty system. According
to a Yugoslav source, the Hungarians did not feel their
participation in the polemics was necessary and, therefore,
244Kommunist , January 1977, (FBIS)
.
245TANJUG (Belgrade) , 4 January 1977 (FBIS Daily Rpt.
,
E. Eur., 5 January 1977, p. 1-6).
246Rabochiy Klass I Sovremennyy Mir , 12 January 1977, (FBIS)
247TANJUG (Belgrade) , 12 January 1977 (FBIS Daily Rpt.
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E. Eur., 13 January 1977, pp. 1-17,18).
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were not showing much enthusiasm for them. The Kadar regime
was obviously taking a more flexible and understanding view
of the Eurocommunist parties and was asserting that the
Western parties were the "most competent" to choose their
4-u -a ^ i 248methods and styles.
Even in Poland a less than purist line was being followed
Trybuna Ludu was pointing out that even Lenin indicated that
the movement "could not take the same course in various
countries," and maintaining that "the communist parties are
right in believing that each party should preserve its self-
dependence and individually work out the political line in
keeping with its own country's socioeconomic situation and
249
national characteristics."
While the Soviets continued to paint Eurocommunism as
simply a creation of the "bourgeois press" in an attempt to
"distort the tactics and strategy of the communist movement,"
the Czechoslovak regime found it to be something quite
different:
"Its theories are dangerous in that they create
an illusion about bourgeois democracy and
distort and falsify the substance of socialist
democracy ... Petty bourgeois ideology is pene-
trating also into the ranks of the workers
movement, and for this reason it disguises
itself with Marxist terminology, which is very
dangerous. .. Revisionism stands on the platform
of the so-called third path of politics ... it
248 x , . ,Ibid.
249Trybuna Ludu, 17 January 1977, (FBIS
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is ideologically and politically dangerous...
under the mask of objectivity and equality,
it makes antisocialist and counter-
revolutionary activity possible." 25 ^
After one month of relatively moderate activity, the
CPSU again took up the attack against the Western communist
parties and the supporters of the dissidents within the
Soviet bloc. At the end of a bloc-wide conference in
Budapest during late January, in which the Bulgarians warned
against the "infiltration of nationalist elements using
251
Eurocommunism as a disguise," the CPSU Central Committee
issued a resolution that reversed the apparent toleration
of diversity inside communism. Once again, proletarian
internationalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat
were to be communism's basic doctrines everywhere. Evidently,
the Central Committee, the core of CPSU officialdom, had
determined that criticism had gone too far and that without
a vigorous counterattack, the very structure of the Soviet
state and its goodwill among the revolutionary-inclined
third-world peoples, not to mention the "loyalist" regimes
252
within the Warsaw Pact, would be seriously eroded. This
decision could also be seen as a rejection of the strategies
advanced by the CPSU's International Department (Ponomarev
and Zagladin) , and possibly those of Leonid Brezhnev himself,
250
Rude Pravo
, 20 January 1977, (FBIS)
.
251Christian Science Monitor
, 2 February 1977, p. 10.
Ibid.
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who, at least publicly, had been pursuing a fairly
moderate course.
As the Czechoslovak press increased its attitude of
intolerance toward the Eurocommunist parties, the Soviet
press did likewise. Numerous Soviet publications now
asserted that Western European communist parties were being
taken in by revisionists and anti-Soviet propaganda which
they themselves encouraged. Eurocommunist assessments of
the defects of the Soviet model, especially regarding its
insufficient democracy, were portrayed as particularly
unacceptable and detrimental. One Soviet journal, Novoye
Vremya
,
even accused the Eurocommunists of "slandering the
democracy of the Soviet Union and its internal and foreign
253policies.
"
A particularly strong attack was noted in the Bratislava
Pravda which escalated the intensity of the accusations:
"Certain Western ideologists are now designing
new variants of "Marxism" so as to split
nations... Often refusing to regard Marxism
as the basis of a cohesive world outlook,
they apply the bourgeois concepts of pluralism
which splits Marxism into mutually independent
"national variants"... They negate the inter-
national nature of the proletarian doctrine
and the unity of... the revolutionary movement.
[Doing this is] like dividing mathematics into
-54
German, French, Russian and American mathematics."
253TANJUG (Belgrade), 7 February 1977 (FBIS Daily Rpt. ,
E. Eur., 7 February 1977, p. 1-7).
254Pravda (Bratislava), 9 February 1977, (FBIS).
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Reacting to the Charter 77 dissidents and, for the first
time, the protests in Poland, the CPSU accused the West of
distracting attention from its own weaknesses, discrediting
socialism, heating up the climate before the Belgrade
conference, and dividing and discrediting the Western
255
communist parties. It was further implied that the
Western communist parties were playing into the hands of the
campaign concerning democratic and human freedoms in the
socialist countries and the CPSU made it very clear that
"all critics of Soviet achievement. . .who in spite of the
truth call our evident successes into question will not be
^ r /-
allowed to interfere in our internal affairs."
By the end of February, in spite of the increased
polemics, there was still no "unitary" attack against the
West or the Eurocommunist parties. Moscow itself was still
hitting out in all directions — at its own dissidents and
those in Prague and the Western European communists and
Yugoslav "revisionists" who supported them. Czechoslovakia
was the most vocal and had to be told to "play it cool" and
leave the main issue to Moscow. Bulgaria was strongly in
the "Soviet camp," but Hungary was still discreetly "neutral"
257in its attitude toward Eurocommunism. When the PCI sent
255Christian Science Monitor , 12 February 1977, pp. 1,6
o C c.
Pravda
, 12 February 1977, (FBIS)
.
257New York Times , 25 February 1977, p. 3A.
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a delegation to Moscow in late February to discuss the
issue of political dissent in Eastern Europe, they found the
Soviets "reluctant" to accept their recommendations. The
PCI delegation noted that "Moscow was aware of the overriding
importance of detente, but if more leeway for the dissidents
was the price of detente, Moscow will think hard whether it's
worth paying." The CPSU officials reportedly told the PCI
delegation that they had no right to intervene on behalf of
the critics in Eastern Europe and stated flatly that "if you
want to be autonomous, then you must respect the autonomy of
the Czechoslovak comrades and, for that matter, of the Soviet
party to deal with the dissidence as they see fit." In
his assessment of the Eurocommunist/Soviet debate as of
February 1977, Jiri Pelikan, the prominent former Czechoslovak
party official, observed the following:
"The recent document of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee in preparation for the celebration of
the 60th Anniversary of the Bolshevik revolu-
tion. . .confirms that for the Soviets the
Berlin conference was a temporary compromise
with Eurocommunism and that they are continuing
to insist, on principle, on their monopoly of
the leadership role, as a big power, and of
the hegemony of their party with respect to the
other communist parties. . .what matters to it is
hegemony, as a state, over the East bloc
countries and over the Eurocommunist parties...
...The conflict among the parties will intensify.
We are at the beginning of a process at whose
Ibid.
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conclusion there will be another split in
the communist movement, because these two 2 rg
conceptions cannot coexist for very long."
That such a split was looming ever more largely on the
international horizon should have been accentuated by the
events during the first week of March. While the PCI, PCF,
and PCE leaders were meeting together in Madrid, represen-
tatives of the Central Committees of Bulgaria, East Germany,
Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
2 fi n
and the USSR were meeting simultaneously in Sofia, Bulgaria.
Held under the guise of "preparing for the 60th anniversary
of the Great October Socialist Revolution," the actual pur-
pose of the Sofia conference was to draft and adopt a coor-
dinated offensive against both the Western human and civil
rights accusations and the "revisionism" of the Eurocommunist
parties, in addition to preparing a common position for the
forthcoming Belgrade conference that is to review the imple-
mentation of the Helsinki Final Act. This meeting was
necessary, according to Nepszabadsag
,




(Pelkan Interview) 26 February
1977, (FBIS).
2 fi
The major European delegates at the Sofia conference
were as follows: USSR - Ponomarev, Katushev, Zymyanin;
Bulgaria — Lilov, Filipov; East Germany — Hager, Axen, Lamberz;
Poland — Frelek, Luaszewicz; Romania — Burtica; Hungary —
Ovari, Gyenes, Gyori; and Czechoslovakia - Havlin, Bilak.
(One might note at this point that not only can Eurocommunism
weaken the links between the Eastern European regimes, but
it can also drive them together in an effort to maintain
their legitimacy and internal order; two strangely conflicting
and contradictory effects of the Eurocommunist phenomenon.)
167
incitement, not experienced for a long time, has been
launched in the capitalist countries. A wide-ranging
anti-communist and anti-Soviet maneuver has been started
with the aim of poisoning the international atmosphere and
driving a wedge between the European communist parties." 261
At the conference, the Soviets revealed to the delegates
what they had privately told the Czechoslovak party two
weeks earlier — that the clash with the Eurocommunists was
inevitable
,
but at the present time , due to the dissidence
and economic problems in the Soviet-bloc, nothing should
be done to hasten its onset. The Soviets, thus, insisted
on a more prudent policy that would avoid, among other
things, any open confrontation that would seriously compli-
2 fi 2
cate East-West relations. When the conference closed,
its decisions were hailed as confirming the "maturity, unity,
and close cooperation of the fraternal parties; it confirmed
2 c -j
the unity of thought and action of 25 million communists."
The new propaganda drive started in mid-March with none
other than Rude Pravo which now asserted that "dissidents
in the socialist countries" were supported by the American
CIA, the same CIA which holds that "part of its dirty act
is to procure female companions for Western officials visiting
261Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 6 March 1977, (FBIS)
.
262 L'Espresso , 27 March 1977; see also Christian Science
Monitor , 4 March 1977, p. 4.
263 Rabotnichesko delo, 6 March 1977, (FBIS).
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Washington." A La Vanguardia interview with the Soviet
editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta , Vitaliy Syrokomskiy , revealed
the following comments:
The U.S. press says Eurocommunism is the means
of weakening the Soviet Union's position in
its international relations; it is the means
of destroying the unity of the socialist
countries . . . and the international communist
movement. If this is really so, then, as is
natural, we are opposed to Eurocommunism...
The Soviet Union supports all communist parties
in the world. On the other hand, I will tell
you that now, since communism is so fashionable,
some parties are taking the name although they
are not really communist . This applies to the
parties which do not follow . . . the principles
recognized by all the communist parties in
the world ... the great ideas of Marx, Engels,
and Lenin [are] the strict guarantees of each p
fi(
-
party's sovereign independence. (Emphasis Added)
The Soviet publication Novoye Vremya then added that the
Eurocommunist parties were not "acting in accordance with
the conclusions of the Berlin conference," were "weakening
international solidarity," and were viewing internationalism
through the prism of "accelerated attainment of national
goals." This, according to Novoye Vremya , is a "great and
unforgivable sin."
By the end of March, Western propaganda analysts began
to notice that the polemics originating in Prague, Sofia,
264 Rude Pravo
, 15 March 1977, (FBIS)
.
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La Vanguardia (Barcelona), 16 March 1977, (FBIS).
266TANJUG (Belgrade), 12 March 1977 (FBIS Daily Rpt.
,
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East Berlin and Moscow appeared curiously dated; "like Karl
Marx and Frederich Engels thundering about conditions in
England more than 100 years ago," commented one analyst
in Vienna. It was also apparent to these analysts that,
although the Czechs, East Germans and Bulgarians were
particularly strident, the Poles and Romanians were less
9 c -i
so and the Hungarians were almost silent; in fact, the
Kadar regime had actually praised President Carter's speech
? ft ft
at the United Nations.
Obviously, the "unity of thought and action of 25 million
communists" expressed at the Sofia conference was short-lived.
It would appear that some of the Eastern European regimes
wished to have no direct involvement with the US/USSR con-
frontation over human rights. "When the atmosphere cools
between Moscow and Washington," remarked one Eastern European
official in the Christian Science Monitor , "we are the first
to feel the chill. There is reason to believe that many
Eastern Europeans feared that too much rhetoric could cause
269
the Soviets to seek a general tightening up within the bloc."
Given the CPSU's pronouncement at Sofia that now was
not the time for the inevitable clash with the Eurocommunists
and that "prudent policies" should be pursued, the Kremlin
was no doubt surprised by Vasil Bilak's comments to the
267New York Times , 14 April 1977, p. 4A.
268Christian Science Monitor , 23 March 1977, p. 9.
269 T , . ,Ibid.
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Czechoslovak Central Committee. As reported in the West,
Bilak called the Eurocommunists "traitors" and specifically
attacked the PCF for forming an alliance with "one of the
biggest anti-communists in existence — F. Mitterand."
Bilak additionally castigated the PCE and expressed his
harsh criticism of the Eurocommunist meeting in Madrid,
270
calling it "an unprincipled and treacherous policy."
Then again, perhaps the CPSU was not surprised at all,
especially considering that Bilak is one of the most
orthodox Czechoslovak leaders who had previously asked the Soviet
271Union for "fraternal assistance" in 1963.
Throughout April, the Czechoslovaks continued their
polemics and began to harrass Western correspondents who
attempted to talk with dissidents, in some cases actually
denying visas to reporters who would not pledge to avoid
such contacts. The Hungarians continued to maintain their
reticence and the Poles, too, pressed forward with relatively
moderate policies and actions. On April 22, the CPSU held
its annual gathering to celebrate the anniversary of Lenin's
birth and the 60th anniversary of Lenin's seizure of power.
The traditional speech was delivered by Mikhail Zimyanin,
former Pravda editor, and now a member of the Central Committee.
"The teaching and cause of Lenin are immortal," declared
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Zimyanin, and those who move away from it "betray the
socialist revolution." The speaker went on to proclaim
that Lenin's principle of "proletarian internationalism"
was an "eternal theory" and added that the attitude towards
Lenin and Leninism had become the "touchstone of a true
revolutionary spirit." "There is no internal opposition
in the Soviet Union - only isolated renegades, agents of
foreign propaganda, and espionage centers," Zimyanin told
his audience; a claim that was highly reminiscent of
272Stalin's days in the Kremlin. A few days after this
celebration, the CPSU protested to the United States about
the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,
claiming their broadcasts amounted to "ideological sabotage."
The Soviet warning also threatened "consequences" if the
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"provocations" were not halted.
The final blast leveled at the Eurocommunist parties,
as of the writing of this report, was the product of the
annual meeting of the communist parties in Prague, held
under the auspices of the World Marxist Review . These
meetings have become a sounding board for international
communist theory and have turned into something akin to a
contemporary Comintern. This meeting, prepared under the
guidance of Mikhail Suslov, once again loudly insisted on
Christian Science Monitor , 25 April 1977, p. 42
273Monterey Peninsula Herald, 5 May 1977, p. 39.
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the universal validity of the Kremlin's system of communism.
Boris Ponomarev, Suslov's deputy, told the assembled communist
party representatives that Eurocommunism and its defense
of human rights was "a deceptive slogan fabricated by
imperialism to undermine the prestige of the communists and
their parties in capitalist countries." Ponomarev strongly
censured those parties who emphasized the Russian character
of the Soviet revolution and went on to demand unconditional
acceptance of Soviet policy by all loyal communists. These
pronouncements would tend to indicate that now even the
CPSU's International Department is prepared to foresake
the moderate line in favor of a policy that reasserts the
CPSU's primacy and leadership within the world communist
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movement.
What should be undeniably obvious from this rather
lengthy discussion of the reactions and responses of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is that to this point,
no effective answer to the Eurocommunist challenge has been
found. What had begun as "comradely advice" in the 1950'
s
turned to bitter debate and overt demands in the 1970's.
The CPSU has attempted to coax unity, organize unity, and
force unity upon the Eurocommunist parties but has had little
success and in many cases has only driven the Eurocommunists
further away from Soviet influence and control. No policy
274 Christian Science Monitor
, 13 May 1977, pp. 1, 6
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yet pursued has managed to further Soviet aims with the
Eurocommunists while simultaneously limiting the negative
impacts of Eurocommunism upon Soviet power, prestige, and
legitimacy. To make matters worse, there appears to be
little consensus within Eastern Europe on how to deal with
this Eurocommunist phenomenon. Czechoslovakia is by far the
most outspoken in advocating strong opposition to the
"traitors" in Western Europe and Bulgaria tends to support
the Czechoslovak attitudes. East Germany is relatively
silent on the issue, although it fully supports the CPSU's
position. The Poles have been remarkably flexible; some-
times supporting the Eurocommunist positions and sometimes
rejecting them — they obviously see some merit in what the
PCI, the PCF, and the PCE are espousing. The Hungarian party,
under Kadar ' s leadership, has quietly refrained from active
participation in the anti-Eurocommunist polemics and appar-
ently concurs with much of the Eurocommunist ideology. And
Romania, while remaining rigid in its internal affairs, has
supported the Eurocommunist positions on numerous occasions,
much to the displeasure of Moscow. Even within the Soviet
elite there are differences of opinion on how to deal with
this new political force. Men like Masherov, Andropov, and
Zymyanin appear strongly opposed to the Eurocommunists while
Ponomarev and Zagladin appear much more conciliatory.
Brezhnev, although generally moderate in his approach,
appears to waver back and forth, depending upon the current
consensus within the ruling elite. In fact, Katushev's
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recent dismissal might be linked with Brezhnev's insistence
that moderation be pursued — a course Katushev has been
known to oppose, especially recently in Eastern Europe. The
continuation or growth of these differences within the
Soviet bloc could easily militate against the development of
a successful bloc-wide policy toward the Eurocommunist
challenge. Should this occur, a crisis of major proportions
could develop in Eastern Europe and possibly within the USSR
itself.
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X. IF ERROR, CORRECT; IF EVIL, DESTROY
Ranged against the awesome powers of the Soviet state,
led by the elite of the CPSU, are but a few communist parties
who see themselves as "Eurocommunists, " and an additional
number of communist parties who, from time to time and issue
to issue, tend to support the goals and concepts embodied
in the Eurocommunist phenomenon. The ruling elites within
the Kremlin and also within virtually every capital of
Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe are faced with an all-too-
real nightmare; Eurocommunism, whose proponents have been
labeled as "anti-communist, anti-Soviet, and traitors," is
on the offensive; a situation brought about largely by
these parties' ringing declarations of independence from
Moscow and their support for democratic, pluralistic, and
parliamentary principles. Two of the major Eurocommunist
parties, the PCF and the PCI, are currently within reach
of strong, influential, and active participation in their
national governments, in fact the PCI already participates
informally. The last election in Italy gave the PCI thirty-
four percent of the vote and its support is growing. The
regional elections in France during March 1977 gave the
Communist/Socialist coalition its biggest election victory
since World War II. Assuming that this "alliance of the
left" can hold together, their victory in next year's
national parliamentary elections appears as a strong possibility
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The Eurocommunist parties have also openly and successfully
challenged the CPSU's claim to primacy in and leadership
of the world communist movement and have publicly denounced
and renounced as obsolete and irrelevant many of the
ideological shibboleths that have for years upheld and
undergirded the power, prestige, and legitimacy of the
Soviet political system, as personified by the CPSU. Beginning
gradually with the "fraternal assistance" to Czechoslovakia
in 1968 and especially after the East Berlin conference of
1976, the Eurocommunist parties have become increasingly
vocal and outspoken in their opposition to the Soviet-bloc's
treatment of its dissidents and reform-minded citizens; a
Eurocommunist-dissident linkage has been established and
has continued to grow. Confronted with unrest at home and
within Eastern Europe, the Soviets are also faced with the
fact that there are ominous signs that some of their Warsaw
Pact "allies" may be beginning to "soften" their stand
against the "heretics" in Western Europe. Given these and
other germane developments, combined with the CPSU's failure
to implement an effective policy to combat Eurocommunism
and its impact within its empire, in what direction can the
Soviets be expected to move? What forms will their responses
most likely take? How, indeed, will they attempt to counter
this "reversed flow in the direction of initiative and
influence within the world communist movement?"
In the short-term, the CPSU faces two major difficult
challenges; the growing dissidence and the up-coming Belgrade
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conference on the Helsinki Final Act, a conference the
Soviets fear may develop into a confrontation that might
erode the Helsinki agreement's value in general and even
re-open the question of the 1945 frontiers in Eastern
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Europe.
With regard to the dissidents, it seems very reasonable
to assert that the CPSU will move to "contain" the human
rights movement both at home and in Eastern Europe prior
to the conference in Belgrade. Czechoslovakia has already
been highly successful in isolating and immobilizing the
movement's best-known and most active figures within the
country and the Czech tactics could easily be "exported"
to the Soviet Union. By relying upon low-key repression,
the denial of visa's to foreign correspondents who contact
dissidents, the confiscation of telephones and driver's
licenses, etc. , the dissidents could be denied access to
each other and also to the movement's channels to outside
public opinion. Immobilizing especially the dissidents'
distribution, recruiting, support, and publications activi-
ties will, no doubt, be a major aim of the CPSU's "contain-
2 7 fi
ment" policy. It is highly important to the CPSU that
the dissidents be silenced. It is evident that the Soviet
27 SChristian Science Monitor , 4 March 1977, p. 7
"? 1 fiChristian Science Monitor, 4 May 1977, p. 6.
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leaders are both afraid of freedom and afraid to admit
that they are afraid of freedom; they wish to practice
repression and yet pretend they are not practicing repression
The bolder and more effective the dissidents are permitted
to become, the more difficult it becomes for the CPSU to
pursue this contradictory policy. For this and other impor-
tant reasons, some Western analysts are firmly convinced
that Moscow has decided it has nothing to lose by moving
forcefully against dissidents in advance of the Belgrade
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conference, a view fully shared by this author.
Another factor seldom emphasized that would tend to
greatly support such a move by the Soviet elite is the
fact that, contrary to Andropov's assertion that the "Soviet
27 8Union is more monolithic than ever before," the Soviet
Union is not homogeneous nor is it "monolithic." It is
an empire in which the Russians dominate a number of smaller
ethnic groups. Within the Soviet Union, over 100 million
non-Slavs live and work. Russians are a majority of the
population only in the RSFSR; everywhere else they are in
a minority, yet they hold most of the high-ranking and
influential positions. Muslims, Mongols, Ubzeks, Moldavians,
Romanians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Tadziks, Jews,
277Christian Science Monitor , 5 March 1977, pp. 1, 9
278
Pravda, 23 April 1976, (FBIS)
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and other non-Slavs all have grievances, as do the Russians'
Slavic brothers, the Ukranians. The CPSU is highly cogni-
zant of the fact that "complaints" can become contagious
and "concessions" can give "ideas" to a lot of other people.
This is not to imply that disintegration of the Soviet
empire is imminent, but no one is sure. The CPSU dismisses
the notion as a "wild dream" of their enemies, but yet they
are quick to stifle the slightest sign of nationalistic
dissidence in any part of their empire. The Soviet ruling
27 9
elite feels vulnerable, whether it is or not.
By the containment of dissidence prior to the Belgrade
conference, the Soviets most likely hope to focus the con-
ference's major attentions on economic and technical issues,
primarily on "Baskets One and Two" of the Helsinki Final
Act. The Sofia conference of "fraternal parties" held in
March 1977 was most assuredly devoted not only to forging a
common program relative to the Eurocommunists and the dissi-
dents but also to solidifying a unified approach to the
conference in Belgrade. Since March, the Soviets have
been putting extreme pressure upon the Yugoslavs to produce
a conference which has no surprises and focuses more on
economic cooperation than on human issues. They view the
Belgrade conference as a "technical meeting," and, according
27 9
See "Mr. Brezhnev is Sensitive — with Reason,"
Christian Science Monitor, 29 March 1977, p. 35.
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to a Yugoslav source, "want to stand up, say what they
28
have to say, and go home quickly."
In the short-term, time and events seem to have moved
to the Soviet's advantage. East-bloc dissident activities
currently no longer command the headlines they did in late
and early 1977; certainly a concrete result of the
bloc's "containment and isolation" policies. President
Tarter has "softened" his human and civil rights campaign
to a great degree since his April 1977 United Nations speech,
probably as a result of the Soviets' immediate rejection of
his initial SALT proposals, in addition to the decreased
access the dissidents have had to the Western media. The
French and the West Germans continue to downplay the entire
human rights issue and there are indications that the West,
in general, will attempt to pull its punches at Belgrade
in the interests of detente. Although the preparatory work
for the conference begins in June 1977, the main, substantive
part of the meetings will not begin until mid-September or
2 81later. Should the international situation change dramatically
to the Soviets' disadvantage, the possibility does exist
that the Soviets and her allies could simply boycott the
Belgrade conference altogether. Such a possibility was, in
282fact, communicated to Washington in mid-March 1977.
28 Washington Post
, 17 March 1977, p. A19.
Ibid.
28 2
U.S. News and World Report, 14 March 1977, p. 12
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Although this communication may have been only an artificial
threat, it does underscore the CPSU's deep sensitivity to
the dissidence issue and its strong committment to a Belgrade
conference devoid of effective attacks upon the party's
legitimacy and domestic policies; views certainly shared
by the greater portion of the ruling elites in Eastern
Europe.
In the attempt to assess long-term Soviet responses to
the challenges posed to the CPSU by the Eurocommunist parties'
existence, policies, and impacts, one is forced to probe
what Winston Churchill once called a riddle wrapped in an
enigma, that is, the real aims of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. This is, to be sure, a difficult task, but
one that must be undertaken, not only as simply an academic
exercise but also in a sincere attempt to provide Western
policy-makers with meaningful data concerning the Soviet
intentions; one of the major pillars upon which Western
foreign policy should rest. Numerous attempts to discover
the CPSU's aims regarding the Eurocommunist phenomenon have
been made, and they have often resulted in contradictory or
conflicting conclusions; quite possibly because the CPSU
party leaders themselves have contradictory and conflicting
preferences. Prior to turning to this author's perceptions
of future Soviet initiatives and responses, it might be well
to examine briefly several of the current theories which
have been routinely advanced as the most likely course of
action the Soviet leadership is determined to follow.
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One of the most common assessments of Soviet aims is
that the CPSU has and will always support the Eurocommunist
parties in order to "subvert" Western Europe, destroy the
NATO alliance, and isolate the United States. It is argued,
sometimes even relatively convincingly, that since the
Soviet Union has aggressive designs in Western Europe they
could hardly give up such useful pressure grups as the Euro-
communist parties have been and would find their presence
in Western European governments a political and strategic
windfall. This approach, however, no matter how popular
and credible it was in the immediate post-WW II period, is
now no longer tenable; the communist parties of Western
Europe in the 1970 's are far different from the same parties
of the late 1940' s. Moscow is certainly cognizant of the
fact that a Western European nation falling under the con-
trol of a pro-Soviet political party would upset the balance
of power to a degree surely to arouse an immediate response
from the United States and other Western European nations
as well. The Western response might not only spell the quick
demise of such a pro-Soviet government, but could also
endanger the flow of Western assistance, food, technology,
and soft-ware into the Soviet Union at a time when these
items are critically needed. The theory of "aggression by
coordinated communist subversion" not only saddles the CPSU
with risks and liabilities it is ill-equipped to handle,
but also requires that one consider all the disputes, dis-
agreements, discords, and dissensions between the CPSU and
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the Eurocommunist parties to be a sham or a charade; a
situation that the facts do not support.
A second stratagem commonly advanced, merely a modifi-
cation of the one just reviewed, would propose that the
CPSU has and will continue to basically "ignore" the Euro-
communist parties. For the time being, the CPSU will choose
to allow the Eurocommunist parties almost unbounded ideological
latitude and encourage them to achieve as much power as
possible, taking special care not to alarm the West. Finally,
once a "moderate" Eurocommunist party has achieved massive
national powers, the CPSU and the "hidden hardliners" will
purge the moderates from the party and assume control,
thus creating an instant pro-Soviet regime in the West. This
prescription, however, suffers from the same limitations as
the first. Additionally, although certainly some staff
planners inside the Kremlin might have considered this
approach, it betrays an indifference to ideology no CPSU
leader could afford and tremendously overestimates the CPSU's
ability to control and direct the activities of the Eurocommunist
parties.
A third theory is based primarily on ideological grounds.
Its proponents would argue that although the CPSU may not
wish to support the Eurocommunists it has no choice but to
do so. Since the CPSU rules in the name of the working
class, it cannot afford for the sake of its own legitimacy,
to desert those communist parties which represent the working
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class of the capitalist countries. Once a Eurocommunist
party formed a working government in the West, the CPSU,
in accordance with ideology and a modified Brezhnev Doctrine,
could not allow it to be voted out or otherwise removed from
power. Rather than recognize its own rule as illegitimate,
its Marxism-Leninism a myth, and its proletarian internationalism
simply a cover for interests of state, the CPSU would be
obliged to give up detente, surrender its relations with
Western governments, industrialists, and bankers in order
to come to the aid and assistance of an embattled Eurocommunist
party. In addition to virtually ignoring all but the ideologi-
cal motivations of the Soviet state, this particular theory
suffers from one major fatal flaw; although the USSR is a
"revolutionary state," it has always put the interest of
28 3
state before those of revolution. The 1918 Brest-Litovsk
treaty, the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939, the interventions of
1956 and 1968, the Soviet treatment of the PCF during the
1974 national elections in France, and the CPSU ' s reaction
to the events in Portugal during 197 5 adequately demonstrate
the limited impact of ideology upon the decisions made by
the Soviet elite.
A fourth scenario, one recently put forth by Charles
Gati, postulates Soviet tolerance, not only of the Eurocommunist
28 3 Zimmerman, "Western," p. 1
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parties themselves, but also of unprecedented reform and
adaptation within the Eastern European economies and
284politics. Asserting that Eastern Europe is now an
economic liability to the Kremlin, that there is popular
discontent and even tension within Eastern European elites,
and that the Soviets do not desire to further alienate the
Eurocommunist parties, the advocates of this approach claim
that liberalization is now possible. They state that the
Soviets have indeed shown restraint and procrastination in
the past and with rising worker complaints, increased con-
sumer demands, and the failure of the system to reconcile
economic realities with ideological imperatives, reform
and adaptation must, by necessity, occur. Gati, himself,
finds this option "potentially destabilizing" and raises
the point that even a "partial introduction" of the "Euro-
communist anti-model might serve to unite the Soviet leader-
ship behind a rigid, conservative, and possibly violent
28 5
reaction." Given the Soviet reactions in 1953, 1956, and
1968, in addition to their rhetoric and actions in recent
times, this particular theory represents more of a tendency
toward "wishful thinking" than an objective assessment of
political reality.
2 84 See Gati, "Europeanization, " pp. 547-553
285 Ibid., pp. 549-550.
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Finally, it has been postulated that the Soviet Union
may be opposed to the Eurocommunist entry into national
governments for two very different reasons. Ideologically,
the CPSU would not wish to see the Eurocommunist parties
softened or corrupted by allying themselves with socialist
and social democrats in order to rescue the West from the
"crisis of capitalism. " Moscow certainly wishes to see
these parties kept ready for the revolution which is bound
to occur in the future. This attitude on the part of the
CPSU explains why they condemn the alliances of the Euro-
communist parties and why they consistently recall them to
the "true path" of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Alternatively,
the CPSU keeps re-emphasizing the "hard-line" in order to
scare the European voters away from the Eurocommunist parties.
They do not want the Eurocommunist in power because they
have given up the hope of revolution and wish to continue
with detente. A communist government in Western Europe could
illicit a Western response disadvantageous to Moscow; if it
failed, it could be humiliating to the whole communist move-
ment, and if it got into trouble, it could be as costly as
Cuba, perhaps more costly if one considers the conditions
in contemporary Italy. Worst of all from the CPSU's point
of view, if such a Eurocommunist government worked smoothly
within the framework of democracy, pluralism, and a free
opposition, it could infect the nations of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet state as well; if it worked in Paris and Rome,
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why not Prague, Budapest, Warsaw, or even Moscow? 286 Based
upon current realities, this forecast of Soviet aims and
intentions appears to be the most valid of the group but
yet falls somewhat short of expressing the totality of the
most likely Soviet response to the Eurocommunist challenge.
A brief examination of the contemporary conditions germane
to the Soviet dilemma should allow one to expand this latter
scenario and to underscore the great likelihood of its
formulation and implementation by the CPSU's ruling elite.
There are many factors within Eastern Europe which would
tend to militate against any substantive reform and adaptation
First, the ruling elites of most Eastern European countries
have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo; it is
they who enjoy the luxuries and privileges that the communist
system of government provides, and they are not likely to
assist in its demise. Additionally, one of the major factors
that enables these elites to rule is the popular domestic
appreciation of the Soviet presence. Without this presence,
a great many Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, etc., just might
shed their attitudes of resignation and passive acquiescense.
If Novotny could be toppled in Czechoslovakia, what would
keep Kadar, Honecker, or Gierek from suffering a similar fate.
The Soviet military presence not only supports the current
"? fi ft
Mclnnes, Eurocommunism, p. 76
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regimes, but also provides an effective brake on revisionism
or deviations from CPSU directives. Thus, the same presence
that upholds a regime can also serve to bring it down. Due
to the presence of Soviet armed forces within or near their
borders, in addition to heavy economic dependence upon the
USSR, none of the members of the Warsaw Pact is in a position
to stray far from Moscow-prescribed orthodoxy in its internal
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affairs. Although the Soviets have permitted some reform
in Eastern Europe, none of the reforms have been allowed to
progress to the point where the party's monopoly of power
288
would be jeopardized. The lessons of the "Prague Spring"
were not lost upon the Eastern Europeans and the Brezhnev
Doctrine is sufficiently ambiguous so as to intimidate would-
be reformers without offering them an effective guideline.
The existence of the Brezhnev Doctrine clearly underscores
the fact that the autonomy currently permitted in Eastern
Europe exists without the concomitant ideological acceptance
by the Soviets of state sovereignty as the fundamental char-
acteristic of international relations. Toleration of some
autonomy in Eastern Europe represents Soviet pragmatism, not
ideological change, and for this reason such autonomy as
28 9does exist in the area is highly unstable.
28 7James E. Dougherty and Diane K. Pfalzgraff, Eurocommunism
and the Atlantic Alliance
, Cambridge: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, Inc., 1977, pp. 32-33.
2 88 Groth, Eastern Europe after Czechoslovakia
, p. 55.
2 89Kenneth Jowitt, "Images of Detente and the Soviet
Political Order," Paper presented to Institute of International
Studies, University of Calif. Berkeley, CA. , 1977, p. 21.
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A regime in Eastern Europe desirous of reform must
operate in either one of two ways. One option - the Polish -
is co-optation by the Soviets in return for a higher status
and some policy maneuverability within the framework of
Soviet hegemony. This option risks not only domestic
instability but also the danger that the Soviets will not
take the individual country's problems into sufficient
account when pursuing Soviet interests. The other option —
the Romanian — is to adopt a nationalist position asserting
equality and the right to pursue national policies and
positions. This second option risks both exclusion from
bloc affairs and Soviet intervention, invasion, or occupa-
tion. The result is that any attempt by an Eastern European
regime to complicate its identity, play different political
roles, or to reform its policies or programs must remain a
. . . . . 290
very high-risk venture.
Relative to the Soviet Union, it seems increasingly
clear that powerful forces within the CPSU view polycentric
tendencies in Europe with grave misgivings. Soviet acquies-
cence in the "dismantling" of European communism would
signal a retreat from the ideological goal of world revolu-
tion, from the invincible, historic progress of Marxism-





voluntarily from a regime steeped in ideology; and if it
did, such a move just might convince radicals in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa that China was, indeed, the sole, legiti-
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mate spokesman for world revolution. Further, any
significant "liberalization" in Eastern Europe could threaten
both COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. This latter organization,
which can be considered a Stalinist revival of the old
Tsarist ambition to secure the western flanks of Russia by
developing its own imperial cordon sanitaire , serves two
important functions. First it denies the use and control
of the region to all non-communist forces and secondly, it
provides non-Soviet land and bases for any offensive actions
that may be contemplated in Western Europe. Given its
importance to the CPSU, no actions that would threaten the
Warsaw Pact are likely to be tolerated by the Soviet Union.
The CPSU also suffers from the fact that it has not
demonstrated the ability to change and adapt. As Paul
Cocks correctly states, much of Soviet history has been a
"frenzied workshop attempting to rationalize the Soviet
system and to overcome the inheritance and consequences
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of the October Revolution." History has provided few
examples of reforming bureaucracies capable of changing from
291Groth, Eastern Europe after Czechoslovakia
, pp. 53-54
292Paul Cocks, "The Rationalization of Party Control,"
in Change in Communist Systems , Chalmers Johnson, ed.,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 183.
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within and even fewer of totalitarian dictatorships accom-
plishing these same tasks. The aims of the Soviet rationali-
zation have been to preserve the substance of totalitarian
power while perfecting its methods, in effect erecting an
"administered society: totalitarianism without terror." 293
There has been no substantial change in the attitudes of
the CPSU's leadership about the necessity for continuous
control and those changes that have occurred have been
quantitative rather than qualitative. The Soviet system
is designed so that "not one Communist remains outside the
field of vision of the party organization and beyond
294
comradely control."
Needless to say, impacts from the West also put con-
straints upon the amount and the direction of liberalization
the Soviets are willing to tolerate. The Western policy
of bridge-building only strengthens the Soviet conviction
that it must increase its Warsaw Pact and internal organi-
295
zational cohesion and political uniformity. Additionally,
any kind of "spin-off" from Eurocommunism developing in
Eastern Europe would most likely result in Soviet leaders
and their hardline colleagues in Eastern Europe simply
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Assuming Eurocommunism will ease life in Eastern Europe —
any more than has the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act — is
little more than a vain hope lodged in the hearts of Western
296democrats.
In light of all this speculation, opinion, data, fact,
and experience, what then is the West to anticipate, in the
long-term, regarding the Soviet responses to the myriad of
challenges posed to it by the Eurocommunist parties? First,
the CPSU will undoubtedly continue its anti-revisionist
polemics in the quickly fading hope that they can rekindle
the revolutionary spirit within these parties. If nothing
else, the CPSU may hope to split the Eurocommunist parties
into pro-Soviet and nationally-oriented factions such as
has occurred in the Nordic states of Western Europe. In
any event, the CPSU will continue, for the moment, to be
privately opposed to active and influential Eurocommunist
participation in national governments since such participa-
tion, if successful, could pose a serious threat to stability
in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself by offering a
socialist "model" at strong variance with the system
currently professed and practiced by the CPSU.
Should these efforts fail to blunt the Eurocommunist
impact within Eastern Europe and the USSR, one could reasonably
296 See Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, Eurocommunism, pp. 32-33.
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expect the CPSU, in order to preserve its hegemony in
Eastern Europe and its legitimacy at home, to move to read
the Eurocommunist parties out of the world communist move-
ment; an effort made in concert with as many "pro-Soviet"
communist parties as possible. By publicly denying that
the Eurocommunist parties are "true" communist parties,
asserting that they have degenerated into social-democratic
opportunists practicing anti-Sovietism and pluralistic
democracy, the CPSU would owe them no more than it currently
owes to such traitors as Mao Tse Tung or Enver Hoxa. Because
of the Eurocommunist committment to working within the
democratic system, jettisoning the dogmas of democratic
centralism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, proletarian
internationalism, and the Leninist party model, an effective
Soviet-sponsored propaganda campaign designed to portray
the Eurocommunists as no longer communist parties would be
quite simple to formulate and carry out. Indeed, the first
steps of such a program may have already been initiated,
beginning with the Novotny, Zaradov, and Masherov pronounce-
ments in 1975, the amplifications of their assessments by
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Zhivkov in 1976, and culminating
thus far in the declarations of the March 1977 conference in
Sofia and Bilak's characterization of the Eurocommunists as
traitors engaged in "unprincipled and treacherous policies."
Elements of the ruling elites of the Soviet bloc have evi-
dently recognized that what Eurocommunism represents is not
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simply a "fundamentally different strategy" but an altogether
"different conception of socialism, " with all that that
297
entails. Given the increased din of Soviet and Soviet-
inspired polemics, the eventual dismissal of the Eurocommunist
parties from the world communist movement seems highly
probable, although its timing remains a significantly open
issue.
Simultaneous with the "excommunication" of the offending
parties from the communist movement, the West can reasonably
be expected to witness increased efforts within the USSR
and Eastern Europe designed to further suppress internal
dissent and unrest. The Soviets are likely to insist upon
unbending ideological purity within the ranks of the Eastern
European parties, and the governments will be subjected to
"comradely persuasion" in order to insure that they toe
tightly to the prescribed Soviet line. The Sofia conference
was certainly one attempt in this direction, as have been
the developing "hardline" policies of East Germany and
2 98Bulgaria; policies strongly reminiscent of Stalinist tenets.
Judging from recent CPSU statements and actions, this
tightening-up policy has most likely already begun. The
strong buildup of Soviet military forces in Central Europe
297Christian Science Monitor
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may indicate the full fury this campaign may reach in the
future should advice, persuasion, and pressure fail to
achieve the desired ends.
What is frightening to consider is that the repression
of revisionism may not be sufficient to stifle the dissent
and unrest that is currently building just under the surface
in Eastern Europe, and quite possibly inside the USSR itself
As a result, it is certainly plausible to envision an
escalation of suppression by the CPSU even to the point
of intervention and invasion similar to the 1968 occupation
of Czechoslovakia. A recent interview with Jiri Pelikan,
the Listy editor, speaks directly to this point:
PELIKAN : The government has reacted — so
far to a limited extent — with detentions
and arrests. It seems to me that we are
still in a waiting period, however. If I
may put it in very simple terms, I believe
that the regime could make concessions — if
you like, detente gestures. If it does not,
the possibility of explosions of discontent
cannot be ruled out, not only in Czechoslo-
vakia, but above all in Poland. Frankly,
I maintain that the situation in Eastern
bloc countries is as dramatic as in 1956
and 1968, on the eve of the events in Poznan
and Prague. .
.
... To survive, this system is forced to change
nothing and prefers to defend itself stubbornly
against every form of dissent and against
every innovative initiative...
... If a Czech were to promote the ideas of
Berlinguer, Marchais, or Carrillo, he would
be thrown in jail...
INTERVIEWER: Might Soviet reaction follow the
lines of 1968?
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PELIKAN: If it were just Czechoslovakia,
intervention is always possible. But . .
.
if, paraphrasing Che Guevara, there were
one, two, or three "springs" tomorrow,
then simultaneous intervention would
certainly be impossible. Even the USSR
is no longer what it was in 1968... 2 ^9
The significant point Pelikan raises is that without
concessions, dissent and unrest will continue and could
lead to massive, popular uprisings against the regimes in
power. As both this report and Pelikan 's interview assert,
these concessions are not likely to be made since they
would undermine the prestige, power, and legitimacy of the
regimes which made them. Although it is true that the USSR
of 1977 is not the USSR of 1968, it is difficult to believe,
given the magnitude of the issues involved and the interests
of the Soviet state, that the CPSU would at all hesitate
in using military force if the very basis and structure of
that state were threatened. The Soviets would most likely
move as they saw the first "spring" develop and not wait
around for numbers two and three to flower. They would be
obliged to take advantage of indecision and confusion while
it lasts; the less unity, decisiveness and purpose exhibited
by the regimes in Eastern Europe, the less likely is the
chance of meaningful armed resistance.
299L'Europeo
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The Soviet ability to control Eastern Europe is essen-
tial to its world role; it is the Soviets' military and
political forefield. There are 21 Soviet divisions in East
Germany, 5 in Czechoslovakia, 4 in Hungary, and 2 in Poland.
The supply line to the divisions in East Germany also runs
through Poland. There are at least 9,000 tanks assigned to
that combined force, with over 10,000 more backing them up
west of the Urals. This enormous force facing Western
Europe is a powerful political weapon, causing in some
Western minds defeatism, in others hopelessness. Some
Western European statesmen even talk about Europe's "Fin-
alndization" — meaning a Western Europe fatalistically
giving up any idea of resisting Soviet domination. A
strong Warsaw Pact under Soviet control is a tremendous
political weapon as long as it appears solid, reliable,
and there.
Control of Eastern Europe is also vital to the USSR in
terms of economic value . It is naive to believe that the
Soviet state would give up its economic advantages in that
region willingly, as it would have to do if it opened
Eastern Europe to strong Western political and economic
influences.
Finally, the same ideological dogmas and power relation-
ships which support and legitimize the regimes in Eastern
300Christian Science Monitor, 1 February 1977, p. 27
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Europe also support and legitimize the CPSU as well. To
grant the demanded concessions or to grant the "importation"
of Eurocommunist ideology would be tantamount to the CPSU's
admission that its rule was illegitimate, its shibboleths
myths, its ideology no longer relevant, and its power and
prestige a baseless sham. If even one nation broke from
the "fraternal brotherhood," the rest would quickly attempt
to follow. For the CPSU, it would be like opening Pandora's
Box.
Thus, the stakes are high, and inaction will only
increase the risks involved in later action. Because of
the inherent inflexibility of the Soviet system, the CPSU
can only respond with the tools it has used since the
October Revolution — an escalating implementation of per-
suasion, repression, suppression, intervention, and occupa-
tion . At present, the CPSU does not have to concern itself
with the possibility of NATO/U.S. counter-intervention;
there is little enthusiasm in Washington or Western Europe
for armed action on behalf of the "captive Eastern European
nations." Additionally, unrest and dissidence will continue
to grow unless action to curb it is initiated quickly to
defuse and control it.
The present upsurge of opposition to some of the communist
regimes in Central Europe does not, at first, have the
makings of a major crisis — but major crises develop out of
small ones. There is considerable potential for upheaval
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and the CPSU is more aware of it than the West could ever
hope to be. Nationalist pressures in Eastern Europe have
overthrown two empires in this century, Turkey and Austro-
Hungary, whose death throes triggered a major war. The
clash between Soviet domination and East European nationalism
has led to substantial use of armed force three times since
World War II, in Berlin, in Budapest, and in Prague. It
would be totally unrealistic to assume that such clashes
can never reoccur. According to a recent Brookings study,
the situation in Eastern Europe will remain potentially
unstable until the Soviet leaders reconcile themselves to
a greater degree of Eastern European autonomy and pluralism.
The CPSU, however, will most likely not permit this autonomy
and pluralism to "infect" Eastern Europe. If persuasion
fails to bring the recalcitrant parties and peoples into
line, then force can and will be the most apparent alternative;
the stakes for the CPSU will be too high to allow for the
active consideration of a less emphatic option.
It is often postulated that the Eurocommunist-Eastern
Europe connection will have an opportunity to flower during
the Kremlin's leadership struggle following Brezhnev's
departure from power. Proponents of this scenario point
to the post-Stalin experiences in Hungary and the post-Khruschev
301The Washington Post , 26 January 1977, p. 32
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experiences in Czechoslovakia to support their proposition.
If Brezhnev were to die suddenly or become the victim of
a purge, as was Khruschev, the ensuing struggle for power
within the Kremlin could indeed loosen the constraints in
Eastern Europe and provide a stimulus for reform and
liberalization. But the final outcomes of the Hungarian
and Czechoslovak experiences should adequately demonstrate
the fate that a third such attempt would incur. Additionally,
the ramifications of the leadership struggles of the 1950 's
and 1960's are not known and appreciated only in the West;
the Soviets, too, are most assuredly aware of the difficul-
ties that arose in their cordon sanitaire while the factions
fought for power in Moscow. Although a Brezhnev purge is
highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, his death is
certainly a possibility, as is his voluntary retirement
from office. In either case, the possibility that a post-
Brezhnev power struggle could occur would give the CPSU
leaders an even greater motivation to defuse and control
dissidence and unrest at home and in Eastern Europe now —
before such a struggle took place. Allowing a Warsaw Pact
ally to "stray" during a post-Brezhnev struggle could force
the CPSU into a larger confrontation bloodier than either
Czechoslovakia or Hungary, especially if the nation that
strayed were Poland. Finally, there have only been three
leadership changes in the history of the Soviet state, the
successions of Stalin, Khruschev, and Brezhnev. These three
events are far too few to support generalizations about
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succession in the Soviet Union. Although post-Brezhnev
problems may occur, a smooth, if not prearranged transition
could also take place with a minimum of impact upon Soviet
policies and/or Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
There is, then, within the responses of the CPSU to
the challenges of the Eurocommunist parties to be little
cooperation, only growing confrontation leading to the
eventual expulsion of the Eurocommunist parties from the
world communist movement. This third schism will arouse
more bitterness and polemic than the previous breaks with
China and Yugoslavia and will coincide with a simultaneous
move by the CPSU to purge the USSR and Eastern Europe of
any revisionism or opportunism that threatens the prescribed
Soviet model of socialism. Should the methods employed
by the CPSU fail to achieve their objectives, the West
can expect direct Soviet military intervention in at least
one "limitedly sovereign" nation in Eastern Europe. Detente
may suffer some critical blows, and East-West trade and
aid may simply whither. The open, direct, and forceful
Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of these small,
reform-minded nations will surely disillusion more people,
again stiffen the resistance of the faltering West, and
(ironically) nournish more dissidence and unrest in Eastern
Europe.
But the CPSU will have had little choice - their system
provides them with too few options. Change and adaptation
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would have meant a serious challenge to the legitimacy,
power, and prestige of the Soviet state. Totalitarian
and authoritarian regimes seldom if ever end of their own
volition; their demise usually comes about as a result of
internal conflict or external attack. In the absence of
either, they may last for centuries. Having recently
achieved a military force capable of detering virtually
any external attack, the CPSU now can be reasonably expected
to turn its attention to dissent and unrest within its
empire. To paraphrase Massimo Salvadori, since the CPSU
recognizes neither differentiation nor the legitimacy of
deviation and opposition, what is different is either error
or evil. If error, it is to be corrected; if evil, to
w j . , 302be destroyed!
302Salvadori, Rise of Modern Communism, p. 159
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